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ABSTRACT 
A study of the Green paradox  
in Dynamic Oligopolies:  
Theories and Merger Control Policy 
by 
OSPANOVA Aida 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Aiming to reduce the environmental damage and to ensure the energy security, 
more and more attention has been paid to the development of the renewable sources 
of energy, such as wind, solar, biofuels, etc. Indeed, as expected by the World Bank, 
World Energy Outlook 2017, the demand for fossil fuel, especially for the coal, would 
gradually decrease by 2040.  
However, the non-renewable producers anticipating the decline in the demand 
for the non-renewable energy and the threat of the stringent environmental policies in 
the foreseeing future would respond by accelerating current extraction. This 
phenomenon in the existing literature is called the Green paradox. 
This research contributes to the Green paradox literature by studying the 
strategic behaviour of the incumbent fossil fuel firms in oligopoly markets. I 
constructed a two-period game-theoretical model, whereas, renewable energy 
producer enters in the second period with a horizontally differentiated product and 
compete with the incumbent traditional energy producer(s). I show that the emergence 
of the phenomenon of the Green paradox depends basically on two factors: the existing 
market structure of the incumbent fossil fuel firm(s) and the amount of the existing 
resource stock.   
In particular, I found that if the initial resource stock is large enough, then in 
the subgame perfect equilibrium of the model, the entry of the new energy will not 
raise current emission under the monopoly market structure, but under duopoly or 
oligopoly in general, such entry might provoke Green paradox. In other words, the 
availability of the incumbent rival(s) under oligopoly generates a negative externality 
to other firms, who also attempt to maximize its benefits, when shifting future 
exploration to the current stage, which is not the case for a monopoly firm. 
My research further explores possible ways of overcoming Green Paradox. I 
found that the merger might be welfare maximizing under particular conditions, i.e. it 
is beneficial for the society to allow the existing fossil fuel duopoly to merge. The 
merger to a monopoly can help to mitigate the problem of Green paradox, thereby 
reducing the environmental damages in the first period when renewable energy is not 
yet available.  
This research, thus, extends the existing literature of the merger control which 
considers exclusively competition issues and has overlooked, to the best of my 
knowledge, the possibility of Green paradox.  The merger of the incumbent fossil fuel 
firms may increase the long-term social welfare, by mitigating Green Paradox to the 
extent that such benefit more than outweighs the loss in competition in the traditional 
energy sector. 
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Chapter. 1. Introduction. 
1.1 Motivation and the purpose of the study. 
Combating global warming is the most important concern facing the global 
community. It is considered that early effective and urgent actions are necessary.  
According to the Kyoto Protocol, and later to the Paris Agreement, the majority 
of the countries has been approved the course towards a gradual reduction of the use 
of the non-renewable energy. Many countries have been already adopted stringent 
environmental policies of the gradual decline of the current and future emissions, cap-
and-trade systems, which over time is expected to be tightened. Such worldwide 
announcement of the environmental incentives towards a transition from the 
conventional to the less harmful sources of energy is expected to induce faster 
development of new clean technologies and the gradual replacement by the 
environmentally friendly sources of energy.  
However, according to the arguments of Sinn (2008), these environmental 
policies are might be even more destructive for the environment. The author argues 
that these measures might have the opposite effect. Indeed, the concentration of the 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere depends on the extraction, which in turn depends on 
the demand and supply of the non-renewable energy.   
The supply side reacts to these initiatives in the following way. The anticipated 
improvement in the cost efficiency and rising competitiveness of the new renewable 
energy would be reflected in the amendment in the behavior of the existing non-
renewable resource firms. The non-renewable producers anticipating the decline in the 
demand for the non-renewable energy, stringency of the environmental policies in the 
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foreseeing future would respond by accelerating current extraction. This phenomenon 
is coined by professor Sinn as the Green paradox. 
Sinn (2008) argues that under the anticipation of the tax rise and the entry of 
the alternative energy in the industry, the fossil fuel suppliers, aiming to maximize 
private benefits, would speed up current extraction. The rise of the current supply 
would decrease current price of fossil fuels, increase the current emission levels and 
generated environmental damage.  
Indeed, despite the ongoing environmental policies, the recent trend in carbon 
emissions does not look promising. The data, published by the Global Carbon Project, 
showed that the carbon emissions of 2018 were increased, and the bad news is that the 
carbon emission has not reached its peak yet1. This trend inevitably would lead to 
significant deterioration of climate change, the temperature’s anomalies and have a 
negative socio-economic impact on society. The multiple studies found significant 
adverse effect on the human health, including the health of the infants, productivity’s 
decline, adverse effect of the climate change on the earnings and wellbeing, such as 
Fishman et al (2019), Dell et all (2012), 2 Chen et al (2018)3, Zhang et al  (2018).4 
Based on the extensive literature on the phenomenon of Green paradox, there 
might be identified the combination of the factors, which trigger the emergence of the 
 
1 The widely known concept of the Peak oil stated that the use of oil should reach its peak at some 
point of time. The International Energy Agency (2013) predicted that the peak of oil might happen 
before the 2030.  
2 The study found using the cross country analyses that the temperature rise negatively affects economic 
growth of only poor countries. The robust evidence about the role of the temperature rise in developed 
countries on economic growth was not found. 
3 The authors explored the role of air pollution on the health conditions and the school attendance in 
Chinese schools. They found that air pollution provokes respiratory illnesses which affects school 
attendance in China. The study further reveals the necessity for developing countries to take action and 
adopt the pollution abatement costs to alleviate the negative effect of air pollution on school attendance.  
4 This study found an adverse effect of the temperature rise on the productivity of Chinese manufacturing 
plants. Moreover, the study claimed that the temperature rise might negatively affect productivity of the 
Chinese manufacturing industry by decreasing the output level by 12% annually. 
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Green paradox.  Firstly, it is a binding resource stock of non-renewable energy. 
Secondly, stringent environmental policies, such as emission trading schemes, carbon 
taxes, emission taxes. Thirdly, the entry of renewable energy, which is presented as a 
perfect substitute or closely substitutable energy to the conventional source of energy. 
In the literature, the term “clean backstop” is used to describe this type of renewable 
energy without no capacity or resource constraints. 
Besides, any government subsidies or incentives from both the manufacturing 
firms and government, such as R&D, to the new clean backstop affects the occurrence 
of the Green paradox: Grafton et all (2014), Rajagopal, et all (2011). The rise of the 
number of renewable firms would further stimulate the emergence of Green paradox 
which was shown by Grafton et all (2012).  
The vast literature about the Green paradox concentrated mostly on the on 
perfect competition and, hence, not in strategic settings under oligopoly market 
structure. Indeed, the existence of the Green paradox phenomenon was checked only 
for the perfect competition by van der Ploeg & Withagen (2012), van der Ploeg (2016), 
Hoel (2010), Gerlagh, (2011) and others.  
Furthermore, the reserves of the natural resources are restraint over time by the 
amount of the resources in situ5 6. The owners of the resources face the co-called 
intertemporal capacity constraint7, which they need to allocate within the given 
numbers of periods to get the maximum pay-off. The strategic interaction between the 
 
5 The reserves of conventional oil according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) International 
Energy Outlook 2017 (IEO2017) may exhaust by 2050. The reserves of the unconventional oil do not take into 
considerations by the Green paradox theory. 
6 The reserves of the shale oil are projected to be abundant, despite costly 
 Forbes.com. (2019). How Much Oil Does the World Have Left?. [online] Available at: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2015/06/25/how-much-oil-does-the-world-have-left/#627bc2175b1f 
[Accessed 2 Aug. 2019]. 
7 The term intertemporal capacity constraint uses to describe the resource constraint, which would be 
exhausted within the given period of time. 
 4 
incumbent firms is aggregated by the entry of clean energy, which would further affect 
both current and future fossil fuel supply. In particular, as long as the fossil fuel firm(s) 
is restrained by the resource stock availability, each incumbent firm would need to 
make a decision, taking into account the number of the existing and potential rivals’, 
their sales strategies, resource stock availability and how current sales strategies affect 
future sales and profits.  
The first key contribution of this thesis is to gain an understanding of how the 
emergence of the Green paradox is prone to the different combinations of the existing 
market structures, competition, and the resource stock availability. In order to show the 
role of the competition in the emergence of the Green paradox, I would distinguish two 
cases. At first, I would set up the two-time period model for the single incumbent firm 
with and without anticipation of the new entry. Secondly, I would consider the dynamic 
Cournot oligopoly in which incumbent firms anticipate the entry of the new firm.  
The novelty of this part of my work is to fill in the gap by examining the 
emergence of the Green paradox in the dynamic Cournot oligopoly. To my knowledge, 
this study is the first to address the impact of the intertemporal resource constraint and 
the anticipation of the entry of the new energy on the strategic behavior of the 
incumbent firm/firms, and its implication for the Green paradox theory.  
I found that the emergence of the phenomenon of Green paradox depends 
basically on two factors: the existing market structure of the incumbent fossil fuel firms 
and the amount of the existing resource stock. To prove this, I compared the results of 
the two market structure cases: single fossil fuel producer and the fossil fuel duopoly, 
under the anticipation of the entry of single firm, producing the renewable energy.  
The results showed that if the resource stock is large enough, then in the 
subgame perfect equilibrium of the model, the entry of the new energy does not raise 
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current emission under the monopoly market structure, but under duopoly or oligopoly 
in general, such entry provokes Green paradox. In other words, the competition in the 
traditional energy market generates negative externalities for the existing firms. Each 
conventional energy firm, induced by the entry, would reallocate part of the 2nd period 
extraction towards current period, taking into account the corresponding increase in the 
current production by the rest incumbent firm(s).  Therefore, to gain higher total profit, 
each firm(s) would have to rise the 1st period output and, as a result, strengthen the 
Green paradox, which is not the case for the incumbent monopoly.  
Secondly, an important contribution of this paper flows from the obtained 
results about the conditions under which the Green paradox occurs. As long as the 
Green paradox become more prominent under existing competition in the traditional 
energy market, I would show that the deliberate antitrust policies, which encounter the 
environmental protection, might help to reduce the current concentration in the 
traditional energy market and might be an effective treatment to combat the climate 
change. However, the caveat is that the implementation of these policies might meet 
the resistance due to existing trade-off for the policymaker: either enhance the 
economic activity and maximize the consumer welfare either take into account the 
environmental considerations or/and reduce concentration in the energy industry. 
As the practice shows, the governmental policies to enhance the economic 
activity either relax the environmental standard either neglect environmental concerns, 
which negatively affects competition.  
These tactics of the governmental policies described in the literature as part of 
the “race-to-the-bottom” theory.8 The government, provoked by the increasing 
 
8 For the details see Koninsky (2007), Kunce&Shogren (2005). 
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competition with the other states, are forced to implement the minimum low criteria 
for the environmental standards, which would not affect anymore the competitiveness 
in the related industries. Indeed, stringent environmental policies would decrease the 
numbers of active firms, raises the price of the products and decrease the total consumer 
surplus. Moreover, it might deter potential entry for new companies.  
In contrast, there are the arguments, stated by the “Porter hypothesis”. It says 
that the decrease of the concentration after the enforcement of stringent environmental 
policies is the sign, that these firms were not efficient. The authors of the theory viewed 
the generated negative environmental externalities as the inefficient use of the 
resources. They argue that soon or later those firms would quit the industry and 
environmental policies just would speed up the process.  
Therefore, in the existing literature the impact of the environmental policies on 
the competition was considered, but to my knowledge, not vice versa, namely, the 
causal relationship between the anti-trust policies and the environment protection. In 
particular, how the merger between the resource-selling firms would help to mitigate 
Green paradox and the importance of the inclusion of environmental concern in the 
implementation of antitrust policies.  
I found that merger would enhance the social welfare through the decline of 
concentration in the traditional energy industry and therefore, would help to reduce 
current extraction and environmental damage. The anticipated entry of the non-
renewable energy would speed up emissions and environmental damage in both current 
and future periods under the existing duopoly market structure. On the other hand, 
given a particular amount of the reserves in situ, the merged firm would escape the 
Green paradox phenomenon. This would help to avoid the increase of the current 
negative environmental externalities due to anticipating the entry of the new firm. 
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Therefore, as long as the benefits of the reduced negative externalities would be higher 
than the benefits of the retention of the concentration in the fossil fuel market, the 
merger would maximize total social welfare.  
 
1.2. Literature review. 
1.2.1. Green paradox theory 
 
The definition of the Green paradox was first introduced by (Sinn, 2008). The 
author was concerned about the effect of the stringent environmental policies on the 
current extraction. The introduction of the stringent environmental regulations, as 
proposed by Sinn, would cut the future demand for conventional energy sources. The 
shrinking of the future demand for fossils would have a response from the supply side. 
For instance, even in the absence of the alternative energy, the announcement of the 
future tax rise would provoke the fossil’s owners to compensate for the future losses 
and speed up extraction today.  
The debate was supported by the vast emerging literature about the emergence 
of the Green paradox and the role of the environmental policies in strengthening the 
climate change issues. Hoel (2010) further investigated how amendment of the 
anticipated carbon taxes and the investments to renewable energy would speed up 
current emissions. He used the two-time period model of the aggregate economy under 
the perfect competition.  
The author found that to combat the Green paradox, the socially optimal tax 
should rise strictly at a lower rate than the discount rate. The influence of the 
anticipation of the future carbon tax for the rate of extraction would depend on the 
sensitivity of the cost of extraction to the total extraction. The faster the costs of 
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extraction would rise, the faster the carbon extraction would occur. Furthermore, he 
evaluates the role of the subsidies for renewable energy; where he defined that the rate 
of the injections of investments in carbon substitutes would depend on the returns to 
investments.  
 Another influential finding was made by Gerlagh (2011). He separated the term 
“Green paradox” into “weak” and “strong” Green paradoxes. The author defined weak 
Green paradox as anticipation of improvement in backstop technology that leads to the 
rise of the emissions. A strong Green paradox means an increase in oil extraction 
resulting in a rise of the marginal global damage. The major aim of his research was to 
show the conditions under which the anticipation of the alternative sources of energy 
would make Green paradox less likely. As the framework, infinite horizon models 
under the perfect competition of fossils with constant and increasing extraction costs, 
considering alternative energy both as a perfect backstop and imperfect backstop.  
The results showed that in general perfect backstops might reduce the climate 
damages in reducing the demand for the fossils. However, in the case with constant 
extraction costs the presence of the backstops as a perfect substitute makes both weak 
and strong Green paradox inevitable. And if the clean backstop is not a perfect 
substitute, the threat of the Green paradox would disappear. 
Next, the study of van der Ploeg & Withagen (2012) were concentrated on 
defining the welfare analysis under the threat of the Green paradox and when it's 
optimal to switch from the fossil fuel to the clean backstop. They assume that the clean 
substitute costs evolving, becoming cheaper and the social costs of the fossils, in the 
opposite, become higher with the additional damage generated.  
They found that the stock of the non-renewable resources, the extraction costs, 
the value of the social damage and the costs of renewable energy is crucial in defining 
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the correct period of transition. The faster the renewable become competitive and 
available, the future emissions would decrease, and the effect of renewable energy on 
global warming becomes unclear.  Relatively costly backstops would decrease Green 
welfare. 
The study by the Rezai & van der Ploeg (2013) defined that the social optimum 
might be achieved if the government would allocate aggressive subsidies to the 
development of clean energy. They assumed that this would allow bringing closer the 
use of renewable energy. The damage for global warming, in this case, would be 
minimum.  
Another finding was made by Ploeg (2016), where the main focus was to define 
the first-best and second-best taxation for the two-country setting. The author revisited 
the socially optimal taxation for the case when there is carbon leakage and grey paradox 
exist. The author showed that the first-best tax for the two-country setting should be 
equal to the social costs of carbon. Announcing higher carbon tax in the future would 
boost current oil demand and carbon emissions. This effect is stronger if the price 
elasticities of current and future oil demand are large and those of oil exploration and 
oil supply are small. The anticipated carbon tax will be bare by the oil producer, 
decreasing producer price, motivating them to increase the current flow of resources 
and strengthening weak Green paradox.  
 The effect of the subsidies for the biofuels on the termination date of the fossil 
fuels was studied by Grafton et al. (2012). The major contribution of the study is to 
show how the subsidies for renewable energy would affect Green paradox under a 
different set of marginal costs for renewable and conventional energies. Both energy 
sources assumed to use simultaneously with the exception that it has different costs of 
production. For instance, when the marginal costs of the fossil fuel are zero, but the 
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marginal costs of the biofuels rise despite the increase of the government subsidies, 
then the biofuels would not affect the extraction rates of the fossil fuel. Changing the 
assumption about the marginal costs of fossil fuel to constant marginal costs does not 
change the results, and the extraction path of fossils does not change. However, the 
Green paradox would arise if the marginal costs of the biofuels would follow the 
economies of scale; then, the fossil fuel suppliers would speed up the extraction. The 
subsidies would decrease the price of the renewable and encourage the substitution 
from the non-renewable energy. Consequently, the price for the fossil fuels would 
decrease and the demand for the fossil fuels would increase, then the renewable energy 
would be less competitive and less consumed, given that the two sources are currently 
in use. 
The Gronwald et al. (2017) criticized the view that the renewables resources 
such as biofuel are perfect substitutes for the non-renewable carbon resources. 
Moreover, the transition from non-renewable carbon energy meets the resistance from 
society in various countries, in particular in Europe.9 
The analysis considered the backstops and non-renewable energy as a perfect 
substitute but with the reservation that there are technological and political constraints 
of further increase of the capacity of renewables. Moreover, they extended the theory 
of the Green paradox by introducing the extreme Green paradox. The concept of the 
extreme Green paradox is that the ill-conceived Green policies decline social welfare.  
 
9 In Germany and the UK, the installation of the capacity increasing wind generators met the resistance 
from the local communities. For further information see Clean Energy Wire. (2019). Limits to growth: 
Resistance against wind power in Germany. [online] Available at: 
https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/fighting-windmills-when-growth-hits-resistance 
[Accessed 3 Aug. 2019]. 
 
 11 
The key contribution of this study is to put the constrained capacity of the clean 
energy industry output and test how subsidies for the clean energy as well as the 
subsidies for the increase of the capacity of the clean energy will affect the global 
warming. The dynamic model developed based on the perfectly competitive market 
conditions with a restricted capacity of the backstop’s output and the restricted number 
of available subsidies and in the absence of the carbon taxes. The findings generally 
confirmed the results obtained before in the literature and stated that the green policies 
lead to Green paradox. 
 The well-intended but badly designed climate policies are harmful as seen from 
the Green paradox theory perspective and lead to unexpected outcomes such as the 
carbon leakage and the Grey paradox.10 The Coulomb & Henriet (2014), van der Ploeg 
& Withagen (2012), Michielsen (2014) were investigated the case of the emerging 
theory that the Green Paradox theory exaggerates the negative consequences of the oil 
and gas. Being less emission-intensive, the price of oil and gas will affect less compare 
to the unconventional oil and coal, reducing emission from abundant and dirty coal and 
unconventional oil.  
Rittenhouse and Zaragoza-Watkins (2018) evaluated how the anticipation of 
the stringent environmental regulations would affect the behavior of the firms in the 
transportation sector in the United States of America. They proved empirically that the 
anticipation of the new environmental regulation would increase the sales of the new 
standard trucks right after the announcement of the new standard issued. 
Other findings of the emergence of the Green paradox stated that the stringent 
environmental policies do not always lead to intertemporal leakage. The 
 
10 The term “Grey paradox” is referred to as the phenomenon that the stringent environmental policies 
would harm only producers of highly carbon-intensive fossil fuels, such as coal. And the owners of the 
oil and gas would only benefit from the increase of the carbon tax rates. 
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Eichner&Pethig (2011) assumed that not all countries commit to the Kyoto protocol 
and do not tackle the reduction of the emission level in the foreseeing future. Then, 
there are two types of countries, with high environmental standard and low 
environmental standard. They found that the tightening of the carbon ceiling in 
environmentally clean countries in later period do not always provoke the Green 
paradox. This would just reallocate the emissions between abating and non-abating 
countries.  The carbon emissions would flow to the non-abating countries.  However, 
their model was abstracted from the technological improvement in the renewable 
energy market.  
The Strand (2013) first attempted to evaluate how the different types of 
environmental policies affect climate change. The author found that if the world 
consists of two blocks: importing fossil fuel and the policy block, which implemented 
either a cap-and-trade system or carbon taxes. His findings stated that the policymaker 
in fuel importing countries would prefer a carbon tax over the cap-and-trade system. 
It’s because the fuel importers would charge less price compare to the cap-and-trade 
system. Under the cap-and-trade system, the demand for fossils would become less 
sensitive, and the fossil fuel importers would charge a higher price.  
The results on the effect of subsidies, in general, stated that allocations of the 
subsidies would further increase the current emission. Such findings, for instance, was 
defined by the Jarke and Perino (2017). The authors showed that the subsidies for 
renewable energy would increase the carbon emissions even under conditions that the 
electricity sector is under cap-and-trade system. The reason is the inter-industry 
leakage. The imposed environmental policies on one sector, such as electricity, would 
affect demand for the fossil fuels in other polluting industries, transportation, and the 
agriculture sectors.  
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The stringent environmental protection was at first encountered by the 
resistance. Indeed, this would lead to a decrease in economic activity. The government 
constrained by the pressure from the society instead of adopting adequate measures to 
decrease the environmental damage would be forced to adopt the laxest environmental 
regulations, the so-called “race-to-the-bottom. 
On the other hand, not only the environmental concern but the private benefits 
might lead to stringent political regulations. The Grey (2018) developed the model 
where the firms would seek for the stringent environmental regulations to increase its 
market share. He assumes that some share of the firms, to maximize its benefits, already 
invested in the development of clean technology, abatement equipment. By lobbing the 
government to implement stringent environmental policies they might outperform their 
rivals and increase profits. Furthermore, consumers also might change their preferences 
towards environmentally friendly goods. The environmentally consciousness 
consumers might affect the firms’ incentives to voluntary invest in cleaner technology 
as long as the liability for the emitting carbon damage is not too high.  
Since my work related to the strategic interactions of the non-renewable firm 
under intertemporal resource constraint and the new clean backstop, I would turn to the 
existing literature in this area. There is an extensive source of literature on strategic 
interactions between the resource owned firms when capacities are either endogenously 
or exogenously given, and firms compete either on price or quantity. For instance,  
Osborne & Pitchik, (1986) and Shubik & Levitan, (1972) model the strategic duopoly 
behavior of renewable firms, where the firms compete in prices under the binding 
capacity constraints.  
The closest work to my thesis is studied by the van der Berg et al (2012). The 
authors in their work developed the model where the supply decision of the dynamic 
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duopoly in the two-time period model depends on the intertemporal capacity constraint. 
The main features of the intertemporal capacity constraint are that it affects both the 
two-time profit of the firms and the sales strategy for two periods in such way where 
the decision how to sell today depends on the future sales opportunities. The authors 
constructed the model for the profit-maximizing duopoly market structure with 
asymmetric resource constraints. Both firms compete in quantities in two periods. They 
concentrated on two cases: when firms commit to the sales output in both periods and 
when they are not. For the non-commitment case, both firms set the quantities 
simultaneously in both periods. The purpose of their research is to define the sub-game 
perfect Nash equilibrium output for the duopoly. They found that for any combination 
of the amount of the intertemporal resource constraint there is exists at least one 
subgame perfect Nah equilibrium output.  
The difference between my research and the available literature is that I assume 
the entry of the new clean energy. The entry would affect the demand for period 2 and 
therefore, the supply decision of the incumbent firms, given the intertemporal resource 
constraint, would be revisited.  
 Gaudet & Long (2002) examined how the equilibrium output of the 
nonrenewable resource duopoly would be affected by the asymmetric distribution of 
the resource constraint. They showed that the profits and the output depend on the 
initial endowment of the resource stock. Next, Besanko & Doraszelski (2007) 
evaluated the role of the capacity decision in the strategic interactions between 
asymmetric size firms with identical marginal costs for both quantity-setting and price-
setting firms. They defined that in quantity-setting oligopoly would decide to expand 
the capacities to supply Cournot-Nash equilibrium output, which would converge the 
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sizes of the existing oligopoly to symmetric sized firms. In the case of the price-setting 
oligopoly, the size of the existing firms would be asymmetric, with one dominant firm.  
 
1.2.2. Environmental protection, competition, and merger control. 
 
The anti-trust policy aims to maximize “consumer welfare.” If the consumer 
welfare corresponds to the definition of the consumer surplus, then, the rise of 
competition is the first best to maximize it.  
However, if the social welfare internalizes the negative externalities generated 
from the high concentration on the emitting industries, then social welfare is 
decreasing. And here is the dilemma for the policymaker is either implement stringent 
environmental policies and anticipate the resistance from the fossil fuel-related 
industries and the society or implement lax environmental policies and enhance the 
competition in fossil fuel and dependent industries, increase the consumer surplus. 
In the existing literature, the role of the environmental policy on competition 
and the government policies is heavily debated. Stringent environmental policies might 
hurt competition, decrease the concentration of fossil fuel-dependent industries. For 
instance, high environmental standards to pollution might raise the price of the product; 
the entry to the particular industry might be deterred. 
There is a vast literature of dependence on environmental regulations and the 
competition. The first strand explained the rationale behind government decision-
making. In order to increase economic activity, the government would choose the 
minimum level of the environmental standard. This strand of the literature described 
by the “race-to-the-bottom” theory. Originally, this theory was explaining the motives 
of the governmental regulation of the business environment in order to bust the 
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economic activity, increase the states’ competitiveness. Later, with the rising 
environmental concern, the trade-off between environmental protection and the 
competition began a new wave of discussion in the literature. The empirical study is 
two-fold: there is a debate about whether the race to the bottom is true. The  Konisky 
(2007), for instance, found that the states by choosing the environmental standard 
affected by its strategic competitor's policies.  Potoski (2001), in the opposite, found 
no evidence of the race to the bottom hypothesis while regulating the air pollution of 
the based on the data from the implementation of 1990 Clean Air Act in the United 
States of America.   
Another strand of the literature argues that we should view the problem of 
adverse effect the environmental policies on competition in a way that the stringent 
environmental regulations would not hurt the economic activity. The theory argues that 
stringent environmental policies would just eliminate inefficient companies out of the 
industry. The companies, which would be able to adopt efficiently; environmental 
friendly policies would remain. This theory is called the “Porter hypothesis” and was 
pioneered by 2 studies by M. Porter, C. van der Linde (1995, a,b). The authors viewed 
environmental pollution as the economic waste and assumed that the stringent 
environmental regulations might push the development of innovations and correct for 
distortions of the created externalities.  
The Mohr (2002) empirically supported the Porter hypothesis. The author 
defined that by the threat of the stringent environmental policies the existing companies 
would have to turn to the rapid development of the less polluting and productive R&D. 
Therefore, in the long run, the firms would rather benefit from the efficient 
implementing methods of production, rather than lost from it.  
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The Greaker (2006) studied the role of the stringency of the cap-and-trade 
system on the economic activity of the existing firms. He defined that environmental 
policies would enhance the entry to the industry of producing the abatement equipment, 
developing this industry, making the abatement equipment cheaper and affordable. 
This would increase the competitiveness of the polluting industry compare to its trading 
rivals.  
Empirically, the support of the Porter hypothesis as for the race to the bottom 
hypothesis is not ambiguous. A number of studies show that the stringent 
environmental policies might become a big push for the development of the cost-
saving, less polluting technologies in case of the European Union, such as studies by 
Constantini & Mazzanti (2012),  Stoever & Weche (2018), Kriechel & Ziesemer 
(2009).  
The results of the Stavropoulos et all (2017) in case of Chinese government’s 
policies found that the environmental policies and the technological development 
follow the U-shape relationship, showing that there is might a particular threshold, 
before that the environmental policies might have a negative effect on the 
implementation of the innovations and competitiveness. Furthermore, the Rubashkina 
& Verdolini (2015), found no empirical evidence for the support of the Porter 
Hypothesis for 17 European countries in the period from 1997 to 2009. They found 
that innovation and productivity are neutral the environmental regulations.  
Regarding the merger control, the main rule of the antitrust policies is not to 
allow the merger, which would have the anticompetitive effect. In general, the merger 
guidelines prohibited merger, if it would reduce the concentration in the relevant 
industries and, would rise the market power of the merged firms. Moreover, the merger 
control as the form of the legislation is uniform, and do not distinguish the merger 
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between the firms and do not and does not take into account the damage from 
increasing or even maintaining competition in a particular industry.  
However, some “shifts” in legislation are observed. For instance, the Japan 
approves the changes in the “Guidelines concerning the activities of trade associations 
under the antimonopoly act” from October 30, 1995 by the Fair Trade Commission and 
allows the trade associations to establish its self-regulation, which, among other things, 
do not harm the competition and might lead to the environmental conservation. 
Furthermore, the practice of the European Union and the United States of 
America showed that the firms are encouraged to be involved in the voluntary 
environmental agreements, hereinafter - VEA. The VEA is the voluntary agreement 
between the government and the corporate industry aiming to improve environmental 
quality. Under the VEA policy, the industry typically would choose the aggregate 
policy goals, which would be reflected in the agreement. However, the VEA received 
a lot of criticism that it has the anticompetitive effect for the non-joint firms.  
As I mentioned, the main aim of the antitrust Agency is to consider the mergers 
of the firms from the standpoint of their effect on the welfare of different groups and 
make the final decision based on that assessment.  The assessment most importantly 
made by the standard assigned by legislation, which is either the consumer surplus or 
welfare standard. The debate which of the standard should the anti-trust agency follow, 
namely, whether the social welfare standard surpasses the consumer surplus standard, 
is still on. 
Besanko & Spulber (1993) compared the efficiency of the consumer surplus 
standard with the welfare standard if the lobbying takes place. They found that both 
standards have their disadvantages. However, given the assumption of the asymmetry 
of the information of the marginal costs of the merging firms, the author concluded that 
 19 
the social welfare would be maximum if the agency would employ the standard with 
the consumer surplus bias.  
In particular, they found that the consumer surplus is desirable when the lobby 
takes place. The agency, guided by the consumer surplus standard would not allow the 
merger and the social welfare would be maximized. The opposite effect would arise if 
the agency would assess the welfare standard. Then, the inefficient merger would be 
allowed, and the total welfare would be lower.  
The same consumer surplus defense was found by Lyons (2002). The author 
assuming for the alternative and more efficient possibilities of the merger found that 
the firms would use the advantage to propose the merger which is beneficial for them. 
Therefore, the Agency in order to maximize social welfare should employ the most 
rigid standard – consumer surplus standard.  
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Chapter 2. The Green paradox in Monopoly fossil fuel market. 
 
The purpose of this part of my research is to show how the incumbent fossil 
fuel monopolist would allocate the renewable resources between two periods, given 
that it faces the intertemporal capacity constraint and the entry of the new renewable 
energy in period 2.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. I will start with only one single incumbent 
firm in the fossil industry and then move to the case with the entry of the new energy. 
Towards the end, I would show how the sales strategies of the incumbent monopoly 
change given a limited amount of the resource constraint and anticipated entry of the 
new firm.  
2.1. Theoretical framework. 
 
I assume, that there are two sources of energy available: polluting, which is 
fossil fuel and clean: renewable energy. In period 1, there is only dirty backstop 
available. The polluting energy presented by the one/two incumbent firm/firms in the 
fossil fuel industry.  
I abstract from the extraction costs, assuming that the incumbent and the entrant 
firms have zero marginal costs.  
The total two-period resource constraint for the fossil fuel firm is defined as 𝐴. 
I assume that the resource constraint is nonzero, and the amount of reserves is enough 
to extract the fossil fuels at least in period 1. The new clean energy is produced without 
any resource and capacity constraints. 
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Assumption 1. The resource constraint is enough to produce at least the output 
of period 1: 𝐴 ≥ ($%&)
(
	11. 
The output produced by the incumbent firm is defined as 𝑞,-, where t is the time 
period, 𝑡 − 1,2 and 𝑖 − 1,2	(𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑑𝑢𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑦	𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙).	Then, the new alternative energy 
output (clean backstop) is defined by 𝑧((. 
The inverse demand function for the single incumbent firm is 	𝑃$ = 1 −	𝑞,$ for 
period 1 and 	𝑃( = 1 −	𝑞,( when the single fossil fuel firm does not expect new entry 
to the market.  
The inverse demand changes to 𝑃((𝑞,() = 1 − 𝑞,(– γ𝑧(( , for period 2 with the 
entry of clean energy, 𝛽 = 1, 𝛽( > γ(, with the brand’s measure differentiation, 𝜌 =
EF
GF
, when 𝜌 getting closer to 1, the products become homogenous, and the 𝜌 is getting 
closer to 0, the products are highly differentiable. 
Then, the renewable firm would face the following inverse demand function: 
𝑃((𝑧(() = 1 − 𝑧(( − 𝛾𝑞,(. 
I consider fossil fuel and new energy to be a differentiated product. The 
rationale is defined from the arguments using in the existing literature. For instance, 
Pacala&Socolow (2004) argue that at the moment none of the candidates of non-
renewable energy sources can “single-handedly” replace hydrocarbons. The Hirth 
(2013) considered the wind and solar energy as the variable energy sources. The supply 
of these sources is available only in the windy or sunny days. The problem of using 
them is the storage constraints; the energy is considered as the time-heterogeneous 
good. Therefore, hydrocarbons are the primary winner in the competitive struggle with 
renewable energy sources.  
 
11 See table 1. 
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The efficiency of each resource of energy considered to be different.12 The new 
alternative energy at this moment considered less efficient compared to the non-
renewables. Besides, there is different efficiency between existing non-renewable 
sources of energy, which explains by the diminishing returns to each of the energy 
inputs. It says that the more scarce resource is, the higher its efficiency per unit 
emission it has.  
The incumbent firm(s) discounts the profit it would get in a later period. The 
discount factor 𝛿 is equal to the (1 + 𝑟)%$, where r is the discount rate. I assume that 
the discount factor is strictly 0 < 𝛿 < 1. 
In order to avoid confusion, I would separate the definitions of the output 
produced by the resource firm(s) with or without the entry of new firm. For the case 
when only traditional fossil firm producer or producers operate in the market in both 
periods I will use apostrophe «'», for the case when the fossil producers anticipate the 
entry of the new clean energy to the market, I will use simply 𝑞$(, 𝑞((, 𝑧M(.	 
From the definition of the Green paradox the current extraction is accelerated 
by the anticipation of the demand’s decline for the fossil fuels in a later period caused 
by either the stringent environmental policies, which can be expressed by exposing 
higher per unit taxes on emission, tightening cap-and-trade systems, or either by entry 
of the clean backstop, including supportive subsidies for the alternative energy sources.  
 In this part, I would address the problem when the fossil fuel firm anticipates 
the entry of the new energy; then, the Green paradox occurs if: 
q$$
∗ > q$$
∗P 
 
12 For instance, see Hortidaily.com. (2019). US: What is the most efficient source of electricity?. 
[online] Available at: https://www.hortidaily.com/article/6011458/us-what-is-the-most-efficient-
source-of-electricity/ [Accessed 4 Aug. 2019]. 
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For the single incumbent firm’s case, I would first develop a model with a single 
seller facing intertemporal resource constraint. Then, I would define how the 
incumbent fossil fuel firm would change its selling strategies by competing with the 
new entrant in period 2. In this case, using the backward induction, I would define each 
Nash equilibrium output of the subgames for the fossil fuel firm/firms given the entry 
for period 2, taking as given 1st period output.  
Next, I move to the period 1, where I would define all actions of the incumbent 
firm, which would maximize the first period output given all 2nd period subgames. 
Then, after defining all Nash equilibrium outcomes, I would select the equilibrium 
outcomes, which is the Nash equilibrium outcomes for all subgames by simply ruling 
out the Nash equilibrium outcomes which are not an equilibrium for the 2nd period 
subgames. 
 
2.2. Results for the single fossil fuel firm given no anticipation of the 
alternative energy. 
 
In the beginning, I consider a single incumbent firm in both periods, given no 
anticipation of the alternative energy. The monopolist’s main problem is to define the 
optimal extraction path, which will yield maximum discounted profits over a period of 
time until the deposit is exhausted.  
Without the anticipation of the entry, the monopolist defines the quantity to 
produce:  
𝑞$$ = argmax
VWW
(Π$ + Π() 
s.t. 𝑞$$ + 𝑞$( ≤ 𝐴 
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where:	Π$	and	Π( are the profit of the monopoly in period 1 and 2 
correspondently, q$$	and	q$( - are the output of monopoly in period 1 and 2 respectively. 
From which it follows: 
𝑞$$
∗P = ($%&)\(]^
(($\&)
 and A − 𝑞$$
∗P = 𝑞$(
∗P = (`%($%&)
(($\&)
 (1.1) 
 That is the output the fossil fuel monopolist would produce without anticipating 
the entry of the non-renewables. The equilibrium output is defined by the combination 
of the 𝐴 and discount factor, 𝛿. 
 The fossil fuel monopoly would have to consider two possibilities: 
1) To leave the amount of 𝑞$$ < 𝐴 −
$
(
	for period II. 
2) To leave the amount of resources such that 𝐴 − $
(
≤ 	𝑞$$ ≤ 𝐴. 
 For case 1), the output of the period I,  𝑞$$ < 𝐴 −
$
(
	 if and only if 𝐴 > 1.	 
 For case 2), the 𝑞$$
P ∈ b𝐴 − $
(
; 𝐴d if and only if the $%&
(
< 𝐴 ≤ 1. The table 1 
illustrates the equilibrium output for the monopoly given the amount of the resource 
constraint. 
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑇𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	1	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
 The table summarizes the possible sales strategies for the incumbent firm given 
different resource availability. If the resources are scarce, such that 𝐴 ≤ ($%&)
(
, the 
monopoly would exhaust all the reserves in the current period and quit the industry. If 
the resource constraint is binding, then, the monopoly would allocate the resources to 
maximize two-time period pay-off, given the A and the how it discounts the future 
profit opportunity. And the last, the monopoly, having abundant resources, would 
simply extract the monopoly’s profit-maximizing output in each period, disregarding 
the amount of the resource constraint and the future profit opportunities. 
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2.3. Results given the entry of the “Green” competitor. 
 
 In this part, I would show how strategic behavior of the incumbent firm would 
change due to the entry of the new energy and how it would affect the emergence of 
the Green paradox.  
 At first, for the simplicity, I set that the sunk costs of the entry for the new 
energy firm are not sufficient, so I would abstract from the analysis of the risks related 
to the entry of the new energy and assume that it is always profitable to enter the 
industry for the renewable energy.  
In period 2, both of the firms would compete in quantity. The fossil fuel firm 
would define the output to produce, given the entry of the new “Green” firm. 
Simultaneously, the new entrant would define the output to produce, given that there 
is already an existing firm in the energy market.   
I assume that both firms are not price takers and each of the firms is aware that 
changing the output level would affect their price. Using the Cournot model, I would 
define the equilibrium output, which neither of them would increase more to get a 
higher profit, given that the other produce the Cournot output level. 
The renewable energy firm solves: 
max
nFF
Π((𝑧(() = (1 − 𝑧(( − 𝛾q$()𝑧((, 
The reaction function of the renewable firm then would be as follows: 
𝑧(((𝑞$() =
(1 − 𝛾q$()
2  
(1.2) 
The fossil fuel monopolist anticipating the entry would decide how second 
period sales would change due to the entry of renewable energy. Using the backward 
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induction, the resource monopolist would decide the optimal output to produce in 
period II. From: 
max
oWF
Π((q$() = (1 − q$( − 𝛾𝑧(()𝑞$(  
I can derive the following reaction function for the resource monopolist: 
q$((𝑧(() =
1 − 𝛾𝑧((
2  
(1.3) 
The output of period 2 for the incumbent firm with binding resource constraint 
depends on the period 1’s output. The subgame for the fossil fuel firm in period 2 
results from the 1st period decision of the single fossil fuel firm. Therefore, I set the	𝑇$ 
as the 2nd period available resource stock, where 𝑇$ = 𝐴 − q$$. The table 2 below shows 
all the 2nd period subgame’ Nash equilibrium outcomes. 
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	2	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
The first row represents that the fossil fuel firm left a sufficient amount of the 
resources and the Nash equilibrium for period 2 is the pair (q$(
∗; 𝑧((
∗)	, 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ	𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 q$(
∗ =
𝑧((
∗ = (%E
q%EF
. The second row represents the pair of the Nash equilibrium where the fossil 
fuel firm left less than (%E
q%EF
 output. Then, the q$(
∗ = 𝑇$ and the 𝑧((
∗ = ($%ErW)
(
. 
The equilibrium actions of fossil fuel firm in period 2 is given by the function,  
𝑓$∗(q$$, ) =
⎩
⎨
⎧
2 − 𝛾
4 − 𝛾( , 𝑖𝑓	𝑇$ ≥ 	
2 − 𝛾
4 − 𝛾(
𝑇$	𝑖𝑓	𝑇$ <
2 − 𝛾
4 − 𝛾(
 
Now, replacing the 2nd period subgames with the 2nd period outcomes. The one 
period game in which the payoffs are given by: 
𝚷𝟏𝑹z𝐪𝟏𝟏| = 𝚷𝟏 }𝐪𝟏𝟏, 𝐪𝟏𝟐
∗z𝐪𝟏𝟏|, 𝒛𝟐𝟐
∗z𝐪𝟏𝟏| , 𝐪𝟏𝟏 ≤ 𝑨,		 
The profit function of fossil fuel incumbent firm is then specified as follows: 
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𝛱$(q$$) = q$$(1 − q$$) + 𝛿
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ (2 − 𝛾)
(
(4 − 𝛾()( 		𝑖𝑓	𝑇$ ≥ 	
2 − 𝛾
4 − 𝛾(
𝑇$ 1 − 𝑇$ +
1
2
𝛾(−1 + 𝑇$𝛾) , 𝑖𝑓	𝑇$ <
2 − 𝛾
4 − 𝛾(
 (1.4) 
A strategy 𝐪𝟏𝟏
∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if it holds that: 
𝚷𝟏 }𝐪𝟏𝟏
∗, 𝐪𝟏𝟐
∗z𝐪𝟏𝟏
∗|, 𝒛𝟐𝟐
∗z𝐪𝟏𝟏
∗| ≥ 𝚷𝟏 }𝐪𝟏𝟏, 𝐪𝟏𝟐
∗z𝐪𝟏𝟏|, 𝒛𝟐𝟐
∗z𝐪𝟏𝟏| for all 𝐪𝟏𝟏 ∈
[𝟎; 𝐀] 
Taking the first-order conditions of the profit function (1.4) for the incumbent 
firm and solving for q$$, I derive the following results: 
q$$ =
1
2 
q$$ =
2 − (2 − 𝛾 − 2A(2 − 𝛾())𝛿
4 + 2(2 − 𝛾()𝛿  
 The Nash equilibrium depends on the different combinations of the available 
stock, 𝐴, the coefficient of the product differentiation (𝛾)	and the discount factor, 𝛿.  
1) 1st possibility is that the fossil fuel firm would decide to leave at least as the 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium output for period 2, such that: 𝐴 − $
(
≤ 	q$$ < 𝐴 −
1
(+E
. 
2) 2nd possibility is when the fossil fuel firm having binding constraint, switch the 
supply to period 1 and sell the remain resources in period 2: 𝐴 − 1
(+E
≤ 	q$$ ≤
𝐴 
For case 1), solving for the profit function, the result is given by: q$$ =
$
(
. Then, 
it holds that q$$ =
$
(
, if and only if 𝐴 > q\E
(((\E)
. 
 Section 1) however, have the subsection, where the incumbent firm is better off 
by extracting the amount of the q$$ = 𝐴 −
$
(\E
 in the region from ?̅? ≤ 𝐴 < q\E
(((\E)
. 
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The rationale is that given the entry, the demand for the energy in period 2 become 
comparatively elastic. The unit elasticity for the 2nd period is the profit-maximizing 
output $
(\E
,	 where 0 < 𝛾 < 1, whether for period 1, the $
(
  is still held.  The ?̅? is 
derived from q$$ = 𝐴 −
$
(\E
= (%((%E%(`((%E
F))&
q\(((%EF)&
. 
 Then, the fossil fuel monopoly would leave the 𝐴 − $
(\E
 for period 2 and 
maximize the profit of period 2, because given a higher elasticity in period 2, the 
change in quantity in period 2 would give higher increase in 2nd period profit than the 
same change in quantity supplied in period 1.  
 Moreover, if the discount factor is low, such that 𝛿 → 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒	?̅? → q\E
(((\E)
, 
under which the q$$
∗ = 𝐴 − $
(\E
converges	to	 $
(
. 
For case 2), solving for the profit function, the result is given by: 
q$$ =
2 − (2 − 𝛾 − 2𝐴(2 − 𝛾())𝛿
4 + 2(2 − 𝛾()𝛿  
For q$$ ∈ b𝐴 −
$
(\E
, 𝐴d	if and only if $
q
(2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿) ≤ 𝐴 ≤ ?̅?, where the 
lower bound amount of the resource constraint $
q
(2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿) defined from 
setting q$( = 0,	as long as the q$$ = 𝐴. 
?̅? = $%E((((\E)\E((%E)&))
q(q%EF)
. 
 The entry of the new energy would decrease the price for the energy in period 
2. The fossil fuel firm to maximize the two-time period profit would reallocate the 
outcomes between two periods towards period 1, where it has monopolized the market. 
The closer substitutes the two products become; the more resources the firm will switch 
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to the 1st period. The exception is when the fossil fuel is choosing to maximize profit 2 
first, where q$$
∗ = 𝐴 − $
(\E
.  
 The discount factor, in the opposite, decreases the effect of the output in period 
1. As long as the discount factor is rising, meaning that the fossil fuel firm value the 
future profits higher, the less it would reallocate the output towards period 1 and less 
toward period 2. 
Given the different value of the resource constraint, the fossil fuel firm might 
allocate the resources in the following way.  
q$$ =
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎧ 𝐴, 𝑖𝑓	𝐴 <
1
4
(2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿)
2 − z2 − 𝛾 − 2𝐴(2 − 𝛾()|𝛿
4 + 2(2 − 𝛾()𝛿
	𝑖𝑓	
1
4
(2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿) ≤ A < ?̅?
𝐴 −
2 − 𝛾
4 − 𝛾( 	𝑖𝑓	?̅?
 ≤ 𝐴 ≤
4 + 𝛾
2(2 + 𝛾)
1
2 , 𝑖𝑓	𝐴 >
4 + 𝛾
2(2 + 𝛾)
 
 Table 3 summaries all the variants of the Nash equilibrium output in period I, 
given the different combinations of the available resource constraints.  
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	3	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
 There are the 4 regions of the resource constraint, under which the fossil fuel 
firm would decide the amount of the output to extract given the entry. The 
substitutability between the energy sources would affect the first period output in the 
following way. 
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	3.1. ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
 Now, I can determine at what values of the resource constraints, Green paradox 
might arise. From the definition, the Green paradox occurs if the entry of the new 
energy would increase current extraction, therefore: 
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q$$
∗ > q$$
∗P 
 Proposition 1. The anticipation of the entry of the clean energy in period 2 
provokes the emergence of the Green paradox if and only if the existing resource 
stock is in a range: (𝟏%𝜹)
𝟐
< 𝑨 ≤ 𝟏.  
 The proof presented in the table below. 
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	4	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
 The above proposition is stated that the Green paradox would occur under 
incumbent monopoly given binding resource constraint, such as 𝐴 < 1. The amount of 
the available reserves should be at least as high as the minimum amount of the output, 
the monopolist would extract in period 1, which is presented by the region 𝐴 ≤ ($%&)
(
. 
If the monopolist is limited by less amount of the resources, it is sufficient for him to 
extract all resources in period 1 and quit the industry in period 1. In this case, the entry 
would not affect the decision of the fossil fuel monopolist and there is no possibility of 
the Green paradox 
 The entry of the new energy would increase the quantity of the total energy 
supplied in the industry in period 2. Then, the price of fossil fuel would decrease. The 
incumbent firm’s profit would decrease. In order to maximize the total profit and given 
that resources available are restricted, the fossil fuel firm would switch part of 2nd 
period output towards the 1st period.  
 The current supply of the traditional energy would increase, followed by the 
decline in current price. The profit of the monopoly in period 1 would increase, which 
would partly compensate for the profit loss in period 2 due to the entry. The monopolist 
would be better off by switching the extraction towards period 1 given by anticipation 
of the entry. 
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The abundant resource constraint makes the 1st period output of fossil fuel 
firm(s) independent of 2nd period output, and, therefore, of the potential entry. The 
Green paradox does not arise. 
Under the moderate levels of the resource constraint, the 1st period output is no 
longer independent of the later period decision, which forces incumbent firm(s) to 
reallocate part of the 2nd period output towards current period to maximize payoffs. 
The main reason for the firm(s) not to utilize all the resource is that doing so would 
lower the price and hence their profit. Therefore, the resource constraint may not be 
binding for a moderate level of A. 
  
 
 
  
 32 
Chapter 3. The Green Paradox in Oligopoly: A dynamic game-theoretical study. 
 
 In this part, I would set up the model for the incumbent duopoly with the 
symmetric resource constraints. I will use a two-time period model to show how 
strategic interaction of the incumbent would be affected by the entry of the new energy. 
The benchmark of my research is the model of van der Berg et all (2012).  
 The optimal supply decision of the firms well understood if there is no binding 
resource constraint. The main characteristics of the intertemporal resource constraint 
are that the supply decision of the fossil fuel firms today would depend on both the 
supply and demand tomorrow and the vice versa. 
 I will start with the case when the incumbent fossil fuel duopoly does not 
anticipate the entry of the new firm. Then, both symmetric fossil fuel firms decide on 
the output supplied in period 2, taken the 1st period sales as given. Next, I would show 
how the sales strategies of the traditional energy firms would change given the entry. 
Lastly, I would compare the results, obtained in the previous chapter for the single 
fossil fuel firm with the results for the oligopoly. I show how the emergence of the 
Green paradox is affected by the competition and the stock size. 
 3.1. Theoretical framework. 
 
 Here, I would set up the model for the incumbent duopoly, which is in general 
consistent with the model in the previous chapter apart from the existing market 
structure.   
 For the incumbent fossil fuel duopoly, the quantities produced in both periods 
are defined by 𝑞,-, where 𝑖 − 1,2,3		𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑡 − 1,2. The total amount of output produced 
by the incumbent firms is 𝑄-.	The quantity produced by the renewable energy remains 
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as 𝑧M(. The assumption that the only new firm would enter the industry still holds. The 
new energy firm, same as in the previous chapter, have zero marginal costs. 
The market price of the homogeneous product is given by the inverse demand 
function: 𝑃$ = 1 − 𝑞$$ − 𝑞($.  
With the entry of clean backstop, inverse demand function for the fossil fuel 
oligopoly changes to 𝑃((𝑄,() = 1 − (𝑞$$ + 𝑞($) − 𝛾𝑧M(, and the inverse demand function 
for the renewables is as 𝑃((𝑧M() = 1 − 𝑧M( − 	𝛾(𝑞$$ + 𝑞($).  
Assumption 2. Each fossil fuel firm has symmetric resource reserves, 𝐴, =
^
(
, 
where A is the total initial resource stock. 
The Green paradox occurs if: 
𝑄$∗ > 𝑄$∗
P 
where 𝑄$∗ - is the 1st period total output of the fossil fuels under the anticipation 
of the new entrant, such that 𝑄$∗ = q$$ + q($   and 𝑄$
∗P - is the 1st period the total output 
of the fossil fuel without anticipation of the new energy.  
The objective of this part is to gain an understanding of how the incumbent 
duopoly would change its sales strategies for the given periods with the entry of the 
new energy. I would define the subgame perfect equilibrium for the cases when at first, 
there is no entry of the new energy and, secondly, with the potential entry.  
I would show how the incumbent fossil fuel firms would decide its selling 
strategies with and without new entrant in period 2. Using the backward induction, I 
would define each equilibrium output of the 2nd period subgames with and without an 
entry in period 2, taking as given 1st period output.  
Next, I move to the period 1. I would define all actions of the incumbent firms, 
which would maximize the first period output given all 2nd period subgames. Then, 
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after defining all possible equilibrium outcomes, I would select the Nash equilibrium 
outcomes, which is the Nash equilibrium outcomes for all subgames by simply ruling 
out the Nash equilibrium outcomes which are not an equilibrium for the 2nd period 
subgames. 
 
3.2. The equilibrium without the entry of the new energy. 
 
First, I consider the model, when the incumbent duopoly does not anticipate the 
entry for renewable energy.  
Let the stock of the reserves remained for the period II left for each firm as 𝑇$ =
𝐴$ − 𝑞($ and 𝑇( = 𝐴( − 𝑞($. For the given sales level 𝑞,(, firm i solves: 
maxΠ,( = }1 − z𝑞,( + 𝑞(| 𝑞,((1.2) (1.5) 
s.t. 𝑇, ≤ 𝑞,(. 
The firm i best response is given by: 
𝜎,z𝑞(, 𝑧| =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ 𝑇,, 𝑖𝑓	𝑇, ≤
1 − 𝑞(
2
𝑚𝑎𝑥 0,
1 − 𝑞(
2
	 , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
(1.6) 
Each subgame for the given amount of the quantity 𝑞,( is represented in table 1.  
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	5	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
The first row shows the equilibrium outcomes for each firm given that each firm 
left $
M
 for period 2. The second row represents the equilibrium outcomes when the firm 
1 has a binding constraint for period 2, which is less than $
M
. Then, the firm 1 would 
extract all the remain resources and the firm 2 would adjust its output to ($% ¡)
(
.	 
 35 
The third row represents the reverse case, when the firm 2 now would have 
binding resource constraint and the firm 1, given no binding 2nd period constraint would 
extract ($% ¢)
(
. The fourth row shows the pair of the equilibrium outcomes when both 
firms would leave insufficient resources for period 2, such that 𝑞$( = T$ and 𝑞(( = T(. 
The equilibrium actions of the firm i in period II was given by the function 
𝑞,(
∗z𝑞,$, 𝑞$|: 
𝑞,(
∗z𝑞,$, 𝑞$| =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
1
3 	𝑖𝑓	𝑇,, 𝑇 >
1
3
(1 − T()
2
	𝑖𝑓		T, >
(1 − T)
2
	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑇 ≤
1
3
T,, 𝑖𝑓	T, ≤
1
3
𝑜𝑟	T ≤ 1 − 2T,
 
 
    
Now, moving to the 1st period, I would determine the strategy’s sales for the 
firm 1 and 2, which would maximize the payoff given the obtained Nash equilibrium 
outcomes of 2nd period, such as:  
Π,z𝑞,$, 𝑞$| = Π, }𝑞,$, 𝑞$, 𝑞,(
∗z𝑞,$, 𝑞$|, 𝑞(
∗z𝑞,$, 𝑞$| , 𝑞,$ ≤ 𝐴,, 𝑞$ ≤ 𝐴 
The reduced profit function for the firm I for the period I is changed to:	
max
V¡
W
(Π,) = }1 − z𝑞,$ + 𝑞$| 𝑞,$ 
+𝛿
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎪
⎧
1
9
	𝑖𝑓	𝑇,, 𝑇 >
1
3
1
2
(1 − 𝑇,)𝑇,	𝑖𝑓	1 − 2T ≤ 𝑇, <
1
3
1
4
(1 − 𝑇)(𝑖𝑓	𝑇, >
(1	 − 𝑇)
2
	𝑎𝑛𝑑	T( <
1
3
		𝑇,(1 − 𝑇, − 𝑇)	𝑖𝑓		T, ≤ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 
(1	 − 𝑇)
2 ; 1 − 2𝑇,
 
(1.7) 
(1.8) 
(1.9) 
(1.10) 
As long as the incumbent firms are identical, then the symmetric game has the 
symmetric Nash equilibrium. A pair of zq$$
∗; q($
∗| is the Nash equilibrium of the entire 
game if and only if it holds that: 
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Π$ q$$
∗, q($
∗
; 𝑞$(
∗zq$$
∗, q($
∗|; 𝑞((
∗zq$$
∗, q($
∗| ≥
Π$ }q$$; q($
∗𝑞$(
∗z𝑞$$, q($
∗|; 𝑞((
∗z𝑞$$, q($
∗| for all q$$ ∈ [0; 𝐴$] 
Π( q$$
∗, q($
∗
; 𝑞$(
∗zq$$
∗, 𝑞($|; 𝑞((
∗zq$$
∗, q($
∗| ≥
Π( }q$$
∗; q($; 𝑞$(
∗zq$$
∗, 𝑞($|; 𝑞((
∗zq$$
∗, 𝑞($| for all q($ ∈ [0; 𝐴(] 
 Now, I would select the Nash equilibrium outcomes which are the Nash 
equilibrium for each period subgames. From the 2nd period subgames, it follows that 
the firm 2 would have three opportunities for the allocation of the resources. At first, it 
can leave the amount of $
(
 for period 2. Secondly, it would leave within the range of 
b$
M
; $
(
 and finally, the firm 2 would leave lower than $
M
. 
 At first, I would start with the case when the 𝐪𝐣𝟏 < 𝑨𝟐 − 
𝟏
𝟐
: 
Then the best response function for firm j is as follows: 
q($ =
1 − q$$
2  
And for the firm i, from the FOC of the reduced profit function,  (1.7)	𝑎𝑛𝑑		(1.8), it 
follows: 
q$$ =
$%oFW
(
 and q($ =
$%oWW
(
 
q$$ =
(%(o©
W%&\(&^ª
(((\&)
 and q($ =
$%oWW
(
 
 If the firm 1 would leave at least $
M
 for period 1, then the equilibrium output is: 
q$$
∗ = $
M
 and q($
∗ = $
M
 
q$(
∗ = $
M
 and q((
∗ = $
M
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 Therefore, the resource constraint of each firm should be as follows: 𝐴$ = 𝐴( >
(
M
. 
 If the firm 1 would leave lower than the amount of  $
M
 for period 1, then the 
equilibrium outcomes is as follows: 
q$$
∗ = (&^W\($%&)
M\(&
 and q($
∗ = M^W%($%&)
M\(&
 
q$(
∗ = (\M&%(&^W
((M\(&)
 and q((
∗ = q%M^W\&
\q&
 
 In this case, the resource constraint of the firm 1 would be q$$ ∈ }𝐴« −
$
M
; 𝐴«, 
from which: 𝐴« <
(
M
− &
¬
.  
 From the assumption, 𝐪𝐣𝟏 < 𝑨𝟐 − 
𝟏
𝟐
, the resource constraint of the firm 2, then, 
𝐴­ = q($
∗ + $
(
= ®

, 𝐴« ≠ 𝐴­,	where which controversial to the assumption the of 
symmetric resource constraint. 
 Next, the 𝑨𝒋 − 
𝟏
𝟐
≤ 𝐪𝟏𝟏 < 𝑨𝒋 − 
𝟏
𝟑
. Then, depends on the firm i’ resource 
constraint, from the FOC of the reduced profit function,  (1.7), (1.8),  and (1.10), then 
starting from (1.7), I get: 
q$$ =
$%oFW
(
 and q($ =
$%oWW
(
 
 If the firm i would leave at least $
M
 for period 1, then the equilibrium output is: 
q$$
∗ = $
M
 and q($
∗ = $
M
 
q$(
∗ = $
M
 and q((
∗ = $
M
 
 Therefore, the resource constraint is required: 𝐴« = 𝐴­ >
(
M
. 
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 Next, the case (1.8).	If the firm i decide to extract less in period II }≤ $
M
	and 
firm j left > ($	% ©)
(
, the corresponding reduced profit function is (1.8), taking the FOC 
and solving for q$$, I get: 
q$$ =
(%(o©
W%&\(&^ª
(((\&)
 and q($ =
$%oª
W
(
 
 The equilibrium output is therefore as follows: 
q«$
∗ = (^ª\($%&)
M\(&
 and q«(
∗ = M^ª%($%&)
M\(&
 
q­$
∗ = (\M&%(&^©
((M\(&)
 and q­(
∗ = q%M^©\&
\q&
 
 Both firms would distribute the resources as follows: 𝐴« − q«$ <
$
M
 and 𝐴­ −
q­$ >
($	%z^ª%oª
W|)
(
.  If the firm 1 would leave less for period 1, then the firm 2 should 
have at least the 𝐴­ − q­$ >
($	%z^ª%oª
W|)
(
, from which I can derive, that the firm 2 should 
have at least the  1 − ^ª
(
	in situ. These results stated that it is not efficient for the firm 2 
to leave $
M
 unless 𝐴( >
(
M
. Therefore, given that if the firm 1 have less than 𝐴« >
(
M
, 
neither of the firms would allocate the $
M
 for period II.  
 Next, I will check whether it is efficient for the duopoly to allocate the resources 
in that way, that in each period only one firm operates. For instance, the firm i would 
extract all the resources in period I and the firm II would not extract in period II and 
leave all the resources for period II. Then, the given that q($ = 0,  q$$ =
(^W\($%&)
M\(&
= 𝐴« 
and q$( = 0, q(( =
q%M^ª\&
\q&
, where 𝐴« =
$
M
(1 − 𝛿)	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝐴­ =
$
(
	. This is controversial.  
 Lastly, if the two firms would leave the insufficient amount in situ for period 
2, where: 
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q$$ =
1 − q­$ − 𝛿 + 2𝛿𝐴« + 𝐴­𝛿 − 𝛿q­$
2(1 + 𝛿)  
q($ =
1 − q$$ − 𝛿 + 𝐴«𝛿 + 2𝐴­𝛿 − 𝛿q«$
2(1 + 𝛿)  
 The equilibrium outcome is q$$ = q($ =
($%&)\M&^W
M($\&)
, where	T« ≤ 1 − 2T­. 
 Now I can define the amount of the resource constraint for this case. Rewriting 
T« ≤ 1 − 2T­	with q$$, q($ , I get the result that the resource capacity should be lower ≤
(
M
.  
 The extreme case when both firms extract 𝐴« in period 1. Then, q$$ =
($%&)\M&^W
M($\&)
= 𝐴«, from which 𝐴« ≤
$
M
(1 − 𝛿). 
 Next, I would turn to the 3rd case when the firm 2 would leave lower than 𝐪𝟐𝟏 >
𝑨𝟐 −
𝟏
𝟑
, where the corresponding reduce function is (1.9). Then the best response 
function for firm j depends on the firm i output. 
Then for firm i it holds that: 
q$$ =
$%oFW
(
  and q($ =
(%(oWW%&\(&^ª
(((\&)
 
 If the firm i would leave the 0 < q«$ ≤ 𝐴« −
$
(
+ $
(
T­, then the equilibrium output 
is: 
q$$
∗ = (&^©\
($%&)
M\(&
 and q($
∗ = M^©%
($%&)
M\(&
 
q$(
∗ = (\M&%(&^ª
((M\(&)
 and q((
∗ = q%M^ª\&
\q&
 
 From which follows that the (
M
≤ 𝐴« <
(\M&
(&
, which is controversial with q($ >
𝐴­ −
$
M
. 
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 Next, the fourth case when both firms would leave q$$; q($ > 𝐴( −
$
M
, from (1.10) 
it follows that: 
q$$ =
1 − q($ − 𝛿 + 𝐴$𝛿 + 2𝐴(𝛿 − 𝛿q($
2(1 + 𝛿)  
q($ =
1 − q$$ − 𝛿 + 𝐴(𝛿 + 2𝐴$𝛿 − 𝛿q$$
2(1 + 𝛿)  
 where equilibrium output is therefore as follows: 
q$$
∗ = ($%&)\M&^ª
M($\&)
 and q$(
∗ = M^ª%($%&)
M($\&)
 
q($
∗ =
($%&)\M&^©
M($\&)
 and q((
∗ = M^©%
($%&)
M($\&)
 
 From which the resource constraints follow from the 𝐴( −
$
(
+ $
(
𝑇(, < q($ <
𝐴( where 
$%&
M
< 𝐴( <
(
M
. 
 Table 6 illustrates the summary of the Nash equilibrium output for fossil fuel 
duopoly.  
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	6	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
 The fossil fuel firms without anticipation of the entry of the new energy 
would follow the above sales strategies for each period given a particular amount of 
the resources in situ. The first row shows the sales strategies for the fossil fuel firms 
given the scarce resources in situ. Here, the fossil fuel firms would just operate in 
period 1. The second row shows the sales strategies given binding resource constraint 
for the two-periods. The fossil fuel firms would decide to allocate the available 
resources between the periods given the amount of the resources available, taking into 
account the rival’s output and the future pay-off opportunity.  
 The third row shows the strategies sales for the fossil fuel firms given that 
the resource constraint is not binding for each firm. Then, the firms would simply 
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extract profit-maximizing output in each period, given another available competitor in 
the industry.  
 
3.3. The results given entry of the new energy. 
 
The next stage of my research is to show how does the current fossil fuel output 
changes due to the competition between the fossil fuel firms which in turn anticipate 
the entry of the “green” competitor in the foreseeing future.  
The major question is how the duopoly’s sales strategies would be affected by 
the entry in the foreseeing future and how it would speed up the 1st period output. 
Again, as in the previous chapter, the stock remained for the period 2 left for 
each firm as 𝑇, = 𝐴, − 𝑞,$. For the given sales level q,(, firm i solves: 
max
V¡
F
𝛱,( = (1 − (𝑞$( + 𝑞(() − 𝛾𝑧M()𝑞$( 
s.t. 𝑇, ≤ 𝑞,(. 
The renewable firm chooses 𝑧M(	𝑡𝑜: 
max
n³F
𝛱M( = (1 − 𝛾(𝑞$( + 𝑞(() − 𝑧M()𝑧M( 
Firm 1 best response is given by: 
𝜎$(𝑞$$, 𝑞($) =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ 𝑇$, 𝑖𝑓	𝑇$ ≤
1 − 𝑞(( − 𝛾𝑧M(
2
𝑚𝑎𝑥 0,
1 − 𝑞(( − 𝛾𝑧M(
2
	 , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
The renewable firm best response is given by: 
 
(1.11) 
𝜎n³F(𝑞$
$, 𝑞($) =
⎩
⎨
⎧
3 − 2𝛾
6 − 2𝛾( , 𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝑇$, 𝑇( >
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾()
1
2
(1 − 𝛾𝑇$ − 𝛾	𝑇(), 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
(1.12) 
Each subgame for the given amount of the quantity 𝑞, is represented in table 7.  
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[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	7	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
The first row shows the triple Nash equilibrium outcomes for the fossil fuel 
firms and the entrant, given that the resource constraint of period 2 is larger than  (%E
((M%EF)
 
for each fossil fuel firm. The second row shows the Nash equilibrium outcomes where 
the firm 1 left with the binding resource constraint for period 2, such as ≤ (%E
((M%EF)
. The 
firm 2 with non-binding constraint would increase the output of period 2 and 
simultaneously the renewable firm would increase the output until $
(\E
−  W((%E
F)
q%EF
 and 
(%E%E W
q%EF
 correspondently.  
The third row is the mirror representation of the second row where the firm 2 
would have a binding constraint. The fourth row shows the equilibrium outcomes when 
both fossil fuel firms left the insufficient resources for the period 2, such as < $
(\E
−
 F((%EF)
q%EF
 and < $
(\E
−  W((%E
F)
q%EF
. Then, the equilibrium outcomes for the entrant would 
increase to $
(
(1 − 𝛾T$ − 𝛾T(). 
The equilibrium action of the firm I in period II given by the function 
𝑓(𝑞$$, 𝑞($, 𝑧): 
𝑞($
∗(𝑞$$, 𝑞($)
=
⎩
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎧
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾()
	𝑖𝑓	𝑇$, 𝑇( >
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾()
2 − 𝛾 − 𝑇((2 − 𝛾()
4 − 𝛾(
	𝑖𝑓		𝑇$ >
2 − 𝛾 − 𝑇((2 − 𝛾()
4 − 𝛾(
	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑇( ≤
𝑇$, 𝑖𝑓	𝑇$ ≤
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾()
𝑜𝑟	𝑇( ≤
2 − 2𝑇$ − 𝛾
2 − 𝛾(
− 𝑇$
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾() 
 
   
(1.13
) 
Moving to the I period, the payoff function for the firm in period I is as follows: 
Π,zq«$, q­$| = Π, }q«$, q­$, 𝑞($
∗(𝑞$$, 𝑞($), 𝑞((
∗(𝑞$$, 𝑞($), 𝑧32
∗(𝑞$$, 𝑞($) , q«$ ≤ 𝐴,, q­$ ≤ 𝐴 
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The reduced profit function for the firm I for the period I is changed to:	
max
V¡
W
(Π,) = }1 − z𝑞,$ + 𝑞$| 𝑞,$ 
+𝛿
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎧ (2 − 𝛾)
(
4(3 − 𝛾()( 	𝑖𝑓	𝑇$, 𝑇( >
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾()
(2 − 𝛾 − T$(2 − 𝛾())(
(4 − 𝛾()( 	𝑖𝑓	
2 − 2T( − 𝛾
2 − 𝛾( − T( ≤ T$ <
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾()
(2 − 𝛾 − T((2 − 𝛾())(
(4 − 𝛾()( 𝑖𝑓	T$ >
2 − 𝛾 − T((2 − 𝛾()
4 − 𝛾( 	𝑎𝑛𝑑	T( <
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾()
T( 1 +
1
2
𝛾 − (T$ + T() 1 +
1
2
𝛾( 	𝑖𝑓		T$ ≤ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 
2 − 2T( − 𝛾
2 − 𝛾(
− T(;
2 − 𝛾 − T((2 − 𝛾()
4 − 𝛾(

 
(1.14.1) 
(1.14.2) 
(1.14.3) 
(1.14.4) 
 
 
 I would distinguish 3 cases based on the subgames. The highest quantity that 
the firm 2 can extract given the firm 1 left zero amount of the resources for period 2 is 
given by T( >
(%E
q%EF
.  
 The 2nd case is when the resources left is enough to produce the firm 2 would 
leave the following amount of the resource for period 2: 𝐴( − }
(%E
q%EF
 ≤ 	𝑞($ < 𝐴 −
(%E
((M%EF)
 .  
 The 3rd case is low when the firm II left less than the (%E
((M%EF)
 resources for 
period 2. The three cases are presented below: 
(1)	𝑞$ < 𝐴 −
2 − 𝛾
4 − 𝛾( ; 
(2)𝐴 − 
2 − 𝛾
4 − 𝛾( ≤ 	𝑞
$ < 𝐴 −
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾() ; 
(3)𝐴 −
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾() ≤ 	𝑞
$ < 𝐴.	
I will start with 1st case: 
(1)	𝑞$ < 𝐴 −
2 − 𝛾
4 − 𝛾( 
 Given that the firm 2 left more resources for the period 2 and less for period 
1, the firm 1 has the two possibilities: whether it might have enough resources to 
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produce for period 1 and leave enough for later period, such that 0 ≤ 	𝑞,$ < 𝐴, −
(%E
((M%EF)
. Taking the FOC from (1.14.1) and (1.14.2), I get: 
	𝑞$$ =
$%V¢
W
(
	and q($ =
$%oWW
(
 
𝑞$$ =
z$%VFW|zq%EF|%((%E%(^W((%EF))&
q((\&)%(EF($\&)
 and q($ =
$%oWW
(
 
 Then, the equilibrium output for this case for both period 1 and 2 is as 
follows: 
Period 1: q$$
∗ = $
M
 and q($
∗ = $
M
 
Period 2:q$(
∗ = (%E
((M%EF)
 ; q((
∗ = (%E
((M%EF)
; 𝑧M(
∗ = M%(E
%(EF
 
 From which it follows that the 𝐴$ >
$
(
+ ((%E)
((M%EF)
 and 𝐴( >
$
M
+ ((%E)
((M%EF)
. 
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium exists as long as the 𝐴$ >
$
(
+ ((%E)
((M%EF)
 and 𝐴( >
$
M
+
((%E)
((M%EF)
, then the pair of the zq$$
∗; q($
∗| is a Nash equilibrium.  
 Next, if the firm 1 would leave lower than $
M
 for period 1, and the reduced 
profit (1.5.1), then the equilibrium output: 
Period 1:q$$
∗ = q%(q%´^W)&\(E&%E
F($\q^W&)
q(M\(&)%EF(M\q&)
 and q$(
∗ = q%$(^W%E
F\M^WEF%q&\(E&
%$(\MEF%´&\qEF&
 
Period 2:q$(
∗ = q%(%\q^W)&%E(E\($%((%$\^W)E)&)
q(M\(&)%EF(M\q&)
;  q((
∗ = $
(
( $
(\E
+
%$µ\E(M\(E)%^W(%(\EF)
%q(M\(&)\EF(M\q&)
)  and 𝑧M(
∗ =
zq%EF|}´%E(M\E)%M^Wz(%EF|%(((%E)((%EF)&
M(%q\EF)F\q(´%EF\E¶)&
. 
 where the output sales of the firm 1 is : 0 ≤ 	𝑞$$ < 𝐴$ −
(%E
((M%EF)
 , I get: 
(\E%(&
\ME
< 𝐴$ <
%E\·EF\(E³\q(%\&)
((\E)(%M\EF)
	 and 𝐴­ >
q´\(®(%(q^W)&\ME³($\(&)%(E(\·&)\E¶((%q(%$\^W)&)\qEF(%®\(%´\®^W)&)
((%M\EF)(%q(M\(&)\EF(M\q&))
, which is a 
contradiction with the 𝐴$ = 𝐴(. 
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(2)𝐴 − 
2 − 𝛾
4 − 𝛾( ≤ 	𝑞
$ < 𝐴 −
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾() ; 
 Then, depends on the firm 1’ resource constraint, from the FOC of the reduced 
profit function,  (1.14.1), (1.14.2),  and (1.14.4). Solving for q$$	𝑓𝑜𝑟	the reduced profit 
(1.14.1), I get: 
q$$ =
$%oFW
(
 and  q($ =
$%oWW
(
 
 Again, if the firm 1 would leave at least 0 ≤ 	𝑞$$ < 𝐴$ −
(%E
((M%EF)
 for the period 
1, then the equilibrium output is: 
Period 1: q$$
∗ = $
M
 and q($
∗ = $
M
 
Period	2:	q$(
∗ = (%E
((M%EF)
 ; q((
∗ = (%E
((M%EF)
; 𝑧M(
∗ = M%(E
%(EF
 
 Therefore, if resource constraint is 𝐴$ = 𝐴( >
$
(
+ ((%E)
((M%EF)
, then the pair of 
the zq$$
∗; q($
∗| is a Nash equilibrium.  
 Next, if the firm I decide to produce less in period 2: 𝐴$ −
(%E
((M%EF)
≤ 	 𝑞$$ <
𝐴$ + T( −
(%( F%E
(%EF
 and the firm 2 would leave T( >
(%E% W((%EF)
q%EF
,  Solving for 
q$$	𝑓𝑜𝑟	the reduced profit (1.14.2), I get: 
q«$ =
z$%VFW|zq%EF|%((%E%(^W((%EF))&
q((\&)%(EF($\&)
 and q($ =
$%oWW
(
. 
Then the equilibrium output as follows: 
q$$
∗ = q%(q%´^W)&\(E&%E
F($\q^W&)
q(M\(&)%EF(M\q&)
 and q($
∗ = q%$(^W%E
F\M^WEF%q&\(E&
%$(\MEF%´&\qEF&
 
q$(
∗ = q%(%\q^W)&%E(E\($%((%$\^W)E)&)
q(M\(&)%EF(M\q&)
;  q((
∗ = $
(
( $
(\E
+ %$µ\E(M\(E)%^W(%(\E
F)
%q(M\(&)\EF(M\q&)
)  and 
𝑧M(
∗ =
zq%EF|}´%E(M\E)%M^Wz(%EF|%(((%E)((%EF)&
M(%q\EF)F\q(´%EF\E¶)&
. 
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 Both firms would distribute the resources as follows: 𝑇$ ≤
(%E
((M%EF)
 and 𝑇( >
$
(\E
−  W((%E
F)
q%EF
.  If the firm 1 would decide to leave less for period 1, then the firm 2 
should have at least the 𝐴( − q($ >
$
(\E
− z^W%oW
W|((%EF)
q%EF
, from which we can derive that 
the firm II should have at least the  𝐴$ >
(q%EF)($(%E(M\(E))\q((%E)&
($(%·EF\E¶)
.  
 For firm 2, it is optimal to leave less amount if the resources is equal to 𝐴$ <
q´\M(&\ME³($\&)\(E¶($\&)%qE(M\(&)%(EF($µ\¬&)
(q%EF)(M\(&%EF($\&))
, which is controversial, meaning that 
given the symmetric resource constraint it is not efficient for the firm II to leave (%E
((M%EF)
 
unless 𝐴$ >
$
$
+ (%E
((M%EF)
. Therefore, given that if the firm has less than 𝐴$ >
$
(
+
(%E
((M%EF)
, neither of the firms would allocate the (%E
((M%EF)
 for period II and this case does 
not have the Nash equilibrium as long, as 𝐴$ = 𝐴(.  
 Further, within case 2), both firms might leave binding resources for period 
2, then firms would choose to produce the below amount of the output (which is derived 
from reduced profit (1.7.1): 
𝑞$$ =
2(1 − 𝛿) − 𝑞($(2 + 2𝛿 − 𝛾(𝛿) + 2𝛿(2 − 𝛾()(𝐴$ + 𝐴() + 𝛾𝛿
2(2 + 2𝛿 − 𝛾(𝛿)  
𝑞($ =
2(1 − 𝛿) − 𝑞($(2 + 2𝛿 − 𝛾(𝛿) + 2𝛿(2 − 𝛾()(𝐴$ + 𝐴() + 𝛾𝛿
2(2 + 2𝛿 − 𝛾(𝛿)  
 Here, the resources would not be enough to extract in period 1 altogether 
with firm 2, therefore, the firm 1 might choose to produce 0 today, and switch the 
extraction to later period, therefore, the lowest amount of output along with 𝐴$,might 
be 0. Therefore, the output for the period I, holds that 𝑞$$ ∈ b𝑚𝑎𝑥 º0; 𝐴$ + T( −
(%( F%E
(%EF
» ; 𝐴$] if: 
$

(2 + (−2 + 𝛾 + 𝑠𝛾)𝛿) ≤ 𝐴$ ≤
$
M
+ ((%E%E¼)
((M%EF)
 and $

(2 + (−2 +
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𝛾 + 𝑠𝛾)𝛿) ≤ 𝐴( ≤
$
M
+ ((%E%E¼)
((M%EF)
, then the pair of the zq$$
∗; q($
∗| is a Nash equilibrium.
  
(𝐶)𝐴 −
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾() ≤ 	𝑞
$ < 𝐴 
 When the firm II’s 1st period output is given and fewer resources left for 
period 2, the profit the firm 1 might get is given by either (1.14.3)	if		0 ≤ 	𝑞$$ < 𝐴$ −
(%(rF\E\rFEF
q%EF
		and (1.14.4)	if	𝐴, −
(%(rF\E\rFEF
q%EF
≤ 	𝑞$$ < 𝐴,	. Solving for 𝑞$$ in (1.14.3) 
the results are given by: 
𝑞$$ =
$%VFW
(
 and 𝑞($ =
((%$\VWW)%(((%$\(^F\^W%VWW)\E\(%(^F%^W\VWW)EF)&
%q\((%(\EF)&
 
 So, similarly, it holds that 𝑞$$ ∈ b0; 𝐴, −
(%(rF\E\rFEF
q%EF
 if 
	qz(%VF
W%rF|%(E\(%$\VFW\(rF)EF
((q%EF)
< 	𝐴,, the 𝑞$$ ∈ b𝐴, −
(%(rF\E\rFEF
q%EF
; 	𝐴,d. 
 Where substituting the 𝑞($ in  𝑞$$ =
$%VFW
(
, I get: 
 𝑞($
∗ = q%(q%´^W)&\(E&%E
F($\q^W&)
q(M\(&)%EF(M\q&)
 and 𝑞$$
∗ = q%(%\q^W)&%E(E\($%((%$\^W)E)&)
q(M\(&)%EF(M\q&)
, where 
the $
M
− (&((%E)
M(q%EF)
< 𝐴( <
zq%EF|z$(%E(M\(E)|%q((%E)&
($(%·EF\E¶)
	and  
𝐴$ >
q´\(®(%(q^W)&\ME³($\(&)%(E(\·&)\E¶((%q(%$\^W)&)\qEF(%®\(%´\®^W)&)
((%M\EF)(%q(M\(&)\EF(M\q&))
.  
 However, from the assumption of the symmetric resource constraint, there 
is no Nash equilibrium.  
 Next, the reduced profit function (1.14.4),	the FOC would give the following 
best response functions: 
𝑞$$ =
2 − z2 − 𝛾 + 3𝐴$(2 − 𝛾()|𝛿 − 𝑞((2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)
4 + 2(2 − 𝛾()𝛿  
𝑞($ =
2 − z2 − 𝛾 + 3𝐴$(2 − 𝛾()|𝛿 − 𝑞$(2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)
4 + 2(2 − 𝛾()𝛿  
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 The NE outcome is 𝑞$$
∗ = 𝑞($
∗ = (%((%E\M^W((%E
F))&
\M((%EF)&
, where T$ ≤
$
(\E
−
 F((%EF)
q%EF
	𝑎𝑛𝑑	T$ ≤
(%E%zq%EF|rF
((%EF)
. 
 Now I can define the amount of the resource constraint for this case. 
Rewriting T$ ≤
$
(\E
− ¼E\ F((%E
F)
q%EF
 with 𝑞$$
∗, 𝑞($
∗, the following resource constraints:  
$

(2 + (−2 + 𝛾)𝛿) ≤ 𝐴$ ≤
$
M
+ ((%E)
((M%EF)
 and 
 $

(2 + (−2 + 𝛾)𝛿) ≤ 𝐴( ≤
$
M
+ ((%E)
((M%EF)
,  
then the pair of the zq$$
∗; q($
∗| is a Nash equilibrium.  
 The extreme case when both firms extract 𝐴$ in period I. Then, 𝑞$$
∗ =
(%((%E\M^W((%EF))&
\M((%EF)&
= 𝐴$, from which 𝐴$ ≤
$

(2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿). 
 Table 8 illustrates the summary of the Nash equilibrium output for fossil fuel 
duopoly. 
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	8	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
The Green paradox occurs if: 
Q$∗ > Q$∗
P
 
 Now, I can check whether the total output of period 1 increased compare to the 
case when there is no entry of the clean backstop anticipated. 
 Proposition 2. The anticipation of the entry of the clean energy in period 2 
provokes the emergence of the Green paradox under the duopoly market structure if 
and only if the existing resource stock is in a range: (𝟏%𝜹)
𝟑
< 𝑨 ≤ 𝟒
𝟑
.  
 The proof presented in the table below. 
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	9	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
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 The entry would not affect the sales strategies for period 1 and 2 as long as the 
duopoly possesses either extremely scarce resources in situ, either non-binding 
resource constraint. By analogy with the monopoly, high and low values of the resource 
constraint would make 1st period output independent of the 2nd period output. In these 
cases, the phenomenon of the Green paradox does not arise.  
 The entry would rise 1st period sales strategies of the incumbent firms if the 
resource stock is binding. The incumbent duopoly driven by the anticipated decline in 
the future demand would reallocate part of the 2nd period sales towards period 1. 
 Moreover, at which rate it would speed up the extraction depends on the 
resource availability, the discount factor, number of the incumbent rivals and the degree 
of the product differentiation between the energy sources. As long as the discount factor 
𝛿	converges	to	0, the Green paradox become weaker. The product differentiation 
parameter rises the 1st period outcomes. The closer the renewable energy becomes, the 
stronger the effect of the Green paradox. 
3.4. The effect of competition on the emergence of the Green paradox. 
 
 Now, I can address the important question of this part of my research: how the 
combination of the size of the available resource stock and the market structure might 
affect the emergence of the Green paradox. For doing this, I would refer to the obtained 
results in the current and previous chapters.  
 Proposition 3. There exist the parameter range, such as (𝟏%𝜹)	
𝟐
≤ 𝑨 <
𝟐
𝟑
(𝟏 − 𝜹), where the Green paradox emerge under the incumbent Monopoly, but 
not under incumbent Duopoly and in the range 𝟏 ≤ 𝑨 < 𝟒
𝟑
 , the Green paradox 
emerges under the incumbent Duopoly, but not under the incumbent Monopoly.  
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Proof. 
 The summary of the obtained results from the single firm, fossil fuel duopoly 
is presented in the table 10 below.  
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	10	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
 According to table 10, the manifestation of the Green paradox is not always 
ambiguous. Under the same amount of the resources, the Green paradox less likely to 
occur under the monopoly market structure. For instance, if the resource stock is higher 
than the 𝐴 > 1, the monopolist has no incentive to speed up the current extraction, as 
long it would extract the monopoly’s profit-maximizing output even without the entry 
of new firm. However, the duopoly, in the opposite, would increase the current 
extraction.  
The below graph illustrates the results from table 10. 
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ	1	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
 As seen from the graph 1, competition matters, especially, when it comes to the 
Green paradox. The single entry, as in my model, would change the strategic behavior 
of the incumbent firm(s).  
 Higher concentration in the conventional energy industry along with the 
moderate resource stock availability would increase the risk of emergence of the Green 
paradox. Given the high values of the total resource stock, the 1st period’s strategic 
behavior of the incumbent firm(s) would be independent of the 2nd period strategies, 
including possible entry. However, in case of a higher concentration, the existing 
competition in the traditional energy market would generate additional externalities for 
the fossil fuel firms, increasing the range for the total resource stock, where the Green 
paradox might arise (Graph 1). Therefore, there is the possibility that under some 
particular resource stocks Green paradox would not emerge under monopoly market 
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structure but under duopoly, if the resource stock is small and vice versa when the 
resource stock is high enough as stated in Proposition 3. 
Under the moderate levels of the resource constraint, competition in the 
traditional energy market would provoke the fossil fuel firms to increase current 
extraction even without the entry of the new firm. The entry, by rising the concentration 
in a later period, would extrude the traditional energy supply move towards the current 
period. Which means that each conventional energy firm, induced by the entry, would 
reallocate part of the 2nd period extraction towards current period, taking into account 
the corresponding increase in the current production by the rest incumbent firm(s).   
Therefore, to gain higher total profit, each firm(s) would have to rise the 1st 
period output and, as a result, strengthen the Green paradox.  The single incumbent 
firm would not be the subject for the competition in period 1 and, therefore, Green 
paradox would be less prominent under incumbent monopoly compare to the 
incumbent duopoly, oligopoly cases.  
In my model, I abstracted from the environmental taxes, subsidies and positive 
extraction costs because the main objective in this thesis is to study the impacts of entry 
of new energy producers on the possibility of Green paradox. However, environmental 
taxation and positive extraction costs indeed would change the results quantitatively 
and shift the amount of the critical resource constraints, for both the incumbent 
monopoly and duopoly.  
Incorporating the taxes and the extraction costs in the model for both the 
incumbent monopoly and duopoly I got the following results. For instance, the critical 
resource constraint for the monopoly would shift from 1 to 1 − 𝑐, where c = 𝜏 + ς, 
where 𝜏 is the fixed rate per unit tax for period 1 and 2 and ς is the positive per unit 
extraction costs. The environmental taxation decreases output in each period for the 
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fossil fuel monopoly and duopoly. I added a brief discussion of how the inclusion of 
environmental taxation and positive extraction costs would affect the results on page 
59 of my thesis. 
Graphically, the role of environmental taxation and the positive extraction costs 
on the Green paradox occurrence might be shown by changing the graph 1 in the 
following way.  
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ	1.1	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
 These findings have important implication for the policy-making and mitigation 
of the Green paradox. The further chapters will explore particular measure might be 
implemented in order to avoid the Green paradox based on current findings.   
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Chapter 4. Social welfare analysis and environmental impact evaluation. 
 
4.1. The setup 
 
 In this section, I would show how does the social welfare changes due to the 
Green paradox phenomenon and given a particular market structure and the resource 
stock.  
 I define social welfare as the sum of the industry’s total profit plus the consumer 
surplus and minus the environmental damage, generated from the combustion of fossil 
fuels.  
 The carbon emissions are referred to as the mixed type of pollution, where the 
damage generated from both the stock-damage and flow pollutions. To monetary 
capture the environmental damage, I will employ the common used notation of the 
cumulative damage function (van der Ploeg, (2012), Perman, (2011)). The 1st period 
damage function is the accumulation of the combustion of extracted output in period 
1,  D$ =
Å(ÆW)F
(
, where 𝑄$  and 𝑄(– the total extraction  in periods 1 and 2. For 
simplicity, I assume that the initial stock of pollutions for period 1 is 0. 
 For period 2, the damage function includes accumulation of the damage 
generated in period 1 and the flow of combustion of the 𝐶𝑂( in period 2, such that D( =
Å(ÆW\ÆF)ÆF
(
.  
 The generated damage in period 2 as well as the consumer surplus and producer 
surplus would be discounted. In the related literature, the term ecological discount 
factor uses to represent the net present value of future emissions for society. In this 
model, for simplicity, we set the ecological discount factor to be equal to the social 
discount factor.  This applies that the current emissions are more harmful than future 
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emissions. Thus, the flatter the extraction today, the less harm for the total social 
welfare (Hoel, 2010), (van der Ploeg, 2012, 2016), (Gerlagh, 2007, 2012).  
 Next, the total producer surplus of the industry is the sum of the profit of all 
incumbent firm(s) plus the profit of the new entrant for the period 2 if any.  
Consumer surplus is defined as the approximate gain the consumers enjoy from 
buying fossil fuel and the new energy.  When there is only one homogeneous product 
is in the industry, the consumer surplus is the difference between the market size, 𝛼	and 
the price of the resource multiply by the quantity supplied. The market size in our 
model is set to 1.  
 The consumer surplus, when fossil fuel is the only homogeneous product 
available is as follows:	𝐶𝑆-(𝑄,-) =
$
(
((𝑄,-)(), where 𝑄,- – the total output of the 
industry’s output. 
 The consumer surplus for the differentiated products is derived from the total 
utility the society get, minus the expenditures for consuming these products.  
 The utility functions are 𝑈$(𝑄,-) = 𝛼(𝑄,-) −
$
(
}𝑄,-
( for homogeneous product 
and 𝑈((𝑄,(; 𝑧(() = 𝛼(𝑄,( + 𝑧,) −
$
(
((𝑄,()( + (𝑧(()( + 2𝛾𝑧((𝑄,() for differentiated 
products, where for simplicity 𝛼 = 1. 
 The consumer surplus for period 2 given entry is: 𝐶𝑆((𝑄,(; 𝑧(() = 	𝑈((𝑄,(; 𝑧(() −
𝑃(𝑄,( − 𝑃n𝑧((, where 𝑃(	-  2nd period price for the fossils, 𝑃n the price for the renewable 
energy. 
 Clearly,  ËÌÍ
ËÎ
> 0, the consumer surplus is rising with the number of incumbent 
firms and new entrants (N).  
 Finally, the total two-time period social before and after the entry of new energy 
would be as follows: 
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𝑆𝑊P = 𝐶𝑆$Pz𝑄,$
P| + Π$Pz𝑄,$
P| − D$P + 𝛿z𝐶𝑆(Pz𝑄,(
P| + Π(Pz𝑄,(
P| − D(P|, 
and  
𝑆𝑊 = 𝐶𝑆$(𝑄,$) + Π$(𝑄,$) − D$
+ 𝛿z𝐶𝑆((𝑄,(; 𝑧(() + Π((𝑄,(; 𝑧(() + ΠnFF(𝑄,
(; 𝑧(() − D(| 
 The abbreviation “ P” referred, when the incumbent firm/firms do not 
anticipate the entry of new energy.  
 Next, I show how social welfare would change with the entry of the new energy 
for both incumbent monopoly and duopoly market structures for a particular resource 
stock availability I derived in the previous chapters.  
 For this purpose, I have separated the resource constraints by the availability of 
resources and the possibility of occurrence of Green paradox.  The region II is referred 
to the region, where there is no possibility of the Green paradox due to two extreme 
cases: insufficient or in opposite abundant resource constraint. The region I is for the 
binding resource constraint, where the Green paradox phenomenon might occur. 
4.2. Incumbent monopoly analysis.  
4.2.1. Social welfare analysis, when there is no Green paradox. 
 
 
First, I would start with the analysis, when the Green paradox would not occur. 
The results might be summarized in the following way. The absence of the Green 
paradox means that the current output would not be affected by the entry when the 
resource constraint is either too high or too low.  
In particular, for the region II, where	0 < 𝐴 ≤ $
(
(1 − 𝛿), the entry would 
generate additional output to produce and consume. Consumer surplus in period 2, 
therefore, would rise. The total consumer surplus, in turn, would rise. The same applied 
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for the producer surplus. The environmental damage would not change. As the 
outcome, the total social welfare would rise.  
For region II, where	𝐴 > 1, the entry again would not speed up the present 
extraction. The entry would generate higher supply of the energy available. The 
demand for fossil fuel would decline. The price of the energy would decline. The 
consumer surplus would be greater with the renewable energy firm. The producer 
surplus of the conventional energy producers would decline. However, the total 
producer surplus would be higher compare when there is no entry.   
As long as the resource constraint is abundant, fossil fuel monopolist has no 
incentive to rise current extraction. Therefore, the consumer and producer surpluses 
would not change in period 1. The same applied for the environmental damage in 
period 1.  Given that the second period extraction would be lower with the entry, the 
total damage would be lower with the entry of the renewable firm. The total social 
welfare, in this case, would be higher than without entry of the new energy. (The results 
of the social welfare analysis are shown below in details). 
 
Region II, where	𝟎 < 𝑨 ≤ 𝟏
𝟐
(𝟏 − 𝜹), no Green paradox. 
 Profit of the non-renewable firm is constant as the output in period I do not 
change due to the entry of the new energy.  
 Consumer surplus is increasing: 
𝐶𝑆∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝐶𝑆∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ =
𝛿
8 
 Entrant in period 2 would supply the new energy as a single producer. The two-
period consumer surplus given entry would rise.  
 The no-entry social welfare is as follows: 
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𝑆𝑊∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ =
1
8 (3 − 𝜃 − (−2 + 𝛿)𝛿(1 + 𝜃)) 
The social welfare with the entry: 
𝑆𝑊∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ =
4
9 +
1
9 z2
(3 − 𝛾()(1 + 𝛿) + 3𝛿(2 − 𝛾)|𝜃
+
𝛿(59 − 64𝛾( + 4𝛾 + 24𝛾M)
8(3 − 𝛾()(  
 The social welfare is rising due to additional new firm entering the market.  
𝑆𝑊∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝑆𝑊∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ =
𝛿
2 > 0	𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝛿 > 0.	 
 
Region II, where	𝑨 > 𝟏, no Green paradox. 
 Profit of the non-renewable firm decreases in period II due to competition 
with renewable energy. 
Π∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − Π∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ =
1
4 −
1
(2 + 𝛾)( < 0 
  Consumer surplus is increasing: 
𝐶𝑆ÖÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝐶𝑆ÖÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ =
(4 + 4𝛾 − 𝛾()𝛿
8(2 + 𝛾)( ≥ 0 
 The consumer surplus rises due to competition created by the entry of the new 
firm in period 2. The 1st period output of fossil fuel and price would not change. 
Therefore the consumer surplus in period 1 would remain constant. 
 The total two-time period environmental damage would decrease. The 
environmental damage in period 1 remains constant; the damage in period 2 would 
decrease with the entry of the new rival.  
 The cases with no-entry and entry social welfare is as follows: 
𝑆𝑊∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ =
3
8 −
𝜃
8 + 𝛿(
3
8 −
𝜃
4) 
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𝑆𝑊∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ =
3
8 +
8𝛿(3 + 𝛾) − (2 + 𝛾)(2 + 𝛾 + (4 + 𝛾)𝛿)𝜃
8(2 + 𝛾)(  
 The social welfare is increasing due to the entry of the new firm: 
𝑆𝑊ÖÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝑆𝑊ÖÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ =
𝛿z12 − 𝛾(4 + 3𝛾 − (2 + 𝛾)𝜃)|
8(2 + 𝛾)( ≥ 0 
 The below graph illustrates the change in social welfare before and after the 
entry of new energy. The closer substitute the renewable energy becomes for the 
conventional energy source, the social welfare rises. The discount factor affects the 
social welfare in opposite way. The lower the discount factor gets; the difference 
between the social welfare with the entry of new energy and given no entry, tends to 
get lower.   
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ	2	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
 Proposition 4. The entry of the new energy always rises the social welfare 
under the monopoly structure and the available resource stock is in a range of 
𝟎 < 𝑨 ≤ 𝟏
𝟐
(𝟏 − 𝜹) and 𝑨 > 𝟏. 
 In general, my results state that given no Green paradox phenomenon, the social 
welfare always rises with the entry of new producer. Consumer surplus, fossil fuel 
industry’s profit, and the environmental damage, then in period 1 would remain 
constant. The 2nd period social welfare would rise. The new energy would provoke the 
competition, decrease future prices on energy. The consumer surplus would go up. The 
fossil fuel’s demand would decrease, making the environmental damages in period 2 
lower. The profit of the incumbent firm would decrease; however, the total energy 
industry’s profit would go up. At these cases, the development of the new energy would 
help to combat climate change. 
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4.2.2. Social welfare analysis, when there is Green paradox arises  
(Region I: 𝟏
𝟐
(𝟏 − 𝜹) ≤ 𝑨 < 𝟏). 
 In this part we need to divide the social welfare analysis on subsections depends 
on the sales strategies of the incumbent firm, which in turn depends on the entry and 
vary with the resource availability, where  $
(
(1 − 𝛿) ≤ 𝐴 < 1. The subsections are 
shown in the table below.  
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	11	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
 The below graph shows the relationship between the quantity extracted by the 
single firm with and without anticipation of the new energy in period 2 and the 
intertemporal resource constraint. The discount factor and the product differentiated 
parameter: 𝛿 = 0.5, 𝛾 = 0.6. 
[Insert	graph	3	here	] 
 The extraction of the fossil fuel for each subsection would depend on the 
discount factor, the stock of the resource constraint and the substitutability between 
two sources of energy. Higher the resource constraints and closer the product 
substantiality, the higher would be the difference between the sales strategies with 
and without the entry. The below analysis is shown the simulations results for the 
consumer, producer surplus, environmental damage and the social welfare.  13 
Producer surplus. 
 The results of each subsection showed that producer surplus as expected is 
getting higher with the entry of the green energy in period 2: 
Δ𝑃𝑆 = PS∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − PS∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ > 0 
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ	4. 𝑎. ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
 
13 The detailed results for each subsection presented in the Appendix 1. 
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Consumer surplus. 
The consumer surplus would always rise with the number of incumbent or entry 
firms. The expected decline in the demand for the traditional energy would force the 
fossil fuel monopolist to reallocate the extraction towards period 1. The quantity 
extracted would increase and the price of the fossil fuel would go down in period 1. 
The total two-period consumer surplus would increase. 
 The below results show the consumers would always benefit from the entry of 
the new firm: 
Δ𝐶𝑆 = CS∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − CS∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ > 0 
 
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ	4. 𝑏	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
 
Environmental damage 
 As I defined, the first period damage is more harmful. The rise of the current 
extraction would increase the damage in period 1 and, in turn, rise the total damage in 
two periods. Therefore, as seen from the graph 4.c, the environmental damage at first 
increases.  
 However, as long as the resource stock converges to 1, the environmental 
damage without entry is higher than with entry. This would further affect the results of 
the total social welfare.  
 The intuition for this result is that the total extraction within 2 periods with the 
entry would be lower than when there is no entry. Then, given the entry, the incumbent 
firm would speed up the current extraction until the resource constraint would be 
enough to extract equilibrium outputs of $
(
  and $
(\E
 for period 1 and 2 correspondently. 
On the other hand, the single firm, given no entry, would continue to extract resources 
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until it reaches  $
(
  in each period. Then, 2nd period output would be higher under the 
variant with no entry, making the two-time period extraction, and therefore, total 
environmental damage larger under the variant “no entry” of new renewable energy. 
ΔD = D∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − D∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ 
 
[𝑰𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒕	𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒑𝒉	𝟒. 𝒄. 𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆] 
 
Social welfare. 
 The sign of the change in social welfare is unambiguous.  
∆SW = 𝑆𝑊∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝑆𝑊∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ 
 The caveat about whether the social welfare the increase or decraese is 
generated environmental damage.   
 Proposition 5. The social welfare given the entry of renewable energy rises 
as long as the parameter of environmental damage is below its critical value, such 
as 𝜽 < 𝜽𝑴∗ for 
𝟏
𝟐
(𝟏 − 𝜹) < 𝑨 ≤ 𝟒\𝛄
𝟐(𝟐\𝛄)
.  
 The  results show that the social welfare would be maximized  for $
(
(1 − 𝛿) <
𝐴 ≤ q\í
(((\í)
	with the entry of the new energy as long as the parameter of environmental 
damage, which we defined as 𝜃, would be below the corresponding threshold 𝜃Ö∗,
𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ	𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡	𝜃 < 𝜃Ö∗. If the 𝜃 > 𝜃Ö∗, the social welfare with the entry would decrease. 
Given high environmental damage, the competition with the new energy in period 2 
would increase current extraction of the single fossil fuel firm. It means that 
environmental damage would “eat up” the benefits coming from the consumer surplus, 
new energy firm’s profit.  
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 On the other hand, entry of the new firm would decrease the second period 
extraction if the resource stock is large enough. Then, with the increase of the available 
resources, the total environmental damage might be higher without the entry. In this 
case, the entry would always rise the social welfare.  
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ	4. 𝑑. ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
 The simulation results (Graph 4.d) are conducted for the particular values of 
the discount factor and the product sustainability. As long as the resource constraint 
converges to 1, the entry rises the social welfare, where on the graph the thresholds 
takes negative values for a range starting from 𝐴 > 0.92	 (but which depends on the 
parameters value 𝛿, 𝛾).  
As I defined, as long as the quantity of resource constraint is moderate and the 
quantity of the resources extracted in both cases with “entry” and “no entry” is the 
same, the social welfare always rises with the entry of new producer in case of 
emergence of the Green paradox as long as the parameter of environmental damage is 
below its critical value, which I defined for each market structure.14 
 However, as long as the incumbent firm(s) driven by the potential entry would 
stop the resource extraction, but the incumbent monopoly or duopoly given no 
anticipated entry would continue to extract resources until they reach 1 and q
M
 
correspondently, the intuition why social welfare might be lower or higher depends on 
whether the social benefits of the entry of the new producer would be higher or lower 
than the costs of the entry for the society.  
 
14 For instance, incumbent monopoly would extract amount of 1 in two periods given NO ENTRY and 
A is sufficiently large and q\E
(((\E)
 in two periods given ENTRY, where q\E
(((\E)
< 1. The incumbent 
duopoly would extract q
M
 given NO ENTRY and  𝟏𝟐%𝜸(𝟑\𝟐𝜸)
𝟑(𝟑%𝜸𝟐)
 with ENTRY and A is sufficiently large. 
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The intuition behind these results is as follows. Whether the social welfare 
would be higher or lower is depend on whether the social benefits of the entry of the 
new producer would be higher or lower than the costs of the entry for the society.  
The social benefits of entry are driven by the competition in the conventional 
energy industry in period 2, raising the variety of the products available. The prices for 
the energy would be lowered in period 1 and 2, correspondently. The consumer surplus 
would rise for both periods.  
However, the major social costs of the entry are caused by the Green paradox 
phenomenon, which rises current environmental damage. The environmental damage 
is considered as cumulative and, following the Green paradox theory, the flatter 
extraction is desirable because it generates less harm for the society in general. In this 
case, the discount factor is crucial in determining the total environmental damage and 
the total costs of entry for society.  
Therefore, if the society discounts future low and the environmental costs are 
high, the entry of the new producer would decrease the social welfare. The social 
welfare, in the opposite, might be higher with the entry, as long as the society discounts 
the future comparatively high.  
 
    4.3. Incumbent duopoly analysis. 
4.2.1. Social welfare analysis, when there is no Green paradox. 
 
 At first, according to the first part of this chapter, I will start analysis for the 
duopoly from the cases, where the resource constraint is either too low or too high, and 
there is no presence of the Green paradox. Next, I will switch to the part (II), when 
there is a possibility of the Green paradox.  
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 The results of the social welfare under the duopoly market structure within the 
range of the resource constraints: A ≤ $
M
(1 − 𝛿)	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝐴 > q
M
	are as follows. The 
consumer surplus and the total producer surplus would rise with the new firm entry. 
The environmental damage would not change in period 1. Moreover, the environmental 
damage in period 2 would decline given the resource stock available such as 𝐴 > q
M
. 
The fossil fuel duopoly would shrink the extraction with new firm’s entry. The detailed 
analysis in parameter values shown below.  
Region II, where 𝐀 ≤ 𝟏
𝟑
(𝟏 − 𝜹),	No Green paradox. 
 The total profit of the non-renewable firms in two period remains constant as 
the output in period I is not changing due to the entry of the new energy. Consumer 
surplus is increasing: 
𝐶𝑆ïÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝐶𝑆ïðÒÐ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ =
𝛿
8 > 0, 𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝛿 > 0 
 The case when the resource constraint is low (region I) where	A ≤ $
M
(1 − 𝛿) , 
the social welfare is always increasing: 
𝑆𝑊ïÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝑆𝑊ïðÒÐ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ =
3𝛿
8 > 0	𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝛿 > 0 
  Region II, where 𝑨 > 𝟒
𝟑
, 𝐚𝐛𝐮𝐧𝐝𝐚𝐧𝐭	𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐨𝐮𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐬, 𝐧𝐨	𝐠𝐫𝐞𝐞𝐧	𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐝𝐨𝐱. 
 Profit of the non-renewable firm decreases in period II due to competition 
with renewable energy. 
ΠïÐÑ-ÒÓ − ΠïðÒÐ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ = −
𝛾(36 − 33𝛾 + 4𝛾M)𝛿
18(3 − 𝛾()( < 0, 𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝛿 > 0	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝛾 > 0 
Consumer surplus increases: 
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𝐶𝑆ïÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝐶𝑆ïðÒÐ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ =
(81 − 36𝛾 − 84𝛾( + 72𝛾M − 16𝛾q)𝛿
72(3 − 𝛾()( > 0, 𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝛿
> 0	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝛾 > 0 
 The social welfare would increase:	
𝑆𝑊ïÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝑆𝑊ïðÒÐ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ
=
(3 − 2𝛾)z(81 − 78𝛾 − 12𝛾( + 16𝛾M)𝛿 + 4𝛾(18 − 3𝛾 − 4𝛾()𝜃|
72(3 − 𝛾()(
> 0, 𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝛿 > 0	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝛾 > 0 
 Proposition 6. The entry of the new energy always rises the social welfare 
under the incumbent duopoly structure and the available resource in a range: 
𝟎 < 𝑨 ≤ 𝟐
𝟑
(𝟏 − 𝜹) and 𝑨 > 𝟒
𝟑
.   
 To sum up the results from the region I, when there is no possibility of the Green 
paradox, the incumbent duopoly would not speed up extraction. The consumer surplus, 
fossil fuel industry’s profit and the environmental damage in period 1 would remain 
constant.  
 The 2nd period’s social welfare always rise. The new energy would raise the 
concentration in period 2, then the consumer surplus would increase. At these two 
cases, the results are the same as for the monopoly market structure, the development 
of the new energy would help to mitigate climate change. 
 
4.3.1. Social welfare analysis, when there is Green paradox (Region I, where 
𝟐
𝟑
(𝟏 − 𝜹) < 𝑨 < 𝟒
𝟑
, 𝐆𝐫𝐞𝐞𝐧	𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐝𝐨𝐱). 
 Next, the regions, where the Green paradox would occur, by analogy with the 
monopoly, I can separate on several subsections depend on the sales strategies for 
particular resource stock availability. The subsections resented below in the table 12. 
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[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	12	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒]. 
The detailed social welfare analysis is presented below. 15 
Producer surplus. 
 The two-time period producer surplus would in general increase with the entry 
of new energy. The higher or lower the total producer surplus would be depends on the 
price elasticity of demand. As long as the resource availability is low, the incumbent 
duopoly would operate on the elastic demand area, where the increase of the current 
supply due to the Green paradox would rise the producer surplus. However, as long as 
the quantity supplied by the incumbent firms would further increase due to higher 
resource availability, the demand for the fossils in period 1 would be inelastic.  
 Through the Green paradox, the incumbent firms would switch part of the 2nd 
period production towards period 1. The decrease of the current price would offset the 
increase of the current supply. The total producer surplus would decline.  
 As seen from the graph 5.a, the producer surplus would be positive as long as 
the resource constraint converges to non-binding constraint. Higher the resource 
constraint, the higher the first period output the incumbent duopoly would extract and 
lower the losses for the producer surplus in period 1. At the same time as long as the 
resource constraint is higher than   $(%E(M\(E)
(M%EF)
, the second period producer surplus is 
maximized. Therefore, the total producer surplus would start to rise with higher 
resource availability. The detailed simulations results are shown in the graph below. 
∆𝑃𝑆∗ = PS∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − PS∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ 
 
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ	5. 𝑎. ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
 
15 The analysis in parameter values is shown in the Appendix 2.  
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Consumer surplus. 
 Consumer surplus, in opposite, would be higher with the additional source of 
energy in the market as expected: 
 
∆𝐶𝑆∗ = 𝐶𝑆∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝐶𝑆∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ > 0 
 
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ	5. 𝑏. ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
 
Environmental damage 
The caveat of the Green paradox is that it affects the current extraction, 
which in turn rises current damage. As long as the environmental damage 
parameter is high, the Green paradox is curse for the society. 
The incumbent fossil fuel duopoly same as the fossil fuel monopoly affected by 
the entry of the new energy, but at the greater extend. The current damage, therefore, 
would rise more under duopoly rising total 2-time period damage.  
However, the Green paradox might have the positive effect on the environment 
as long as the resource constraint is large enough,	𝐴 > $(%E(M\(E)
M(M%EF)
. At this stage, the 
fossil fuel duopoly would have no incentive to further rise the 1st period output. 
Given the entry, the quantity demanded decreased in period 2. The fossil fuel 
duopoly without anticipation of the entry would continue to allocate available 
resources in order to maximize its profit until it reaches q
M
.  
The difference in sales strategies in 1st period due to Green paradox would 
decline as A committed to q
M
.	 At the same time, the 2nd period output would be higher 
than with the entry. The total extraction would be higher. According to the total 
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damage, it would depend on the value of the discount factor and the parameter of the 
environmental damage. The higher the discount factor, such as the value of the 
discount factor is getting closer to 1, the lower the total damage would be with the 
entry of the energy. 
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ	5. 𝑐. ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
 
Social welfare 
The social welfare would change as follows: 
𝑆𝑊ïÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝑆𝑊ïÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ 
 The sign of the change of social welfare is unambiguous. The consumer surplus 
would always rise with increasing number of incumbent or entry firms in the industry. 
The total producer surplus would be higher with the entry of the new firm. The 
environmental damage would increase.  
 Proposition 7. The social welfare given the entry of the renewable energy 
rises as long as the parameter of the environmental damage is below its critical 
value, such as 𝜽 < 𝜽𝑫∗ for 
𝟏
𝟑
(𝟏 − 𝜹) ≤ 𝑨 ≤ 𝟏𝟐%𝜸(𝟑\𝟐𝜸)
𝟑(𝟑%𝜸𝟐)
.  
 The below graph shows the value of the threshold simulations for the 3 
subsections of the resource availability. 
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ	5. 𝑑. ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
 The social welfare is higher with no entry as long as the 𝜽 > 𝜽𝑫∗ for 
$
M
(1 −
𝛿) ≤ 𝐴 ≤ $(%E(M\(E)
(M%EF)
. If the environmental damage is below the value of the threshold, 
the Green paradox is a blessing for the society. Then, the generated environmental 
damage does not offset the social benefits of the entry of the new firm.  
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 With the further increase in 𝑨, such as  $(%E(M\(E)
(M%EF)
≤ 𝐴 < q
M
, the incumbent firms 
given the entry in period 2 would not further speed up current extraction. Then, the 
entry despite the Green paradox would be a blessing for the society if the total 
environmental damage generated by the sales strategies of the incumbent firms given 
entry would be below the total damage without the Green paradox. 
 The results obtained for the numerical values for 𝛿 = 0.8	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝛾 = 0.6 stated 
that the entry would rise social welfare for $(%E(M\(E)
M(M%EF)
≤ 𝐴 < q
M
, which is numerical 
1.196 ≤ 𝐴 < q
M
. However, for the lower values of the discount factor, the results show 
that if the resource constraint under 𝐴 < 1.237 in numerical values, then the social 
welfare decreases as long as the parameter of the environmental damage is below its 
critical value ( 𝜃 < 𝜃ï∗).	For resource constraint, higher than  𝐴 > 1.237, the entry 
always rises the social welfare.  
 These results coincide with the findings of the incumbent monopoly social 
welfare analysis and therefore, I will use the same intuition to explain the result. In case 
when the social benefits from the entry of the new energy would be higher than the 
costs from the entry for the society, the entry would always rise the social welfare. As 
long as the society discount the 2nd period low and given high environmental damage, 
the total environmental damage would be high, i. e., the social costs of entry would 
exceed the social benefits and social welfare decline with the entry.  
 In case when the society discounts 2nd period high enough, total environmental 
damage would be almost the same for “entry” and “no-entry” cases, then despite high 
environmental damage, the social welfare would be higher with the entry of new firm. 
 To sum up all the findings, we found that the Green paradox would be negative 
for the society’s welfare as long as the environmental damage generated would be 
 70 
higher than the environmental damage threshold. With the further increase of the 𝑨, 
such that: 𝟒\𝛄
𝟐(𝟐\𝛄)
< 𝑨 ≤ 𝟏 for the incumbent monopoly and $(%E(M\(E)
(M%EF)
≤ 𝐴 < q
M
  for the 
incumbent duopoly, the results show that the Green paradox might be a blessing if the 
total environmental damage, generated by the incumbent firm(s) without the Green 
paradox would outweigh the generated total environmental damage with the Green 
paradox.  
  
 71 
Chapter 5. Merger Policies and Environmental Protection. 
 
5.1. Background. 
 
As I defined in the previous chapters, the competition between the incumbent 
firms would speed up current extraction under the Green paradox. In this chapter, I 
would show under what conditions the merger might help to mitigate Green paradox 
and would rise the social welfare.  
In my thesis, I showed the merger as an additional measure that might be 
implemented by the government to alleviate the problem of the Green paradox to 
existing environmental policies, such as pollution taxes and subsidies. The role of the 
pollution taxes, which was already explained in the existing literature, would not be 
discussed in this chapter.16 
To support my arguments, I would like to refer to the real antitrust cases, which 
was discussed by the (Adler, 2005). In the 1930th and 1940th, there were few antitrust 
cases against the action of the fishers in Mississippi, California, Galveston Bay, 
Hawaii. In each case the fisherman, shrimpers and oystermen organized the unions to 
bust their revenues, control the market prices, the size of the harvest and to deter the 
entry. The courts, in respect of these unions, endured the uniform decision: the activity 
of the unions was considered as illegal, which distort the competition and decrease 
consumer surplus. However, it was noted that these unions brought significant 
improvements in the quality of the environment, i. e; the actions of the unions 
conserved the fish stock, rising the number of healthy fish species.  
 
16 For the reference see Hoel (2010), Coulomb&Henriet (2018), Sinn (2008), van der Ploeg (2016) 
 72 
These cases showed that the commitment between the market actors,  aiming 
to increase its profits, resulted in the conservation of natural resources and a decrease 
of the environmental concern. However, environmental protection was not yet reflected 
in the anti-trust legislation.  
Regarding the merger practice in the fossil fuel industry’s level, the largest 
mergers in the oil and gas industries occurred in the 1980th and 1990th amid falling oil 
prices 17 18 (“BP to acquire rest of Standard Oil,” 1987). The statistics of the allowed 
mergers in the oil and gas industry showed the following trends. In general, the mergers 
were proposed aiming to achieve the costs efficiency and economies of scale. The 
merger with synergies  has the opposite effect on social welfare compare to the mergers 
without synergies. The output produced would rise with the costs decline, the prices 
would go down and the consumer surplus would increase.  
Starting from 2000th the number of mergers activity slowdown, but due to the 
Asian crisis in 1998, the restructuring of the oil and gas industry was resumed.19 For 
instance, the merger of the Exxon and Mobil, the largest merger of the 2000th  was also 
proposed with the aim to reduce the costs and raise the profits in a period of the cyclical 
volatility of the oil price (Corlay & Huby, n.d.). 
 
17 Nytimes.com. (2019). F.T.C. Approves Chevron-Gulf Deal. [online] Available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/1984/10/25/business/ftc-approves-chevron-gulf-deal.html 
[Accessed 15 Mar. 2019]. 
 
18 Cole, R. (2019). CITIES SERVICE AGREES TO OCCIDENTAL'S BID IN $4 BILLION 
MERGER. [online] Nytimes.com. Available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/08/26/business/cities-service-agrees-to-occidental-s-bid-in-4-
billion-merger.html [Accessed 15 Mar. 2019]. 
 
19 Ibrahim, Y. (2019). British Petroleum Is Buying Amoco in $48.2 Billion Deal. [online] 
Nytimes.com. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/12/business/british-petroleum-
is-buying-amoco-in-48.2-billion-deal.html [Accessed 15 Mar. 2019]. 
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Presently, the mergers in the oil and gas sector were slow down and remain 
relatively low (Deloitte, 2019). However, there was discovered the trend in the increase 
of the mergers between the shale oil industry firms, especially in the Permian Shale. 
There are around 112 companies operate in the region with a different scale, costs 
efficiency and break-even price, varying $32 to $65. The decline of the current prices 
of oil provokes the boom for the merger and acquisition in the Permian Shale. The 
small and inefficient operators are a force to sell the actives (Deloitte, 2019).20 
According to the forecast of the experts, the potential of the Permian shale oil 
would reach the 8 million barrel per day with the break-even price $30-$40 per barrel 
and the large players, who can achieve the economies of scale, is the key to achieve 
this goal. 21 22 Therefore, the trend for the shale oil is on the verge of a radical 
transformation, following the logic: the more is better. Big Oil companies are 
expanding their strength in the region. For instance, both Exxon and Chevron began to 
show interest in the existing small Permian holdings, preferring small exchanges land 
to big corporate deals. The British Petroleum agreed to buy the assets of the BHP in 
the US shale valued by $10,5 billion.23. 
 
20 Rigzone.com. (2019). Permian Shale Primed For Mergers and Acqusitions. [online] 
Available at: 
https://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/158345/Permian_Shale_Primed_For_Mergers_and_
Acqusitions [Accessed 13 Mar. 2019]. 
 
21 Forbes.com. (2019). Shale Oil Will Face Trouble As Oil Prices Fall Below The Magic 
Threshold. [online] Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenrwald/2018/12/20/shale-oil-
will-face-trouble-as-oil-prices-fall-below-the-magic-threshold/#2621d0381a5c [Accessed 13 
Mar. 2019]. 
 
22 OilPrice.com. (2019). Analysts: Permian Oil Output Set To Double By 2023 | OilPrice.com. 
[online] Available at: https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Analysts-Permian-Oil-
Output-Set-To-Double-By-2023.html [Accessed 13 Mar. 2019]. 
 
23 U.S. (2019). BP pays $10.5 billion for BHP shale assets to beef up U.S. business. [online] 
Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bhp-divestiture-bp/bp-pays-105-billion-for-
bhp-shale-assets-to-beef-up-us-business-idUSKBN1KG34V [Accessed 13 Mar. 2019]. 
 
 
 74 
It turns out, that through a merger of the unconventional oil firms would reduce 
the costs and compete with conventional oil. The OPEC, in turn, would respond by 
reducing prices and increase the current supply of fossil fuels.  
These cases reveal the gaps in the current view of the anti-trust policies, which 
should be rethinking by adding environmental concern. In this regard, I argue that given 
high environmental damage, it is beneficial for the society to allow the existing fossil 
fuel duopoly to merge. The merger of the fossil fuel firms, provided that the fossil fuel 
generates high environmental damage, should be rethinking and the merger is 
recommended to be allowed to achieve higher long-term social welfare.  
In this chapter, I show that when the benefits from the competition in the fossil 
fuel industry are lower than the losses from the generated environmental damage, the 
environmental regulations became preferable to the anti-trust policy. In particular,  I 
would study how does the merger of the fossil fuel firm might improve the social 
welfare, given the resource stock available: 𝟏
𝟑
(𝟐 − (𝟐 − 𝜸)𝜹) < 𝑨 ≤ 𝟒/𝟑 and under 
what stock availability the merger can help to mitigate the Green paradox.  
5.2. Theoretical framework. 
 
I start by conducting the analysis for each particular resource availability, 
depends on which the incumbent fossil fuel firm(s) would change its sales strategies. 
The table below shows 5 regions of the resource availability and the output sales, 
extracted in period 1 by the incumbent monopoly and duopoly. 
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	13	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
I assume that the incumbent fossil fuel firms decide to merge in period 1. I 
assume that the merger is without synergies. The merging parties would propose the 
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merger to the Agency. I assume no lobbying takes place and the agency operates under 
the full information. 
The antitrust legislation is implemented through the merger control, the basis 
of which is Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The merger control strictly forbid the 
commitment, tacit collusion or other factors which might affect the competition, the 
prices of the products and consumer surplus (Whinston, Michael D.  2008). 
On the other hand, the guidelines are a set of rules, followed by the Agency in 
evaluating the proposed mergers and which issued for the information for merging 
parties. However, what is crucial is how the agency conducts the evaluation of the 
proposed mergers. There are two possible standards, which the Agency might use in 
making a final decision: welfare and consumer surplus standards. The debate about 
which of the standard is beneficial for the society given the uncertainty or asymmetry 
of the information, lobbying was discussed by the Besanko & Spulber (1993), Neven 
& Röller (2005), Fridolsson (2015).  
The agency would decide on mergers. I consider that the agency expected to 
evaluate the mergers by using the welfare standards, otherwise, if the agency would 
employ the consumer surplus it would reject the merger without achieving the 
economies of scale. 24 
Let the ∆𝐶𝑆Ö∗ denote the change in the 2-time period consumer surplus before 
and after the merger. The ∆ΠÖ∗  is the change in two-time gross profit of the merging 
firms. The ∆𝑃𝑆Ö∗ is the change in the total producer surplus of all firms in the industry. 
The change in the environmental damage denoted as ∆𝐷Ö∗. If the merger would be 
 
24 The supplementary material about the comparison of the existing standards is shown in Appendix 4.  
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declined by the agency, the consumer surplus, profits and the created environmental 
damage remain the same and the change is zero.  
Before I proceed to the results, it is necessary to note the potential effect of the 
merger on the market participants and environmental concern. At first, the merger 
would decrease the price of the output in period 1. In a later period, due to the entry, 
the price of the energy would fall, and the consumer surplus would increase. However, 
the two-time period consumer surplus would be smaller compared with the non-merger 
case.  
The two-time period gross profit of the merging firms in both periods expected 
to be higher than if two incumbent firms would operate independently in the industry.  
On the other hand, it is considered that the merger, followed by the entry, is not 
profitable for the merging firms, but beneficial for the rest non-merging firms (Werden 
and Froeb, 1998). Indeed, the incumbent firms have no incentive to merge, if they 
anticipate the entry of the new competitor in the later period, where merged parties 
would no longer enjoy the absolute market power, and the effect of the merger would 
vanish. However, as long as I assume the duopoly in the fossil fuel market originally, 
it is always beneficial for the duopoly to merge to the fossil fuel monopoly. 
 The total environmental damage is expected to decrease, as long as the 
premerger output is higher than the total output of the merged firm. Additionally, the 
1st period damage is assumed to be more harmful to the society, therefore, the larger 
the current damage, the higher would be the two-period damage and higher the losses 
for the society.  
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5.3. The summary of the findings.25 
At first, I would start with the results of the producer surplus of the merging 
firms as long as the firms, having higher producer surplus under monopoly, would have 
the incentive to merge.  
The change in the profit of merging firms, ∆ΠÖ∗ would be greater if the agency 
allows the merger. In my model, the entry would occur only in period 2, and in period 
1 the merged firm enjoys the monopoly profit. The 2nd period profit decreases due to 
the entry of the new firm. The two-time period profit is maximized under the merger.  
 The graph below illustrates that the total profit of the merged firm would rise, 
and the incumbent firm has the incentive to merge.  
∆ΠÖ = ΠÖ − ΠÎÖ > 0, 𝑖𝑓𝑓 	𝛿 < 1, 𝛾 < 1 
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ	6	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
The profit of the merged firm might be below the gross profit of the non-merged 
fossil fuel firms given the resource constraint below 𝐴 ≤ ´%E((\E)
((q%EF)
. In this case, the 
merged firm output in period 1 would be less affected by the entry, the monopoly would 
adjust its sales strategies, but at less extent compare to the duopoly. The demand for 
the fossils would be comparatively elastic for the monopoly, which means that the 
consumers become exponentially more prone to purchase a unit of output when the 
price drops, anticipating the entry of the new energy in period 2. Then, duopoly, driven 
by the inner competition, would extract higher quantity and would get higher profit. 
As long as the resource constraint rises, such that 𝐴 > ´%E((\E)
((q%EF)
, the monopoly 
reaches the equilibrium output of $
(
		and have no incentive to further increase it. The 
 
25 The detailed results of the merger for every 5 regions are shown in Appendix 3. 
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profit of the merging firm would be maximized and would exceed the joint profit of 
the non-merging firms. 
Next, the two-period consumer surplus. The results are straightforward. The 
decrease of the concentration in the energy industry would decrease the consumer 
surplus:  
∆𝑪𝑺𝑴∗ = 𝑪𝑺𝑴∗ − 𝑪𝑺𝑵𝑴∗ < 𝟎 
[𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ	7	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
In period 2, the consumer surplus would increase due to the entry of new energy. 
However, in period 1, if two incumbent firms would merge, the consumer surplus 
would be lower. Joint consumer surplus of the two periods decreased with the merger.  
Next, I would switch to environmental damage. The total environmental 
damage as expected would be always higher under the duopoly market structure: 
∆𝐃𝐌∗ = 𝐃𝐌∗ − 𝐃𝐍𝐌∗ > 𝟎 
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ	8	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
And finally, the gross surplus from the merger is expected to be nonnegative 
(to avoid the cumbersome results, the total surplus is presented in the parameter values 
in the graph below: 
∆𝐒𝐖𝐌∗ = 𝐒𝐖𝐌∗ − 𝐒𝐖𝐍𝐌∗ 
From which proposition 8 derived: 
Proposition 9. The social welfare increases if two incumbent firms will 
merge in period 1, if and only if 𝜽 > 𝜽∗.  
Proof. 
The above graph shows the value of the 𝜃∗, when the merger becomes 
beneficial for the society 𝛿 = 0.5, γ = 0.6).  
[𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡	𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ	9	ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒] 
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In general, results stated that whether the social welfare would rise, depends on 
the environmental damage, fossil fuel resource availability and the value of the 
discount factor.  
 The critical value of the environmental damage parameter (𝜽∗)	shows the value, 
where the social welfare under the merged firm would exceed the social welfare of the 
duopoly fossil fuel firms. If the benefits, which the society enjoys from the existing 
market size, outweigh the environmental damage, then, it’s not reasonable to allow the 
merger. If the benefits from the concentration in fossil fuel markets lower than the 
generated environmental damage, there should be done emphasis on the environmental 
protection in making the decision regarding the merger.  
 The value of the threshold as seen from graph 9 decreases with the rise of the 
value of the resource constraint. On the segment, where (
M
(2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿) ≤ A ≤
´%E((\E)
((q%EF)
, the monopoly and duopoly would extract all the available resources within 
two periods. What is important here, is at what speed the extraction takes place in 
period 1 under duopoly and monopoly market structure. The higher the current 
extraction, the larger the total environmental damage.  If the parameter of the 
environmental damage is high, then, besides larger consumer and producer surpluses, 
the social welfare under incumbent duopoly would be below the social welfare under 
the merged firm.  
 The steep downward fall of environmental threshold starting from the segment 
where  ´%E((\E)
((q%EF)
< A ≤ (zM%E
F|\M((%E)
(M%EF)
  can be explained in the following way. The 
merged firm does not have an incentive to further increase the quantity to supply in 
period 1. The total damage under the merged firm would not depend on Green paradox 
phenomenon. The fossil fuel duopoly, in the opposite, would further rise current 
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extraction due to the anticipation of the demand’s fall in period 2. The total damage 
under the duopoly would continue to rise until the resource constraint become non-
binding for the duopoly ((zM%E
F|\M((%E)
(M%EF)
< A ≤ q
M
).  
The merger which proposed and allowed by the agency would help to decrease 
the environmental damage in period 1 and correspondently the total damage.  
As I defined in the previous chapters, the merged firm would not be prone for 
the Green paradox unlike the duopoly, hence oligopoly, if the resource constraint is the 
range of 1 < 𝐴 ≤ q
M
. Therefore, the merger of the incumbent fossil fuel firms would 
help to prevent the negative effect of the Green paradox on social welfare.  
To sum up my results from this chapter, the competition is matters. Along with 
the view of the conventional economics that competition is a blessing for the society, 
it might have a negative flipside, such as the competition-provoked rise of the negative 
environmental externalities. What I defined, after comparing the results with and 
without the merger I found that competition not always the welfare-maximizing. In 
opposite, given the negative externalities, the competition gives an adverse effect on 
the total wellbeing.  
Therefore, when the authorities decide the antitrust policies, the special 
approach should be developed for such industries, taking into account the 
environmental concern and if necessary the competition should be limited. 
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Conclusion. 
 
In my thesis, I showed how the different combinations of the resource stock and 
the market structures affect the emergence of the Green paradox. Secondly, I conducted 
the social welfare analyses and identified when Green paradox would be either a curse 
or blessing for the society. In the third part of my thesis, I worked on the possible 
measure might be done to avoid the Green paradox.  
At first, to show the role of the competition on the emergence of the Green 
paradox, I constructed two-time period models separately for the single incumbent firm 
and incumbent fossil fuel duopoly, which would anticipate the single entry of the new 
clean energy in a later period.  
I defined that the emergence of the Green paradox depends on two factors: the 
existing market structure and the amount of the existing resource stock. I found that if 
the initial resource stock is large enough, the entry of the new energy would not rise 
current emission under the monopoly market structure, but under the duopoly, 
oligopoly market structures, the entry might provoke Green paradox.  
The social welfare given no Green paradox would always rise. The single 
entrant, producing clean energy, would always increase social welfare. For the case 
when the Green paradox arises, the change of two-time period social welfare before 
and after entry of the new energy would depend on the environmental damage 
generated by each additional unit of output.  
The third part flows from the findings, obtained in the first part of my research. 
I found, the merger might be welfare-maximizing, which contradicts conventional 
economics, where no-synergies merger brings the losses for the total social welfare. I 
defined that competition might be a curse for the society as long as this is a competition 
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in the “special” externality generated industries. Therefore, a special approach needed 
in constructing the antitrust policies and, in particular, merger control for such 
industries.  
Based on my findings, the competition should be lessened if it is the reason for 
the rapid generated environmental damage. Moreover, merger for the single fossil fuel 
firm would help to mitigate the problem of Green paradox, given the non-binding 
amount of the reserves in situ for the merged firm. This would help to avoid the rise of 
the current negative environmental externalities due to anticipating the entry of the new 
firm. Therefore, if the benefits of the reduced negative externalities would be higher 
than the benefits of the retention of the concentration in the fossil fuel market, the 
merger would maximize total social welfare. 
In my work, I abstract from the subsidies and its effect on the Green paradox. 
The possible extension of my future work might be the comparison between two 
policies: the adoption of the subsidies for the renewable energy and no-subsidies 
policies, instead of comparison between the cases with and without the entry of the new 
firm.  
The subsidies would indeed motivate the new firm to enter the industry in 
period 2. The direct effect of the subsidies on the Green paradox would depend on the 
form of the subsidies. The lump-sum subsidies would indirectly affect the current 
extraction rate. It would help to ease the entry to the energy industry for the new firm(s), 
which would encourage the competition in a later period and in turn affects the current 
extraction given the moderate values of the resource constraint.  
Per unit subsidies would affect the entry by decreasing the costs of production 
for renewable energy, which is considered to be more expensive in the existing 
literature compared to the conventional energy sources. Therefore, in a later period the 
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competition would be enhanced by the entry. Moreover, given the allocation of per unit 
subsidies, renewable energy would become more competitive in period 2 to the 
conventional sources of energy. This would motivate the producers of the conventional 
energy speed up current extraction further. In this regard, the Green paradox would be 
worsened.  
Additionally, I would consider the empirical calibrations for the merger model 
to get the approximate results for the environmental threshold and the role of the merger 
in case of the oligopoly market structure. Another possible extension of my work would 
be to use a continuous time model, which would help to avoid tedious mathematical 
calculations and simplify the analysis of my research.  
Furthermore, I aim to add the other factors that further affects the Green 
paradox, for instance, the development of the energy sources, such as biofuel, wind, 
solar, which might be close substitutes to conventional fossil fuels. In my thesis, I 
consider the incumbent duopoly with asymmetric costs, however, the use of the 
oligopoly market structure would generalize my results along with asymmetric 
resource constraints. These investigations I leave for future research. 
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Appendix 1 
The subsection 1: 𝟏
𝟐
(𝟏 − 𝜹) ≤ 𝑨 < 𝟏𝟔%𝜸(𝟐(𝟐\𝜸)\𝜸(𝟐%𝜸)𝜹))
𝟒(𝟒%𝜸𝟐)
. 
 
 Given the entry of the new energy the two-time period producer surplus of the incumbent firm 
would go down, such as: 
PS∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − PS∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ =
𝛾𝛿z8𝐴(𝛾 − 8𝐴(1 + 𝛾 + 𝛿 − 𝛾𝛿) + 𝛾(2 − 3𝛿 + 3𝛿() + 4(1 − 𝛿()|
8(1 + 𝛿)(2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿) ≤ 0 
The consumer surplus given the competition from the new entrant would always increase.  
𝐶𝑆∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝐶𝑆∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ
= (𝛿(16𝛾𝛿M(1 + 𝛿) − 144𝐴((−2 + (−2 + 𝛾()𝛿)( + 𝛾q𝛿(28 − 19𝛿 − 191𝛿()
− 64𝛾®𝛿((−1 + 𝛿() − 64𝛾(1 + 𝛿)((−3 − 𝛿 + 4𝛿() + 16(1 + 𝛿)((25 − 23𝛿
+ 16𝛿() + 4𝛾M𝛿(−57 − 64𝛿 + 57𝛿( + 64𝛿M) − 4𝛾((15 + 70𝛿 − 53𝛿( − 60𝛿M
+ 48𝛿q)))/(288(1 + 𝛿)(−2 + (−2 + 𝛾()𝛿)() > 0 
The change in the environmental damage: 
𝐷∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝐷∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ
= ((𝛾𝛿(1 + 𝛿 + 𝛾(1 − 2𝐴 − 𝛿))(4 + 𝛿(−4𝛿 + 𝛾(1 + 𝛾(−1 + 𝛿) + 𝛿) + 2𝐴(2
− 2𝛿( + 𝛾((−1 + (−1 + 𝛿)𝛿))))𝜃)/(8(1 + 𝛿)((2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)()) 
  The social welfare is rising or decreasing regarding the value of the environmental damage, 
the substitutivity between the energy sources and the discount factor. 
𝑆𝑊∗ − 𝑆𝑊∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ
= ((48 − 64𝛾 + 28𝛾M − 9𝛾q)𝛿® + 16(1 − 2𝐴)𝜃 + 𝛿M(288 + 𝛾(−16𝐴(𝛾(−3
+ 𝛾() + 16𝐴(−18 + 5𝛾(1 + 𝛾)) + 𝛾(−140 + 𝛾(−28 + 15𝛾))) − 8(−2
+ 𝛾()(−4𝐴( + (1 + 2(−1 + 𝐴)𝐴)𝛾()𝜃) + 4𝛿(12 + 8(2 − 3𝐴)𝛾 − 16𝐴(𝜃 + (−1
+ 2𝐴)𝛾((−7 + 6𝐴 + 4𝜃)) + 2𝛿q(−16(4 + 3𝐴)𝛾 + 2(7 + 10𝐴)𝛾M + 8(12 + 𝜃
− 2𝐴𝜃) + 2𝛾((−21 + 20𝐴 − 4𝜃 + 8𝐴𝜃) + 𝛾q(9 + 2𝜃 − 4𝐴(4 + 𝜃)))
− 4𝛿((8(−4 + 9𝐴)𝛾 + (7 − 10𝐴)𝛾M + (−1 + 2𝐴)𝛾q(−3 + 2𝐴 + 𝜃) + 8(−6 + 𝜃
− 2𝐴𝜃 + 4𝐴(𝜃) + 𝛾((7 − 4𝜃 + 4𝐴(5 − 6𝐴 + 2𝜃
− 4𝐴𝜃))))/(32(1 + 𝛿)((−2 + (−2 + 𝛾()𝛿)() 
The value of threshold is: 
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𝜃Ö∗ = ((𝛿(1 + 𝛿)(−48(1 + 𝛿)M + 32𝛾(1 + 𝛿)((−2 + 3𝐴 + 2𝛿) − 4𝛾M𝛿(1 + 𝛿)(−7 + 10𝐴 + 7𝛿)
+ 𝛾q𝛿(12 + 16𝐴( + 32𝐴(−1 + 𝛿) + 9(−3 + 𝛿)𝛿) − 4𝛾((1 + 𝛿)(7 − 21𝛿
+ 4𝐴(−5 + 3𝐴 + 5𝛿))))/(4(1 − 2𝐴 − 𝛿)(1 − (1 − 2𝐴)𝛿)(2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)()) 
 
The subsection 2: 𝟏𝟔%𝜸(𝟐(𝟐\𝜸)\𝜸(𝟐%𝜸)𝜹))
𝟒(𝟒%𝜸𝟐)
≤ 𝑨 ≤ q\í
(((\í)
. 
 
 Given the entry of the new energy the two-time period profit of the incumbent firm would go 
down, such as: 
PS∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − PS∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ =
(($%(^)E((\E)&%zq\E%(^((\E)|
F
%E(q\E)&F
q((\E)F($\&)
> 0  
  The consumer surplus given the competition from the new entrant would always increase.  
𝐶𝑆∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝐶𝑆∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ
=
z(4𝐴(2 − 𝛾)(2 + 𝛾)( + 2𝛾((−1 + 𝛿)( + 𝛾M(1 − 𝛿)( + 8𝐴(−4 + 𝛾()(1 + 𝛿) + 16𝛿(3 + 𝛿) − 4𝛾(2 + 𝛿 + 3𝛿()|
(8(2 − 𝛾)(2 + 𝛾)((1 + 𝛿)))
> 0 
The change in the environmental damage: 
𝐷∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝐷∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ
=
1
8 (
4(−1 + 𝐴(2 + 𝛾))(
(2 + 𝛾)( +
4𝐴𝛿
2 + 𝛾 −
2𝐴𝛿(−1 + 2𝐴 + 𝛿)
1 + 𝛿 −
(−1 + 𝛿 − 2𝐴𝛿)(
(1 + 𝛿)( )𝜃 
  The social welfare is rising or decreasing regarding the value of the environmental damage, 
the substitutivity between the energy sources and the discount factor. 
𝑆𝑊∗ − 𝑆𝑊∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ
=
1
8(−2 + 𝛾)(2 + 𝛾)((1 + 𝛿)( (4𝛾(2 + 𝛿 + 9𝛿
M − 2𝛿((−4 + 𝜃) − 2𝜃)
− 𝛾M(−1 + 𝛿)((3 + 3𝛿 − 𝜃) − 32(−2 + 3𝛿( + 𝛿M − 𝛿𝜃) + 4𝐴((−2
+ 𝛾)(2 + 𝛾)((−1 − 𝜃 + 𝛿(𝜃 − 𝛿(1 + 𝜃)) − 2𝛾((7 + 3𝛿M − 𝛿((−1 + 𝜃) − 𝜃
+ 𝛿(5 + 2𝜃)) + 2𝐴(−4 + 𝛾()(4(3 + 𝜃 + 2𝛿(1 + 𝜃) − 𝛿((1 + 𝜃)) + 𝛾(−1
+ 𝛿)(−4 + 𝛿(𝜃 − 𝛿(4 + 𝜃)))) 
 The results are shown that if the two energy sources get closer substitutes, social welfare 
decreases. The discount factor, in the opposite, softens the green paradox, decreasing the speed of current 
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extraction. The lower the present value of the future entry and the loss associated with it, the lower the 
speed of extraction today.  
𝜃Ö∗ = ((1 + 𝛿)((−2 + 𝛾)(−8 − 3𝛾 + 2𝐴(2 + 𝛾))(−4 − 𝛾 + 2𝐴(2 + 𝛾)) + 2(32 + 4𝐴(−2 + 𝛾)(1
+ 𝛾)(2 + 𝛾) + 𝛾(2 − 𝛾(2 + 3𝛾)))𝛿 + (32 + 3𝛾(−12 + 𝛾(2 + 𝛾)))𝛿())/((−2
+ 𝛾)(−4 + 2𝐴(2 + 𝛾) + 𝛾(−1 + 𝛿))(𝛾(−1 + 𝛿) + 4𝛿 + 2𝐴(2 + 𝛾)(−1 + (−1
+ 𝛿)𝛿))) 
  
 The subsection 3: 𝟒\𝛄
𝟐(𝟐\𝛄)
< 𝑨 ≤ 𝟏. 
 
 Given the entry of the new energy the two-time period profit of the incumbent firm would go 
down, such as: 
PS∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − PS∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ =
𝛿(4𝐴((2 + 𝛾)( − 8𝐴(2 + 𝛾)( + 4𝛾(3 − 𝛿) + 𝛾((3 − 𝛿) + 4(5 + 𝛿))
4(2 + 𝛾)((1 + 𝛿) > 0 
 As the single incumbent firm facing the threat of the new entrant, it would increase the first-
period output.  The price of fossil fuel would go down. Moreover, the 2nd period demand would decrease, 
and the quantity demanded would reduce.  
  The consumer surplus given the competition from the new entrant would always increase. 
Furthermore, as the incumbent firm would speed up the extraction, the consumer surplus would further 
increase in period 1.  
𝐶𝑆∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝐶𝑆∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ =
𝛿(4𝐴((2 − 𝛾)(2 + 𝛾)( + 𝛾(4 + 𝛾(2 + 𝛾)(−3 + 𝛿) − 12𝛿) + 16(3 + 𝛿))
8(2 − 𝛾)(2 + 𝛾)((1 + 𝛿)
> 0 
The change in the environmental damage: 
𝐷∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝐷∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ =
𝛿(2(2 + 𝛾) − 𝐴(𝛾(1 − 𝛿)( − 8𝛿) − 2𝐴((2 + 𝛾)(1 + 2𝛿))𝜃
4(2 + 𝛾)(1 + 𝛿)(  
  The social welfare is rising or decreasing regarding the value of the environmental damage, 
the substitutivity between the energy sources and the discount factor. 
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𝑆𝑊∗ − 𝑆𝑊∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ
=
1
8(−2 + 𝛾)(2 + 𝛾)((1 + 𝛿)( 𝛿(𝛾
M(9 + 6𝛿 − 3𝛿( − 4𝜃) − 32(4 + 5𝛿 + 𝛿( − 𝜃)
− 2𝛾((−9 − 6𝛿 + 3𝛿( + 4𝜃) + 4𝛾(−3 + 6𝛿 + 9𝛿( + 4𝜃) + 4𝐴((−2
+ 𝛾)(2 + 𝛾)((1 + 𝛿 + 𝜃 + 2𝛿𝜃) + 2𝐴(−4 + 𝛾()(−8(2 + 𝛿(2 + 𝜃)) + 𝛾(−8 + 𝜃
+ 𝛿(𝜃 − 2𝛿(4 + 𝜃)))) 
 Then,  
𝜃Ö∗
=
(1 + 𝛿)(−(2 + 𝛾)(9𝛾( + 4(−4 + 𝐴)𝐴(−4 + 𝛾()) + 3𝛾(−12 + 𝛾(2 + 𝛾))𝛿 + 4(3𝛾 + 8(4 + 𝛿)))
2(−4 + 𝛾()(−2(2 + 𝛾) + 𝐴(𝛾(−1 + 𝛿)( − 8𝛿 + 2𝐴(2 + 𝛾)(1 + 2𝛿)))  
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Appendix 2. 
The subsection 1: 𝟐
𝟑
(𝟏 − 𝜹) ≤ 𝑨 < 𝟐z𝟑%𝜸
𝟐|\𝟑(𝟐%𝜸)
𝟔(𝟑%𝜸𝟐)
. 
 
 Given the entry of the new energy the two-time period producer surplus of the incumbent firm 
would go down, such as: 
PS∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − PS∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ
= (𝛿(36(1 + 𝛿)M + 24𝛾M𝛿(1 + 𝛿)(−1 + 2𝐴 + 𝛿) − 16𝛾(1 + 𝛿)((−5 + 9𝐴 + 5𝛿)
+ 4𝛾((1 + 𝛿)(8 + 27𝐴( + 30𝐴(−1 + 𝛿) + 𝛿(−17 + 7𝛿)) − 𝛾q𝛿(8 + 36𝐴(
+ 36𝐴(−1 + 𝛿) + 𝛿(−13 + 11𝛿))))/(36(1 + 𝛿)(−2 + (−2 + 𝛾()𝛿)() 
The consumer surplus given the competition from the new entrant would always increase.  
𝐶𝑆∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝐶𝑆∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ
= 𝛿(−12𝛾M(2 + 𝐴 − 2𝛿)𝛿(1 + 𝛿) + 8𝛾(2 + 9𝐴 − 2𝛿)(1 + 𝛿)( + 36(1 + 𝛿)M
+ 𝛾q𝛿(−16 + 36𝐴( + (41 − 7𝛿)𝛿) − 4𝛾((1 + 𝛿)(−4 + 27𝐴( + 12𝐴(−1 + 𝛿)
+ 𝛿(19 + 7𝛿))) 
The change in the environmental damage: 
𝐷∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝐷∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ
= ((𝛾𝛿(2(1 + 𝛿) + 𝛾(2 − 3𝐴 − 2𝛿))(8 + 𝛿(−8𝛿 + 2𝛾(1 + 𝛾(−1 + 𝛿) + 𝛿)
+ 3𝐴(2 − 2𝛿( + 𝛾((−1 + (−1 + 𝛿)𝛿))))𝜃)/(18(1 + 𝛿)((2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)()) 
  The social welfare is rising or decreasing regarding the value of the environmental damage, 
the substitutivity between the energy sources and the discount factor. 
𝑆𝑊∗ − 𝑆𝑊∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ
= (𝛿(𝛾q𝛿(4𝜃(3𝐴 + 2𝛿 − 2)(3𝐴((𝛿 − 1)𝛿 − 1) + 2(𝛿 − 1)) − (𝛿 + 1)(36𝐴(
+ 72𝐴(𝛿 − 1) + 𝛿(29𝛿 − 67) + 32)) + 4𝛾((𝛿 + 1)((𝛿 + 1)(27𝐴( + 48𝐴(𝛿 − 1)
+ 𝛿(7𝛿 − 53) + 20) − 2𝜃(9𝐴((𝛿 − 1)𝛿 + 6𝐴(𝛿 − 1)((𝛿 − 1)𝛿 + 2) + 2𝛿(5𝛿
− 7) + 8)) − 12𝛾M𝛿(𝛿 + 1)((𝐴(2(𝛿 − 2)𝜃 − 7) − 6𝛿 + 6) + 8𝛾(𝛿 + 1)((2(𝛿
− 1)𝜃(3𝐴𝛿 + 4) − (𝛿 + 1)(27𝐴 + 22(𝛿 − 1)))
+ 108(𝛿 + 1)q))/(72(𝛿 + 1)(((𝛾( − 2)𝛿 − 2)() 
The value of threshold is: 
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𝜃ï∗ = ((1 + 𝛿)(8𝛾(27𝐴 + 22(−1 + 𝛿))(1 + 𝛿)( − 108(1 + 𝛿)M − 12𝛾M𝛿(1 + 𝛿)(−6 + 7𝐴 + 6𝛿)
− 4𝛾((1 + 𝛿)(20 + 27𝐴( + 48𝐴(−1 + 𝛿) + 𝛿(−53 + 7𝛿)) + 𝛾q𝛿(32 + 36𝐴(
+ 72𝐴(−1 + 𝛿) + 𝛿(−67 + 29𝛿))))/(4𝛾(−2(1 + 𝛿) + 𝛾(−2 + 3𝐴 + 2𝛿))(8
+ 𝛿(−8𝛿 + 2𝛾(1 + 𝛾(−1 + 𝛿) + 𝛿) + 3𝐴(2 − 2𝛿( + 𝛾((−1 + (−1 + 𝛿)𝛿))))) 
 
  The subsection 2: 	(zM%E
F|\M((%E)
(M%EF)
≤ 𝐴 < q
M
. 
 
 Given the entry of the new energy the two-time period producer surplus of the incumbent firm 
would go down, such as: 
PS∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − PS∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ
=
1
36(−3 + 𝛾()((1 + 𝛿) 𝛿(−72𝐴(−3 + 𝛾
()( + 36𝐴((−3 + 𝛾()( + 9(41 + 9𝛿)
− 2𝛾(𝛾(45 − 51𝛿) + 4𝛾M(−3 + 𝛿) + 90(1 + 𝛿))) 
The consumer surplus given the competition from the new entrant would always increase.  
𝐶𝑆∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝐶𝑆∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ
=
1
72(−3 + 𝛾()((1 + 𝛿) 𝛿(−36𝐴
((−3 + 𝛾()( + 9(73 + 9𝛿) + 4𝛾(−9(1 + 𝛿)
+ 𝛾(−3(39 + 7𝛿) + 2𝛾(9 + 6𝛾 + 9𝛿 − 2𝛾𝛿)))) 
The change in the environmental damage: 
𝐷∗ÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝐷∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ =
1
18 (
3(−2 + 𝛾)(−12 + 𝛾(3 + 2𝛾))𝛿
(−3 + 𝛾()( −
(2 + (−2 + 3𝐴)𝛿)(
(1 + 𝛿)( )𝜃 
  The social welfare is rising or decreasing regarding the value of the environmental damage, 
the substitutivity between the energy sources and the discount factor. 
𝑆𝑊∗ − 𝑆𝑊∗ÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ
=
1
72(−3 + 𝛾()((1 + 𝛿)( 𝛿(−24𝛾
M(1 + 𝛿)((−3 + 𝜃) − 32𝛾q(−3 + (−2 + 𝛿)𝛿
+ 2𝜃) + 36𝛾(1 + 𝛿)((−11 + 6𝜃) + 24𝐴(−3 + 𝛾()((−6(1 + 𝛿) + (−1 + 𝛿)(𝜃)
+ 36𝐴((−3 + 𝛾()((1 + 𝛿 + 𝜃 + 2𝛿𝜃) + 9(155 + 182𝛿 + 27𝛿( − 32(3 + 𝛿(2
+ 𝛿))𝜃) + 12𝛾((−54 + 33𝜃 + 𝛿(−44 + 10𝛿 + 2𝜃 + 𝛿𝜃))) 
The value of threshold is: 
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𝜃ï∗ = (1 + 𝛿)(144𝐴(−3 + 𝛾()( − 36𝐴((−3 + 𝛾()( − 9(155 + 27𝛿) + 4𝛾(99(1 + 𝛿) + 2𝛾(81
+ 4𝛾((−3 + 𝛿) − 15𝛿 − 9𝛾(1 + 𝛿)))))/(4(−16𝛾q + 6𝐴(−3 + 𝛾()((−1 + 𝛿)(
+ 54𝛾(1 + 𝛿)( − 6𝛾M(1 + 𝛿)( + 9𝐴((−3 + 𝛾()((1 + 2𝛿) − 72(3 + 𝛿(2 + 𝛿))
+ 3𝛾((33 + 𝛿(2 + 𝛿)))) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 101 
Appendix 3. 
Subsection 𝟏: 𝟐
𝟑
(𝟐 − (𝟐 − 𝜸)𝜹) ≤ 𝑨 ≤ 𝟏𝟔%𝜸(𝟐(𝟐\𝜸)\𝜸(𝟐%𝜸)𝜹))
𝟒(𝟒%𝜸𝟐)
 
 
Under the horizontal separation, the Cournot equilibrium (the detailed derivation of the 
equilibrium outputs is presented in the previous chapters) given the entry of the new energy, indexed as 
∗ is:  
I period:	𝑞$$
∗ = 𝑞($
∗ =
q%}q%(E%Mz(%EF|&
\M((%EF)&
;	𝑃$∗ = 1 −
q\z(\(E%MEF|&
\M((%EF)&
 
II period:	𝑞$(
∗ = 𝑞((
∗ = $%((%E)&
\M((%EF)&
; 𝑧M(
∗ = %(E\&%qE&%E
F&
((\(&%EF&)
; 		𝑃(∗ =
q\´&\E³&\EF((\q&)%(E(M\®&)
((\((%EF)&)
 
Two-time period producer surplus, consumer surplus and the social welfare: 
ΠÎÖ∗ =
4 − (8 − 4𝛾 + 9𝐴(4 − 𝛾 − 𝛾( − 𝐴(2 − 𝛾()))𝛿 + (2 − 𝛾)(𝛿(
18 + 9(2 − 𝛾()𝛿  
 	PSÎÖ∗ =
$
M(%(\(%(\EF)&)F
(32 + 𝛿(4 + 80𝛾 + 40𝛿 − 36𝐴((4 − 3𝛾( + (−2 + 𝛾()(𝛿) + 12𝐴(24 −
2𝛾(6 + 5𝛾) + (24 + (−2 + 𝛾)𝛾(6 + 𝛾(10 + 3𝛾)))𝛿) + 𝛿(68𝛿 + 𝛾(−80𝛿 − 𝛾(4(1 + 𝛿) + 3𝛾(8 +
(−8 + 𝛾)𝛿)))))) 
𝐶𝑆ÎÖ∗
=
64 + (116 + 88𝛾 − 108𝛾()𝛿 + 4(38 + 18𝛾 − 35𝛾( − 9𝛾M + 9𝛾q)𝛿( + (100 − 16𝛾 − 92𝛾( + 24𝛾M + 9𝛾q)𝛿M
72(2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)(  
𝑆𝑊ÎÖ∗ =
1
72 (32 + 11𝛿 − 16𝛿
( − 64(1 − 𝛿)(𝜃) 
Under the horizontal integration I got: 
I period:	𝑞$$
∗ = (($%&)\(&^z(%E
F|\E&
(((($\&)%EF&)
; 𝑃$∗ =
(\(%E%(EF%(^((%EF))&
q\(((%EF)&
;  
II period:𝑞$(
∗ = (%q^%(&\E&
((%(%(&\EF&)
; 𝑃(∗ =
$
q
2 − 𝛾 +
(}q%E%EF%(^z(%EF|
(\((%EF)&
 ; 𝑧((
∗ = q($\&)%E
F&\(E($%(^%&)
´\q((%EF)&
;		 
Two-time period consumer surplus, producer surplus and the social welfare: 
	ΠÖ∗ =
4 − 𝛿(8 − 4𝛾 + 8𝐴(4 − 𝛾 − 𝛾( − 𝐴(2 − 𝛾()) + (2 − 𝛾)(𝛿)
16 + 8(2 − 𝛾()𝛿  
𝑃𝑆Ö∗ =
1
16(−2 + (−2 + 𝛾()𝛿)( (16 + 𝛿(−4(−8 + 𝛾)𝛾 + 4(4 + 𝛾
( − 3𝛾M)𝛿 − (−32 + 𝛾(32 + 𝛾(8
+ (−12 + 𝛾)𝛾)))𝛿( − 16𝐴((4 − 3𝛾( + (−2 + 𝛾()(𝛿) + 8𝐴(16 − 2𝛾(4 + 3𝛾)
+ (2 + 𝛾)(8 + 𝛾(−8 + 𝛾(−1 + 2𝛾)))𝛿))) 
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𝐶𝑆Ö∗ =
1
32(−2 + (−2 + 𝛾()𝛿)( (16 + 𝛿(4𝛾
M(−1 + 𝛿)𝛿 + 5𝛾q𝛿( + 16𝛿(1 + 2𝛿) + 16𝐴((4 − 3𝛾(
+ (−2 + 𝛾()(𝛿) − 8𝐴𝛾(−2(2 + 𝛾) + (−4 + 𝛾(2 + 𝛾))𝛿) + 4𝛾((−3 + 𝛿 − 8𝛿())) 
𝑆𝑊Ö∗ =
1
32(−2 + (−2 + 𝛾()𝛿)( (−16(−3 + 𝜃) + 𝛿(28𝛾
M(−1 + 𝛿)𝛿 + 3𝛾q𝛿( − 16𝛾(−1 + 𝛿)(4
+ 4𝛿 − 𝜃) + 16𝛿(3 + 6𝛿 − 𝜃) + 32𝜃 + 8𝐴(32 − 12𝛾 − 10𝛾( + 32𝛿 − 12𝛾𝛿
− 22𝛾(𝛿 + 5𝛾M𝛿 + 4𝛾q𝛿 − (2 + 𝛾((−2 + 𝛿) − 2𝛿)(2 + (−2 + 𝛾)𝛿)𝜃) − 4𝛾((5
+ 𝛿(−3 + 12𝛿 + 𝜃)) − 16𝐴((𝛾q𝛿(1 + 𝜃) + 4(1 + 𝛿 + 𝜃 + 2𝛿𝜃) − 𝛾((3 + 4𝛿
+ 6𝛿𝜃)))) 
The change in the consumer surplus: 
∆𝐶𝑆Ö∗ = 𝐶𝑆ÎÖ∗ − 𝐶𝑆Ö∗
= 	
(2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿)(56 − 𝛿(56𝛿 + 9𝛾M𝛿 − 4𝛾(1 + 𝛿) − 6𝛾((−7 + 4𝐴 + 7𝛿)))
288(2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)(  
The change in the profit of the merged firm: 
∆ΠÖ∗ = ΠÎÖ∗ − ΠÖ∗ =
(2 + (−2 + 𝛾)𝛿)(
72(−2 + (−2 + 𝛾()𝛿) 
The change in the total producer surplus:  
∆PSÖ∗ = PSÎÖ∗ − PSÖ∗ =
(2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿)(𝛿(8𝛿 − 𝛾(20(1 + 𝛿) − 3𝛾(6 − 8𝐴 − (6 + 𝛾)𝛿))) − 8)
144(2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)(  
 Change in environmental damage: 
∆DÖ∗ = DÎÖ∗ − DÖ∗ =
(2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿)(14 − 7(2 − 𝛾)𝛿 + 6𝐴(2 − 𝛾((2 − 𝛿) − 2𝛿)𝛿)𝜃
72(2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)(  
The change in two-time period social welfare: 
∆SW-∗ = SW.-∗ − SW-∗
=
1
288(2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)( (2 + (2 − 𝛾)𝛿)(−15𝛾
M𝛿( + 4𝛾𝛿(11 + 11𝛿 − 7𝜃) + 8(1
− 𝛿)(5 − 7𝜃 + 𝛿(5 − 6𝐴𝜃)) − 6𝛾(𝛿(1 − 𝛿 + 4𝐴(1 − (2 − 𝛿)𝜃))) 
The 𝜃∗ is the critical value of the environmental damage derived from the inequality below: 
 where:  
𝜃∗ =
40 + 𝛿(−40𝛿 + 𝛾(44(1 + 𝛿) − 3𝛾(2 + 8𝐴 − (2 − 5𝛾)𝛿)))
56 − 4(7(2 − 𝛾) − 6𝐴(2 − 𝛾((2 − 𝛿) − 2𝛿))𝛿  
 
 
Subsection 𝟐: 𝟏𝟔%𝜸(𝟐(𝟐\𝜸)\𝜸(𝟐%𝜸)𝜹))
𝟒(𝟒%𝜸𝟐)
≤ 𝑨 ≤ 𝟖%𝜸(𝟐\𝜸)
𝟐(𝟒%𝜸𝟐)
 
 
Under the horizontal separation, I got:  
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I period:	𝑞$$
∗ = 𝑞($
∗ =
q%}q%(E%Mz(%EF|&
\M((%EF)&
;	𝑃$∗ = 1 −
q\z(\(E%MEF|&
\M((%EF)&
 
II period:	𝑞$(
∗ = 𝑞((
∗ = $%((%E)&
\M((%EF)&
; 𝑧M(
∗ = %(E\&%qE&%E
F&
((\(&%EF&)
; 		𝑃(∗ =
q\´&\E³&\EF((\q&)%(E(M\®&)
((\((%EF)&)
 
Two-time period consumer surplus, producer surplus and the social welfare: 
 	PSÎÖÌ =
$
M(%(\(%(\EF)&)F
(32 + 𝛿(4 + 80𝛾 + 40𝛿 − 36𝐴((4 − 3𝛾( + (−2 + 𝛾()(𝛿) + 12𝐴(24 −
2𝛾(6 + 5𝛾) + (24 + (−2 + 𝛾)𝛾(6 + 𝛾(10 + 3𝛾)))𝛿) + 𝛿(68𝛿 + 𝛾(−80𝛿 − 𝛾(4(1 + 𝛿) + 3𝛾(8 +
(−8 + 𝛾)𝛿)))))) 
ΠÎÖ∗ =
4 − (8 − 4𝛾 + 9𝐴(4 − 𝛾 − 𝛾( − 𝐴(2 − 𝛾()))𝛿 + (2 − 𝛾)(𝛿(
18 + 9(2 − 𝛾()𝛿  
𝐶𝑆ÎÖ∗
=
64 + (116 + 88𝛾 − 108𝛾()𝛿 + 4(38 + 18𝛾 − 35𝛾( − 9𝛾M + 9𝛾q)𝛿( + (100 − 16𝛾 − 92𝛾( + 24𝛾M + 9𝛾q)𝛿M
72(2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)(  
𝑆𝑊ÎÖ∗ =
1
72 (32 + 11𝛿 − 16𝛿
( − 64(1 − 𝛿)(𝜃) 
Under the horizontal integration I got: 
I period:	𝑞$$
∗ = 𝐴 − $
(\E
; 𝑃$∗ =
M\E%^((\E)
(\E
;  
II period:𝑞$(
∗ = $
(\E
; 𝑃(∗ =
$
(\E
; 𝑧((
∗ = $
(\E
;		 
Two-time period consumer surplus, producer surplus and the social welfare: 
𝐶𝑆Ö∗ =
(1 − 𝐴(2 + 𝛾))( + 2(1 + 𝛾)𝛿
2(2 + 𝛾)(  
𝑃𝑆Ö∗ =
𝐴(2 + 𝛾)(4 + 𝛾 − 𝐴(2 + 𝛾)) − 3 − 𝛾 + 2𝛿
(2 + 𝛾)(  
	ΠÖ∗ =
𝐴(2 + 𝛾)(4 + 𝛾) + 𝛿 − 3 − 𝛾 − 𝐴((2 + 𝛾)(
(2 + 𝛾)(  
𝑆𝑊Ö∗ =
𝐴(2 + 𝛾)(6 + 2𝛾 + 2𝜃 − 𝛿𝜃) − 5 + 2𝛾(1 − 𝛿) + 6𝛿 − 𝜃 − 𝐴((2 + 𝛾)((1 + 𝜃)
2(2 + 𝛾)(  
The change in the total consumer surplus: 
∆𝐶𝑆Ö∗ = 𝐶𝑆ÎÖ∗ − 𝐶𝑆Ö∗
= ((6𝐴(2 + 𝛾) + 2(−7 + 𝛿) + 𝛾(−4 + 𝛾𝛿))(−8(1 + 2𝛾 − 6𝛿) + 6𝐴(2 + 𝛾)(−4
+ (−4 + 𝛾()𝛿) + 𝛿(56𝛿 + 𝛾(8 + 24𝛿 + 𝛾(−2 − 50𝛿 + 3𝛾(4 + (−4
+ 3𝛾)𝛿))))))/(72(2 + 𝛾)((−2 + (−2 + 𝛾()𝛿)()	 
The change in the profit of the merged firm: 
∆ΠÖ∗ = ΠÎÖ∗ − ΠÖ∗ =
(3𝐴(2 + 𝛾) − 5 − 𝛾 − (1 − 𝛾()𝛿)(6𝐴(2 + 𝛾) − 2(7 − 𝛿) − 𝛾(4 − 𝛾𝛿))
9(2 + 𝛾)((2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)  
 The change in the total producer surplus:  
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∆PSÖ∗ = PSÖ∗ − PSÎÖ∗
= −(((6𝐴(2 + 𝛾) + 2(−7 + 𝛿) + 𝛾(−4 + 𝛾𝛿))(8(5 + 𝛾 + 6𝛿) + 6𝐴(2 + 𝛾)(−4
+ (−4 + 𝛾()𝛿) + 𝛿(2(16 − 7𝛾)𝛾 + (8 + 𝛾(24 + 𝛾(−14 + 3(−4
+ 𝛾)𝛾)))𝛿)))/(36(2 + 𝛾)((2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)()) 
 Change in environmental damage: 
∆DÖ∗ = DÎÖ∗ − DÖ∗
= −(((6𝐴(2 + 𝛾) − 2(7 − 𝛿) − 𝛾(4 − 𝛾𝛿))(2 − 14𝛿 + 𝛾(4 + 5𝛾𝛿) + 3𝐴(2
+ 𝛾)(2 + (2 + 𝛾((−2 + 𝛿) − 2𝛿)𝛿))𝜃)/(18(2 + 𝛾)((2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)()) 
The change in two-time period social welfare: 
∆SW-∗ = SW.-∗ − SW-∗ = ((6𝐴(2 + 𝛾) − 2(7 − 𝛿) − 𝛾(4 − 𝛾𝛿))(40𝛿( + 𝛾𝛿(−8(7 +
3𝛿) + 𝛾(26 − 22𝛿 + 3𝛾(4 + (4 + 𝛾)𝛿))) − 8(11 + 4𝛾 + 6𝛿 − 𝜃) − 56𝛿𝜃 + 4𝛾(4 + 5𝛾𝛿)𝜃 +
6𝐴(2 + 𝛾)(4(1 + 𝜃) + 𝛿(4 − 4(−1 + 𝛿)𝜃 + 𝛾((−1 + 2(−2 + 𝛿)𝜃)))))/	(72(2 + 𝛾)((2 + (2 −
𝛾()𝛿)() 
The 𝜃∗ is the critical value of the environmental damage derived from the inequality below:  
𝜃∗ = (88 + 32𝛾 + 48𝛿 − 2𝛾(7 + 2𝛾)(−4 + 3𝛾)𝛿 + (−40 + 𝛾(24 + 𝛾(22 − 3𝛾(4 + 𝛾))))𝛿(
+ 6𝐴(2 + 𝛾)(−4 + (−4 + 𝛾()𝛿))/(8 − 56𝛿 + 4𝛾(4 + 5𝛾𝛿) + 12𝐴(2 + 𝛾)(2 + (2
+ 𝛾((−2 + 𝛿) − 2𝛿)𝛿)) 
 
Subsections26 𝟑 − 𝟒:	 𝟖%𝜸(𝟐\𝜸)
𝟐(𝟒%𝜸𝟐)
< 𝑨 ≤ 2}$
M
+ (%E
((M%EF)
. 
 
Under the horizontal separation, I got:  
I period:	𝑞$$
∗ = 𝑞($
∗ =
q%}q%(E%Mz(%EF|&
\M((%EF)&
;	𝑃$∗ = 1 −
q\z(\(E%MEF|&
\M((%EF)&
 
II period:	𝑞$(
∗ = 𝑞((
∗ = $%((%E)&
\M((%EF)&
; 𝑧M(
∗ = %(E\&%qE&%E
F&
((\(&%EF&)
; 		𝑃(∗ =
q\´&\E³&\EF((\q&)%(E(M\®&)
((\((%EF)&)
 
Two-time period consumer surplus, producer surplus and the social welfare: 
 
26 Within the parameter range 	´%E((\E)
((q%EF)
< 𝐴 ≤ 1 and 1 < 𝐴 ≤ (q%E(\qE\E((%E)&))
(M%EF)
, the sales strategies 
for period 1 and 2 of the fossil fuel oligopoly and monopoly, both given the entry,  would not change. 
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 	PSÎÖÌ =
$
M(%(\(%(\EF)&)F
(32 + 𝛿(4 + 80𝛾 + 40𝛿 − 36𝐴((4 − 3𝛾( + (−2 + 𝛾()(𝛿) + 12𝐴(24 −
2𝛾(6 + 5𝛾) + (24 + (−2 + 𝛾)𝛾(6 + 𝛾(10 + 3𝛾)))𝛿) + 𝛿(68𝛿 + 𝛾(−80𝛿 − 𝛾(4(1 + 𝛿) + 3𝛾(8 +
(−8 + 𝛾)𝛿)))))) 
ΠÎÖ∗ =
4 − (8 − 4𝛾 + 9𝐴(4 − 𝛾 − 𝛾( − 𝐴(2 − 𝛾()))𝛿 + (2 − 𝛾)(𝛿(
18 + 9(2 − 𝛾()𝛿  
𝐶𝑆ÎÖ∗
=
64 + (116 + 88𝛾 − 108𝛾()𝛿 + 4(38 + 18𝛾 − 35𝛾( − 9𝛾M + 9𝛾q)𝛿( + (100 − 16𝛾 − 92𝛾( + 24𝛾M + 9𝛾q)𝛿M
72(2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)(  
𝑆𝑊ÎÖ∗ =
1
72 (32 + 11𝛿 − 16𝛿
( − 64(1 − 𝛿)(𝜃) 
Under the horizontal integration I got: 
I period:	𝑞$$
∗ = $
(
; 𝑃$∗ =
$
(
;  
II period:𝑞$(
∗ = $
(\E
; 𝑃(∗ =
$
(\E
; 𝑧((
∗ = $
(\E
;		 
Two-time period consumer surplus, producer surplus and the social welfare: 
𝐶𝑆Ö∗ =
1
8 +
(1 + 𝛾)𝛿
(2 + 𝛾)(  
𝑃𝑆Ö∗ =
1
4 +
2𝛿
(2 + 𝛾)( 
	ΠÖ∗ =
1
4 +
𝛿
(2 + 𝛾)( 
𝑆𝑊Ö∗ =
12 + 12𝛾 + 3𝛾( + 24𝛿 + 8𝛾𝛿 − (2 + 𝛾)(2 + 𝛾 + 4𝐴𝛿)𝜃
8(2 + 𝛾)(  
The change in the consumer surplus: 
∆𝐶𝑆Ö∗ = 𝐶𝑆ÎÖ∗ − 𝐶𝑆Ö∗
= (28(2 + 𝛾)( − 4(172 − 6𝐴𝛾(2 + 𝛾)((3 + 2𝛾) + 9𝐴((2 + 𝛾)((−4 + 3𝛾()
+ 𝛾(156 + 𝛾(21 + 𝛾(8 + 3𝛾))))𝛿 + (−688(1 + 𝛾) + 36𝐴((2 + 𝛾)((−2 + 𝛾()(
− 12𝐴𝛾(2 + 𝛾)((−6 + 𝛾(4 + 𝛾)) + 𝛾((612 − 𝛾(−544 + 𝛾(44 + 60𝛾
+ 9𝛾())))𝛿( + (2 + 𝛾()(56 + 𝛾(24 + 𝛾(−50 + 3𝛾(−4
+ 3𝛾))))𝛿M)/(72(2 + 𝛾)((−2 + (−2 + 𝛾()𝛿)()	 
 
 The change in the profit of the merged firm: 
∆ΠÖ∗ = ΠÎÖ∗ − ΠÖ∗
= −(2(2 + 𝛾)( + (136(2 + 𝛾) − 36𝐴((2 + 𝛾)((−2 + 𝛾() + 36𝐴(2 + 𝛾)((−4 + 𝛾
+ 𝛾() − 𝛾((50 + 𝛾(52 + 9𝛾)))𝛿 − 4(−2 + 𝛾( + 𝛾q)𝛿()/(36(2 + 𝛾)((2 + (2
− 𝛾()𝛿)) 
 The total producer surplus: 
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∆PSÖ∗ = PSÎÖ∗ − PSÖ∗
= (−4(2 + 𝛾)( + 4(−140 + 9𝐴((2 + 𝛾)((−4 + 3𝛾() − 6𝐴(2 + 𝛾)((−12 + 𝛾(6
+ 5𝛾)) + 𝛾(12 + 𝛾(99 + 𝛾(56 + 9𝛾))))𝛿 + (−560 − 36𝐴((2 + 𝛾)((−2 + 𝛾()(
+ 12𝐴(2 + 𝛾)((24 + (−2 + 𝛾)𝛾(6 + 𝛾(10 + 3𝛾))) + 𝛾(16 + 𝛾(420 − 𝛾(−32
+ 𝛾(10 + 3𝛾)())))𝛿( − (2 + 𝛾()(8 + 𝛾(24 + 𝛾(−14 + 3(−4 + 𝛾)𝛾)))𝛿M) 
 Change in environmental damage: 
∆DÖ∗ = DÎÖ∗ − DÖ∗
=
1
24 (+
4(4 − (4 − 2𝛾 − 3𝐴(2 − 𝛾())𝛿)(
3(2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)( −
8𝐴𝛿(2 − 3𝐴 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿)
2 − (2 − 𝛾()𝛿 − 3
−
12𝐴𝛿
2 + 𝛾)𝜃 
The change in two-time period social welfare: 
∆SW-∗ = SW.-∗ − SW-∗
= (3𝛾𝛿((−9 + 24𝐴 + 𝛿 + 3𝜃 − 12𝐴((1 + 𝜃)) + 8𝛾M𝛿(52 + 76𝛿 − 26𝜃 − 18𝛿𝜃
+ 18𝐴((3 + 4𝛿 + 6𝛿𝜃) − 3𝐴(41 + 59𝛿 − 16𝜃 + 24𝛿𝜃)) + 12𝛾®𝛿((−15 + 𝛿
+ 3𝜃 − 12𝐴((1 + 𝜃) + 𝐴(31 + (4 + 𝛿)𝜃)) + 4𝛾q𝛿(15 − 61𝛿 − 4𝛿( − 9𝜃 − 4𝛿𝜃
+ 9𝐴((3 + 2𝛿𝜃) + 6𝐴(4(−2 + 𝜃) + 𝛿(𝜃 + 2𝛿(5 + 𝜃))) − 16𝛾(−5 + 7𝜃 + 3𝛿M(1
+ 𝐴𝜃) + 𝛿(33 + 15𝐴(−6 + 𝜃) − 34𝜃 + 36𝐴((1 + 𝜃)) + 𝛿((41 − 9𝜃 + 36𝐴((1
+ 2𝜃) − 18𝐴(5 + 3𝜃))) − 16(−5 + 7𝜃 + 𝛿M(−5 + 6𝐴𝜃) + 𝛿(113 + 6𝐴(−24
+ 𝜃) − 50𝜃 + 36𝐴((1 + 𝜃)) + 𝛿((113 + 7𝜃 + 36𝐴((1 + 2𝜃) − 12𝐴(12 + 7𝜃)))
− 4𝛾((−5 + 𝛿M + 7𝜃 + 𝛿(−177 + 𝐴(264 − 72𝜃) + 36𝐴((−2 + 𝜃) + 50𝜃)
− 𝛿((363 + 5𝜃 + 36𝐴((3 + 4𝜃) − 24𝐴(19
+ 9𝜃))))/(72(2 + 𝛾)((−2 + (−2 + 𝛾()𝛿)() 
The 𝜃∗	is the critical value of the environmental damage derived from the inequality below: 
 where:  
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𝜃∗ = (20(2 + 𝛾)( + 4(−452 + 9𝐴((2 + 𝛾)((−4 + 3𝛾() − 6𝐴(2 + 𝛾)((−24 + 𝛾(9 + 8𝛾))
+ 𝛾(−132 + 𝛾(3 + 𝛾)(59 + 15𝛾)))𝛿 − (1808 + 36𝐴((2 + 𝛾)((−2 + 𝛾()(
− 12𝐴(2 + 𝛾)((48 + 𝛾(−18 + 𝛾(−32 + 𝛾(7 + 6𝛾)))) + 𝛾(656 + 𝛾(−1452
+ 𝛾(−608 + 𝛾(244 + 9𝛾(20 + 3𝛾))))))𝛿( + (2 + 𝛾()(40 + 𝛾(−24 + 𝛾(−22
+ 3𝛾(4 + 𝛾))))𝛿M)/((2 + 𝛾)(28(2 + 𝛾) + 4(36𝐴((2 + 𝛾) + (2 + 𝛾)(−50 + 𝛾(16
+ 9𝛾)) + 12𝐴(1 − 2𝛾(−1 + 𝛾(2 + 𝛾))))𝛿 + (36𝐴((−2 + 𝛾)(2 + 𝛾)((−2 + 𝛾()
− (2 + 𝛾)(2 + 𝛾(−4 + 3𝛾))(−14 + 𝛾(4 + 3𝛾)) − 48𝐴(14 + 𝛾(2 + 𝛾(−10 + (−1
+ 𝛾)𝛾))))𝛿( − 12𝐴(−4 + 𝛾q)𝛿M)) 
 
Subsection 5:	𝟐z𝟑%𝜸
𝟐|\𝟑(𝟐%𝜸)
𝟔(𝟑%𝜸𝟐)
< 𝑨 ≤ 𝟒
𝟑
 
 
Under the horizontal separation, I got:  
I period:	𝑞$$
∗ = 𝑞($
∗ = $
M
;	𝑃$∗ =
$
M
 
II period: 𝑞$(
∗ = $
(\E
; 𝑃(∗ =
$
(\E
; 𝑧((
∗ = $
(\E
;		 
 	PSÎÖ∗ =
(
¬
+ ($·%(µE\E
F)&
q(M%EF)F
 
	ΠÎÖ∗ =
(2 − 𝛾)(𝛿 − 2(2 − 𝛾 + 𝐴(−3 + 𝛾())(5 − 𝛾(1 + 𝛾) + 𝐴(−3 + 𝛾())
2(3 − 𝛾()(  
𝐶𝑆ÎÖ∗ =
16𝛾q − 36𝛾𝛿 + 72𝛾M𝛿 − 12𝛾((8 + 15𝛿) + 9(16 + 25𝛿)
72(−3 + 𝛾()(  
𝑆𝑊ÎÖ∗ =
1
72(3 − 𝛾()( (9(32 + 59𝛿 − 16𝜃) + 4(3𝛾
((𝛿(−6 + 𝜃) + 8(−2 + 𝜃)) − 6𝛾M𝛿(−3 + 𝜃)
− 4𝛾q(−2 + 𝜃) − 72𝛿𝜃 + 9𝛾𝛿(−11 + 6𝜃))) 
Under the horizontal integration I got: 
I period:	𝑞$$
∗ = $
(
; 𝑃$∗ =
$
(
;  
II period:𝑞$(
∗ = $
(\E
; 𝑃(∗ =
$
(\E
; 𝑧((
∗ = $
(\E
;		 
Two-time period consumer surplus, producer surplus and the social welfare: 
𝐶𝑆Ö∗ =
1
8 +
(1 + 𝛾)𝛿
(2 + 𝛾)(  
𝑃𝑆Ö∗ =
1
4 +
2𝛿
(2 + 𝛾)( 
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	ΠÖ∗ =
1
4 +
𝛿
(2 + 𝛾)( 
𝑆𝑊Ö∗ =
12 + 12𝛾 + 3𝛾( + 24𝛿 + 8𝛾𝛿 − (2 + 𝛾)(2 + 𝛾 + 4𝐴𝛿)𝜃
8(2 + 𝛾)(  
The change in the consumer surplus: 
∆𝐶𝑆Ö∗ = 𝐶𝑆ÎÖ∗ − 𝐶𝑆Ö∗
=
28𝛾® + 7𝛾 + 252(1 + 𝛿) + 36𝛾(7 + 3𝛿) − 12𝛾M(14 + 3𝛿) − 2𝛾q(7 − 18𝛿) − 3𝛾((35 + 69𝛿)
72(2 + 𝛾)((3 − 𝛾()( 	 
The change in the profit of the merged firm: 
∆ΠÖ∗ = ΠÎÖ∗ − ΠÖ∗ = −
(2 + 𝛾)((7 − 𝛾(2 + 𝛾) − 2𝐴(3 − 𝛾())( + 2(2 − 4𝛾( + 𝛾q)𝛿
4(2 + 𝛾)((3 − 𝛾()(  
 The producer surplus: 
∆PSÖ∗ = PSÎÖ∗ − PSÖ∗ = −
36𝛾 − 24𝛾M + 4𝛾® + 𝛾 + 36(1 + 𝛿) − 2𝛾q(1 − 9𝛿) − 3𝛾((5 + 24𝛿)
36(2 + 𝛾)((3 − 𝛾()(  
 Change in environmental damage: 
∆DÖ∗ = DÎÖ∗ − DÖ∗ =
1
72 (7 −
18(4 + 𝛾)𝛿
(2 + 𝛾)( +
12(2 − 𝛾)(12 − 3𝛾 − 2𝛾()𝛿
(3 − 𝛾()( )𝜃 
The change in two-time period social welfare: 
∆SW-∗ = SW.-∗ − SW-∗
=
1
72(2 + 𝛾)((3 − 𝛾()( (5(−1 + 𝛾)𝛾(3 + 𝛾)(−12 + (−1 + 𝛾)𝛾(3 + 𝛾))
+ 9𝛾(−12 + 𝛾(−5 + 4𝛾))𝛿 + 36(5 + 5𝛿 − 7𝜃) − (7(−1 + 𝛾)𝛾(3 + 𝛾)(−12
+ (−1 + 𝛾)𝛾(3 + 𝛾)) + 6(84 + 𝛾(21 + 𝛾(−32 + 𝛾(−10 + 𝛾(2 + 𝛾)))))𝛿)𝜃) 
The 𝜃∗ is the critical value of the environmental damage derived from the inequality below: 
 where:  
𝜃∗ =
5(2 + 𝛾)((−3 + 𝛾()( + 9(20 + 𝛾(−12 + 𝛾(−5 + 4𝛾)))𝛿
7(2 + 𝛾)((−3 + 𝛾()( + 6(84 + 𝛾(21 + 𝛾(−32 + 𝛾(−10 + 𝛾(2 + 𝛾)))))𝛿 
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Appendix 4 
Supplementary material: Standard’s analysis. 
 
The aim of this Appendix is to compare welfare under the two standards.  
Lemma 1. The change in social welfare of the merger under the welfare standard: 
∆𝑆𝑊∗ =  ∆𝑆𝑊Ö
∗ = ∆𝐶𝑆Ö∗ + ∆𝑃𝑆Ö∗ − ∆𝐷Ö∗ > 0	𝑖𝑓	𝜃 > 𝜃0
∆𝑆𝑊ÎÖ∗ = ∆𝐶𝑆ÎÖ∗ + ∆𝑃𝑆ÎÖ∗ − ∆𝐷ÎÖ∗ > 0		𝑖𝑓	𝜃 < 𝜃0
 
The lemma 1 shows that the social welfare standard would be able to capture the damage 
generated by the economic activity to the environment. It can evaluate whether the merger should block 
or allowed for the firms, which supply the product, generating  negative externalities.  
If the environmental damage is high, then, the Agency would allow the merger, however, if the 
environmental damage is insufficient, then it is beneficial for the society to block the merger of the fossil 
fuel firms in period 1.  
Lemma 2. The consumer surplus standard does not capture the environmental concern: 
 ∆𝐶𝑆Ö∗ < 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛	∆𝑆𝑊ÎÖ∗ = 
∆𝐶𝑆ÎÖ∗ + ∆𝑃𝑆 − ∆𝐷ÎÖ∗ < 0	𝑖𝑓	𝜃 > 𝜃0
∆𝐶𝑆ÎÖ∗ + ∆𝑃𝑆ÎÖ∗ − ∆𝐷ÎÖ∗ > 0		𝑖𝑓	𝜃 < 𝜃0
 
The welfare after the merger would be higher given that the fossil fuel firms would decrease 
the supply and disregarding the decrease of the consumer surplus. In the case when the agency would 
follow the consumer surplus standard, it would not allow, the social welfare would not maximize, and 
the negative externalities would further rise. 
Proposition. For any 𝜽 > 𝜽,∗, the social welfare decreasing under consumer surplus 
standard and increasing under the welfare standard. 
 As seen from the Lemma 1 and 2, the welfare standard would outperform the consumer surplus 
standard for the special case when the firms sell the product which generates negative externalities. 
Therefore, the merger in the oil and gas industries in case of the high environmental damage should be 
approved if and only if it would decrease the concentration in the industry and would not bring the 
synergies in costs saving. Otherwise, it would, in opposite, provoke the Green paradox, increase of 
current extraction and worsen the environmental concern. 
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Appendix 5 
 
Supplementary material: Merger of the fossil fuel firms given no Green paradox.  
 
The rationale of this analysis is that if the goods generated the negative environmental 
externalities, the merger might be beneficial for the society even without the green paradox. Therefore, 
I need to separate the green paradox out of the environmental concern and in this regard, I would show 
how the emergence of the green paradox would bring more incentive for the antirust policies to allow 
the merger for the goods, generated the negative externalities.     
For doing this I need to show when the merger would be preferable or not for the society without 
green paradox. The detailed results shown below.  
The summary of the results stated that merger might be beneficial for the society if and only if 
the 𝜃 > 𝜃∗P,otherwise the merger decreases the social welfare, where 𝜃∗P – the threshold under no 
anticipation of the entry.  
Now I can compare the obtained results of the merger with and without green paradox. The 
graph 1 below shows the simulation results for the environmental threshold parameter, under which the 
merger would be preferable to allow for the case with and without green paradox. The line in italics 
represents the values the environmental threshold takes without the entry of the new energy.  
Proposition. Under the 𝜽∗ < 𝜽∗P, it is stated that the phenomenon of the green paradox 
generates comparatively larger negative externalities and the merger is beneficial in order to 
mitigate the negative effect of the green paradox in a region where 𝟏 < 𝑨 < 𝟒
𝟑
. 
Proof.  
The areas when the B and C represents how the green paradox changes the perception towards 
the merger. At area B, the merger under the green paradox is less beneficial until the 𝐴 < 1. The 
competition, in that case, is more preferable for any 𝜃∗P < 𝜃 < 𝜃∗. The prices would be lower, the 
consumer surplus would be larger. The total damage would still be higher under the duopoly; however, 
it would be offsite by the rise of consumer and producer’s surpluses.  
 
Graph 1. The effect of the green paradox on the change of environmental threshold. 
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𝛿 = 0.5 
 
 
At stage 1 < 𝐴 ≤ q
M
, the duopoly would extract larger amount of the resource in both periods 
compare to the merged firms. The environmental damage would larger in each period, and therefore, in 
total. The green paradox under monopoly, in opposite, would be beneficial for the society as long as the 
resources are not binding for the fossil fuel monopolist as we defined in previous chapter. 
In sum, the merger given the green paradox would be more beneficial than without the green 
paradox as long as the A > 1. 
 
Detailed derivations for the analysis: 
Resource availability:	𝟐
𝟑
(𝟏 − 𝜹) < 𝑨 ≤ 𝟏 
Under the horizontal separation, I got:  
I period:	𝑞$$
∗ = 𝑞($
∗ = (%(&\M^&
\&
;	𝑃$∗ =
$\®&%M^&
M\M&
 
II period: 𝑞$(
∗ = 𝑞((
∗ = (%(&\M^&
\&
; 𝑃(∗ =
®%M^\&
M\M&
;  
 	PSÎÖ∗ =
(%q&\$´^&%¬^F&\(&F
¬\¬&
 
𝐶𝑆ÎÖ∗ =
4 + 𝛿(−8 + 9𝐴( + 4𝛿)
18(1 + 𝛿)  
𝑆𝑊ÎÖ∗ = −
1
18(1 + 𝛿)( (4(−2 + 𝜃) + 𝛿
M(−8 + 6𝐴𝜃) + 𝛿(8 + 6𝐴(−6 + 𝜃) − 8𝜃 + 9𝐴((1 + 𝜃))
+ 𝛿((4(2 + 𝜃) − 12𝐴(3 + 𝜃) + 9𝐴((1 + 2𝜃))) 
0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
A
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.2
B 
𝜃∗ 
C 
𝜃∗P 
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Under the horizontal integration I got: 
I period:	𝑞$$
∗ = $%&\(^&
(($\&)
; 𝑃$∗ =
$\M&%(^&
(\(&
;  
II period:𝑞$(
∗ = (^%$\&
(($\&)
; 𝑃(∗ =
M%(^\&
(\(&
;  
Two-time period consumer surplus, producer surplus and the social welfare: 
𝐶𝑆Ö∗ =
1 − 2𝛿 + 4𝐴(𝛿 + 𝛿(
8 + 8𝛿  
𝑃𝑆Ö∗ =
1 + 𝛿(4(2 − 𝐴)𝐴 − 2 + 𝛿)
4(1 + 𝛿)  
𝑆𝑊Ö∗ =
(1 + 𝛿)(3 + 4(4 − 𝐴)𝐴𝛿 − 3(2 − 𝛿)𝛿) − (1 + 𝛿(−2 + 𝛿 + 2𝐴((1 − 𝛿)( + 𝐴(2 + 4𝛿))))𝜃
8(1 + 𝛿)(  
The change in the consumer surplus: 
∆𝐶𝑆Ö∗ = 𝐶𝑆ÎÖ∗ − 𝐶𝑆Ö∗ =
7(1 − 𝛿)(
72(1 + 𝛿)	 
 The producer surplus: 
∆PSÖ∗ = PSÎÖ∗ − PSÖ∗ = −
(1 − 𝛿)(
36(1 + 𝛿) 
 Change in environmental damage: 
∆DÖ∗ = DÎÖ∗ − DÖ∗ =
(1 − 𝛿)((7 + 6𝐴𝛿)𝜃
72(1 + 𝛿)(  
The change in two-time period social welfare: 
∆SW-∗ = SW.-∗ − SW-∗ =
(1 − 𝛿)((5(−7𝜃 + 𝛿(5(−6𝐴𝜃))
72(1 + 𝛿)(  
The 𝜃∗ is the critical value of the environmental damage derived from the inequality below: 
 where:  
𝜃∗ =
5(1 + 𝛿)
7 + 6𝐴𝛿  
 
Resource availability:	𝟏 < 𝑨 ≤ 𝟒
𝟑
. 
 
Under the horizontal separation, I got:  
I period:	𝑞$$
∗ = 𝑞($
∗ = $
M
;	𝑃$∗ =
$
M
 
II period: 𝑞$(
∗ = $
(\E
; 𝑃(∗ =
$
(\E
; 𝑧((
∗ = $
(\E
;		 
 	PSÎÖ∗ =
(
¬
+ ($·%(µE\E
F)&
q(M%EF)F
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	ΠÎÖ∗ =
(2 − 𝛾)(𝛿 − 2(2 − 𝛾 + 𝐴(−3 + 𝛾())(5 − 𝛾(1 + 𝛾) + 𝐴(−3 + 𝛾())
2(3 − 𝛾()(  
𝐶𝑆ÎÖ∗ =
16𝛾q − 36𝛾𝛿 + 72𝛾M𝛿 − 12𝛾((8 + 15𝛿) + 9(16 + 25𝛿)
72(−3 + 𝛾()(  
𝑆𝑊ÎÖ∗ =
1
72(3 − 𝛾()( (9(32 + 59𝛿 − 16𝜃) + 4(3𝛾
((𝛿(−6 + 𝜃) + 8(−2 + 𝜃)) − 6𝛾M𝛿(−3 + 𝜃)
− 4𝛾q(−2 + 𝜃) − 72𝛿𝜃 + 9𝛾𝛿(−11 + 6𝜃))) 
Under the horizontal integration I got: 
I period:	𝑞$$
∗ = $
(
; 𝑃$∗ =
$
(
;  
II period:𝑞$(
∗ = $
(\E
; 𝑃(∗ =
$
(\E
; 𝑧((
∗ = $
(\E
;		 
Two-time period consumer surplus, producer surplus and the social welfare: 
𝐶𝑆Ö∗ =
1
8 +
(1 + 𝛾)𝛿
(2 + 𝛾)(  
𝑃𝑆Ö∗ =
1
4 +
2𝛿
(2 + 𝛾)( 
	ΠÖ∗ =
1
4 +
𝛿
(2 + 𝛾)( 
𝑆𝑊Ö∗ =
12 + 12𝛾 + 3𝛾( + 24𝛿 + 8𝛾𝛿 − (2 + 𝛾)(2 + 𝛾 + 4𝐴𝛿)𝜃
8(2 + 𝛾)(  
The change in the consumer surplus: 
∆𝐶𝑆Ö∗ = 𝐶𝑆ÎÖ∗ − 𝐶𝑆Ö∗
=
28𝛾® + 7𝛾 + 252(1 + 𝛿) + 36𝛾(7 + 3𝛿) − 12𝛾M(14 + 3𝛿) − 2𝛾q(7 − 18𝛿) − 3𝛾((35 + 69𝛿)
72(2 + 𝛾)((3 − 𝛾()( 	 
The change in the profit of the merged firm: 
∆ΠÖ∗ = ΠÎÖ∗ − ΠÖ∗ = −
(2 + 𝛾)((7 − 𝛾(2 + 𝛾) − 2𝐴(3 − 𝛾())( + 2(2 − 4𝛾( + 𝛾q)𝛿
4(2 + 𝛾)((3 − 𝛾()(  
 The producer surplus: 
∆PSÖ∗ = PSÎÖ∗ − PSÖ∗ = −
36𝛾 − 24𝛾M + 4𝛾® + 𝛾 + 36(1 + 𝛿) − 2𝛾q(1 − 9𝛿) − 3𝛾((5 + 24𝛿)
36(2 + 𝛾)((3 − 𝛾()(  
 Change in environmental damage: 
∆DÖ∗ = DÎÖ∗ − DÖ∗ =
1
72 (7 −
18(4 + 𝛾)𝛿
(2 + 𝛾)( +
12(2 − 𝛾)(12 − 3𝛾 − 2𝛾()𝛿
(3 − 𝛾()( )𝜃 
The change in two-time period social welfare: 
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∆SW-∗ = SW.-∗ − SW-∗
=
1
72(2 + 𝛾)((3 − 𝛾()( (5(−1 + 𝛾)𝛾(3 + 𝛾)(−12 + (−1 + 𝛾)𝛾(3 + 𝛾))
+ 9𝛾(−12 + 𝛾(−5 + 4𝛾))𝛿 + 36(5 + 5𝛿 − 7𝜃) − (7(−1 + 𝛾)𝛾(3 + 𝛾)(−12
+ (−1 + 𝛾)𝛾(3 + 𝛾)) + 6(84 + 𝛾(21 + 𝛾(−32 + 𝛾(−10 + 𝛾(2 + 𝛾)))))𝛿)𝜃) 
The 𝜃∗is the critical value of the environmental damage derived from the inequality below: 
 where:  
𝜃∗ =
5(2 + 𝛾)((−3 + 𝛾()( + 9(20 + 𝛾(−12 + 𝛾(−5 + 4𝛾)))𝛿
7(2 + 𝛾)((−3 + 𝛾()( + 6(84 + 𝛾(21 + 𝛾(−32 + 𝛾(−10 + 𝛾(2 + 𝛾)))))𝛿 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 115 
Tables  
Table 1. Monopoly’s equilibrium output.  
Parameter conditions Period I Period II 
𝐴 ≤
(1 − 𝛿)
2  
q$∗
P = 𝐴 q(∗
P = 0 
(1 − 𝛿)
2 < 𝐴 ≤ 1 q$
∗P =
(1 − 𝛿) + 2δ𝐴
2(1 + 𝛿)  q(
∗P =
2A − (1 − 𝛿)
2(1 + 𝛿)  
𝐴 > 1 q$∗
P =
1
2 q(
∗P =
1
2 
 
 
Table 2. 2nd period equilibrium outcomes. 
 𝑇$ q$( 𝑧(( Π((q$() Π((𝑧(() 
1. ≥
2 − 𝛾
4 − 𝛾( 
2 − 𝛾
4 − 𝛾( 
2 − 𝛾
4 − 𝛾( 
(2 − 𝛾)(
(4 − 𝛾()( 
(2 − 𝛾)(
(4 − 𝛾()( 
2. <
2 − 𝛾
4 − 𝛾( 
𝑇$ (1 − 𝛾𝑇$)
2  
𝜈$ 𝜈( 
 𝜈$ = 𝑇$(1 − 𝑇$ −
1
2 𝛾(1 − 𝑇$𝛾)) 
𝜈( =
1
4 (1 − 2𝑇$𝛾 + 𝑇$
(𝛾() 
 
Table 3. Equilibrium outcomes. 
 Intertemporal resource 
constraint 
Period I Period II 
1. 
 
𝐴 ≤
1
4 (2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿) 
q$$
∗ = 𝐴 q$(
∗ = 0, 𝑧((
∗ =
1
2 
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2. 
 
1
4 (2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿) 	< 𝐴$ ≤ ?̅?
 q$
$∗
=
2 − (2 − 𝛾) − 2𝐴(2 − 𝛾())𝛿
4 + 2(2 − 𝛾()𝛿  
q$(
∗ =
4𝐴 − 2(1 − 𝛿) − 𝛾𝛿
2(2 + 2𝛿 − 𝛾(𝛿)  
𝑧((
∗ = 𝛽$ 
3. 
 
?̅? ≤ 𝐴 ≤
4 + 𝛾
2(2 + 𝛾) q$
$∗ = 𝐴 −
1
2 + 𝛾 q$
(∗ =
1
2 + 𝛾 
𝑧((
∗ =
1
2 + 𝛾 
4. 
 
𝐴 >
4 + 𝛾
2(2 + 𝛾) q$
$∗ =
1
2 q$
(∗ =
1
2 + 𝛾, 
𝑧(( =
1
2 + 𝛾 
 Explanations of the symbols. 
?̅? =
16 − 𝛾(2(2 + 𝛾) + 𝛾(2 − 𝛾)𝛿))
4(4 − 𝛾()  
𝛽$ =
4 − 2(1 − 2𝐴$)𝛾 − (4 − 𝛾(2 + 𝛾))𝛿
4(2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)  
  
Table 3.1. The change in the first period output 
Resource constraint The 1st period output change 
0 < 𝐴 ≤
1
4 (2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿) 
3oWW
∗
3í
= &
q
> 0, 	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑎𝑛𝑦	0 < 𝛿 < 1 
1
4 (2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿) < 𝐴
≤
16 − 𝛾(2(2 + 𝛾) + 𝛾(2 − 𝛾)𝛿))
4(4 − 𝛾()  
∂q$$
∗
∂γ =
𝛿(2(1 + 𝛿) + 𝛾(4 − 8𝐴 + (−4 + 𝛾)𝛿))
2(−2 + (−2 + 𝛾()𝛿)(
> 0	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑎𝑛𝑦	0 < 𝛿 < 1 
16 − 𝛾(2(2 + 𝛾) + 𝛾(2 − 𝛾)𝛿))
4(4 − 𝛾() < 𝐴 ≤
4 + 𝛾
2(2 + 𝛾) 
∂q$$
∗
∂γ = 	
1
(2 + 𝛾)( < 0	 
4 + 𝛾
2(2 + 𝛾) < 𝐴 
∂q$$
∗
∂γ = 0 
 
Table 4. The change of the supply of the fossil fuel firm under the anticipation of the 
entry of the new energy. 
Resource constraint The 1st period output change 
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0 < 𝐴 ≤
(1 − 𝛿)
2  
𝑑q$$
∗ = 0 
(1 − 𝛿)
2 < 𝐴 ≤
1
4 (2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿) 
𝑑q$$
∗ =
𝛾𝛿
4(1 + 𝛿) > 0	𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝛾 > 0, 𝛿 > 0 
1
4 (2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿) < 𝐴
≤
16 − 𝛾(2(2 + 𝛾) + 𝛾(2 − 𝛾)𝛿))
4(4 − 𝛾()  
𝑑q$$
∗ =
𝛾𝛿(1 + 𝛿 + 𝛾(1 − 2𝐴 − 𝛿))
2(1 + 𝛿)(2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿) > 0	𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝛾 > 0, 𝛿 > 0 
16 − 𝛾(2(2 + 𝛾) + 𝛾(2 − 𝛾)𝛿))
4(4 − 𝛾()
< 𝐴 ≤
4 + 𝛾
2(2 + 𝛾) 
𝑑q$$
∗ =
(2 + 𝛾)(2𝐴 − (1 + 𝛿)) − 2(1 + 𝛿)
2(2 + 𝛾)(1 + 𝛿) > 0	𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝛾 > 0, 𝛿 > 0 
4 + 𝛾
2(2 + 𝛾) < 𝐴 ≤ 1 𝑑q$
$∗ =
𝛾𝛿
(4 + 2𝛾)(1 + 𝛿) > 0	𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝛾 > 0, 𝛿 > 0 
𝐴 > 1 𝑑q$$
∗ = 0 
  
Table 5. 2nd period equilibrium outcomes 
 T, T­ 𝑞$ 𝑞( Profit of Firm 1 Profit of Firm 2 
1. >
1
3 >
1
3 
1
3 
1
3 
1
9 
2. ≤
1
3 >
(1 − T,)
2  
T, (1	 − T,)
2  
1
2 (1 − T,)T, 
1
4 (1 − T,)
( 
3. 
>
(1 − T)
2  
≤
1
3 
(1 − T)
2  
T 1
4 (1 − T)
( 
1
2 (1 − T)T 
4. 
≤
(1 − T)
2  
≤
(1 − T,)
2  
T, T T,(1 − T, − T) (1 − T, −	T)T 
 
Table 6. Equilibrium given no entry of renewable energy. 
 Resource capacity Period I Period II 
1. 
 
0 < A ≤
2
3 (1 − 𝛿) 
𝑞,$ = 𝐴, 𝑞,( = 0 
𝑞$ = 𝐴( 𝑞( = 0 
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2. 
 
 
2
3 (1 − 𝛿) < A ≤
4
3 
𝑞,$ =
(1 − 𝛿) + 3𝛿𝐴$
3(1 + 𝛿)  𝑞,
( =
3𝐴$ − (1 − 𝛿)
3(1 + 𝛿)  
𝑞$ =
(1 − 𝛿) + 3𝛿𝐴(
3(1 + 𝛿)  𝑞
$ =
3𝐴( − (1 − 𝛿)
3(1 + 𝛿)  
3.  A >
4
3 𝑞,
$ =
1
3 𝑞,
( =
1
3 
𝑞$ =
1
3 𝑞
$ =
1
3 
  
Table 7. 2nd period equilibrium outcomes 
 T$ T( 𝑧M( 𝑞,( 𝑞( Profit 
of Firm 
I 
Profit 
of Firm 
II 
Profit of clean 
backstop 
1. >
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾() >
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾() 
3 − 2𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾() 
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾() 
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾() 
(2 − 𝛾)(
4(3 − 𝛾()( 
(3 − 2𝛾)(
4(3 − 𝛾()( 
2. ≤
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾() 
> 𝛽$ 2 − 𝛾 − 𝛾T$
4 − 𝛾(  
T$ 𝛽$ 𝛽( 𝛽M (2 − (1 + T$)𝛾)(
(4 − 𝛾()(  
3. > 𝛽q ≤
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾() 
2 − 𝛾 − T(𝛾
4 − 𝛾(  
𝛽q T( 𝛽® 𝛽 𝛽· 
4. ≤ 𝛽q ≤ 𝛽$ 1
2 (1 − 𝛾T$
− 𝛾T() 
T$ T( 𝛽´ 𝛽¬ 1
4 (1 − T$𝛾 − T(𝛾)
( 
 Explanation of the symbols: 
𝛽$ =
1
2 + 𝛾 −
T$(2 − 𝛾()
4 − 𝛾(  
𝛽( =
T$(2 − 𝛾 − T$(2 − 𝛾())
4 − 𝛾(  
𝛽M =
(2 − 𝛾 − T$(2 − 𝛾())(
(4 − 𝛾()(  
𝛽q =
1
2 + 𝛾 −
T((2 − 𝛾()
4 − 𝛾(  
𝛽® =
(2 − 𝛾 − T((2 − 𝛾())(
(4 − 𝛾()(  
𝛽 =
T((2 − 𝛾 − T((2 − 𝛾())
4 − 𝛾(  
𝛽· =
(2 − (1 + T()𝛾)(2 − (1 + T()𝛾)
(4 − 𝛾()(  
𝛽´ = T$(1 − T$ − T( −
1
2𝛾(1 − 𝛾T$ − 𝛾T()) 
𝛽¬ = T((1 − T$ − T( +
1
2𝛾(1 − 𝛾T$ − 𝛾T()) 
 
Table 8. Equilibria given the entry of renewable energy. 
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 Resource constraint Period I Period II 
1. 
 
0 < 𝐴 ≤
1
3 (2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿) 
𝑞$$ = 𝐴$ 𝑞$( = 0 
𝑞($ = 𝐴( 𝑞(( = 0; 𝑧M( =
$
(
 
2. 
 
1
3 (2 − (2 − γ)δ) < A
≤
2(3 − γ() + 3(2 − γ)
6(3 − γ() 	
𝑞$$ =
2 − (2 − 𝛾 + 3𝐴,(2 − 𝛾())𝛿
6 − 3(2 − 𝛾()𝛿  
𝑞$( =
6𝐴, − 2 + 2𝛿 − 𝛾𝛿
3(2 + 2𝛿 − 𝛾(𝛿)  
𝑞($ =
2 − (2 − 𝛾 + 3𝐴,(2 − 𝛾())𝛿
6 − 3(2 − 𝛾()𝛿  
𝑞(( =
6𝐴, − 2 + 2𝛿 − 𝛾𝛿
3(2 + 2𝛿 − 𝛾(𝛿) ; 
𝑧M( = 𝛽$( 
3. 
 
A >
2(3 − γ() + 3(2 − γ)
6(3 − γ() 	
𝑞$$ =
1
3 𝑞$
( =
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾() 
 𝑞($ =
1
3 𝑞(
( =
2 − 𝛾
2(3 − 𝛾() ; 
𝑧M( =
3 − 2𝛾
6 − 2𝛾( 
Explanations of the symbol 
𝛽$( =
6(1 + 𝛿) + 𝛾(4 − 12𝐴$ − (4 + 𝛾)𝛿)
6 − 3(2 − 𝛾()𝛿  
 
Table 9. The relationship between resource availability and the emergence of the Green 
paradox.  
Total resource constraint The 1st period output change 
0 < 𝐴 ≤
1
3 (1 − 𝛿) 
𝑑Q$∗ = 0 
(1 − 𝛿)
3 < 𝐴 ≤
1
3 (2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿) 
𝑑Q$∗ =
3𝐴 − 2(1 − 𝛿)
6(1 + 𝛿) > 0	𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝛾 > 0, 𝛿 > 0 
1
3 (2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿) < 𝐴
≤
2(3 − γ() + 3(2 − γ)
6(3 − γ()  
𝑑Q$∗ =
𝛿(8 − 3𝐴(4 − 𝛾() − 2𝛾((1 − 𝛿) − 8𝛿 + 2𝛾(1 + 𝛿))
6(1 + 𝛿)(2 − (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)
> 0	𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝛾 > 0, 𝛿 > 0 
2(3 − γ() + 3(2 − γ)
6(3 − γ() < 𝐴 ≤
4
3 
𝑑Q$∗ =
(4 − 3𝐴)𝛿
6(1 + 𝛿) > 0	𝑖𝑓𝑓	𝛾 > 0, 𝛿 > 0 
𝐴 >
4
3 
𝑑Q$∗ = 0 
 120 
  
Table 10. The emergence of the Gren paradox under the combination of the different 
resource constraints and the existing market structures. 
  
Table 11. The difference between current extractions given Green paradox and given 
different resource availability. 
 Resource constraint 𝑄$ 𝑄$P 𝑑𝑄$ 
1
. 
 
2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿
4 + 2(2 − 𝛾()𝛿
+
2𝐴(2 − 𝛾())𝛿
4 + 2(2 − 𝛾()𝛿 
(1 − 𝛿) + 2δ𝐴
2(1 + 𝛿)  
𝛾𝛿(1 + 𝛿 + 𝛾(1 − 2𝐴 − 𝛿))
2(1 + 𝛿)(2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)
> 0 
2
. 
16 − 𝛾(2(2 + 𝛾) + 𝛾(2 − 𝛾)𝛿))
4(4 − 𝛾() ≤ 𝐴 ≤
4 + γ
2(2 + γ) 𝐴 −
1
2 + 𝛾 
2𝐴(2 + 𝛾) − 4 − 𝛾(1 − 𝛿)
2(2 + 𝛾)(1 + 𝛿)
> 0 
3
. 
4 + γ
2(2 + γ) < 𝐴 ≤ 1 
1
2 
𝛿 − 𝐴𝛿
1 + 𝛿 > 0 
  
 
The value of the resource constraint 
Green paradox 
Incumbent 
Monopoly 
Incumbent 
Duopoly 
0 < 𝐴 ≤
1
2 (1 − 𝛿) 
- - 
1
2
(1 − 𝛿) < 𝐴 ≤
2
3 (1 − 𝛿) 
+ - 
2
3
(1 − 𝛿) < 𝐴 ≤ 1 + + 
1 < 𝐴 ≤
4
3 
- + 
𝐴 >
4
3 
- - 
The “+” stands for the Green paradox and the “-” – no Green paradox 
$
(
(1 − 𝛿) < 𝐴 ≤ $%E((((\E)\E((%E)&))
q(q%EF)
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Table 12. The comparison of the current extractions of incumbent duopoly given 
resource availability. 
 Resource constraint 𝑄$ 𝑄$
P 𝑑𝑄$ 
1. 
(
M
(1 − δ) ≤ A <
$(%E(M\(E)
M(M%EF)
 
4 − 2(2 − 𝛾)𝛿
6 − 3(2 − 𝛾()𝛿
−
6𝐴(2 − 𝛾())𝛿
6 − 3(2 − 𝛾()𝛿 2
(1 − 𝛿) + 3𝛿𝐴$
3(1 + 𝛿)  
𝛾𝛿(2(1 + 𝛿) + 𝛾(2 − 3𝐴 − 2𝛿))
3(1 + 𝛿)(2 + (2 − 𝛾()𝛿)
> 0 
2. 
12 − 𝛾(3 + 2𝛾)
3(3 − 𝛾() ≤ 𝐴 <
4
3 
2
3 
(4 − 3𝐴)𝛿
6(1 + 𝛿) > 0 
 
Table 13. The resource stock and the incumbent monopoly, duopoly’s 1st period sales 
strategies. 
 A range 
The extraction of 
the Monopoly in 
period 1 
The extraction of Duopoly in 
period 1 
1. 
2
3 (2 − (2 − 𝛾)𝛿) ≤ 𝐴
≤
16 − 𝛾(2(2 + 𝛾) + 𝛾(2 − 𝛾)𝛿))
4(4 − 𝛾()  
𝑄$∗
=
2 − (2 − 𝛾)
4 + 2(2 − 𝛾()𝛿
−
2𝐴(2 − 𝛾())𝛿
4 + 2(2 − 𝛾()𝛿 
𝑄$∗
= 2
2 − (2 − 𝛾 + 3𝐴,(2 − 𝛾())𝛿
6 − 3(2 − 𝛾()𝛿  
2. 
16 − 𝛾(2(2 + 𝛾) + 𝛾(2 − 𝛾)𝛿))
4(4 − 𝛾()
≤ 𝐴
≤
8 − 𝛾(2 + 𝛾)
2(4 − 𝛾()  
𝑄$∗ = 𝐴 −
1
2 + 𝛾 
3. 
8 − 𝛾(2 + 𝛾)
2(4 − 𝛾() < 𝐴 ≤ 1 
𝑄$∗ =
1
2 
4. 1 < 𝐴 ≤
2(3 − 𝛾() + 3(2 − 𝛾)
6(3 − 𝛾()  
5. 
2(3 − 𝛾() + 3(2 − 𝛾)
6(3 − 𝛾() < 𝐴 ≤
4
3 𝑄$
∗ =
2
3 
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6. 𝐴 >
4
3 
𝑄$∗ =
2
3 
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Figures 
 
Graph 1. The Green paradox under the Monopoly and duopoly market structures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Region I – no Green paradox 
Region II – Green paradox 
 
 
 
Graph 1.1. The Green paradox under the monopoly and duopoly market 
structures (given the inclusion of the environmental taxation and positive extraction 
costs). 
 
 
 
 
 
Region I – no Green paradox 
Region II – Green paradox 
 
Graph 2. Change in social welfare depending on amount of discount factor  
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𝛿 = 1 
 
𝛿 = 0.5 
 
 	
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	∆𝑆𝑊 = 𝑆𝑊ÖÐÑ-ÒÓ − 𝑆𝑊ÖÑÔ%ÐÑ-ÒÓ 
 
Graph 3. The schedule of the quantity of output in period 1 with and without Green 
paradox given the discount factor. 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4.a The change in producer surplus given green paradox (incumbent 
monopoly) 
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q(q%EF)
 
16 − 𝛾(2(2 + 𝛾) + 𝛾(2 − 𝛾)𝛿))
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≤ 𝐴 ≤
4 + γ
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Graph 4.b The change in consumer surplus given Green paradox (incumbent 
monopoly) 
𝛿 = 0.8, 𝛾 = 0.6 𝛿 = 0.5, 𝛾 = 0.6 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4.c The change in environmental damage given green paradox (incumbent 
monopoly) 
𝛿 = 0.8, 𝛾 = 0.6 𝛿 = 0.5, 𝛾 = 0.6 
 
 
 
 
  
Graph 4.d The detailed simulations value of the 𝜃-∗ 
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Graph 5.a. The change in producer surplus given Green paradox 
𝛿 = 0.8, 𝛾 = 0.6 𝛿 = 0.5, 𝛾 = 0.6 
  
 
Graph 5.b. The change in consumer surplus given Green paradox 
𝛿 = 0.8, 𝛾 = 0.6 𝛿 = 0.5, 𝛾 = 0.6 
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𝛿 = 0.8, 𝛾 = 0.6 𝛿 = 0.5, 𝛾 = 0.6 
  
 
 
Graph 5.d. The change in social welfare given Green paradox 
𝛿 = 0.8, 𝛾 = 0.6 𝛿 = 0.5, 𝛾 = 0.6 
  
  
Graph 6. The change in the total profit of the merged firm given discount factors and 
parameter of product differentiation. 
𝛿 = 0.5, γ = 0.6 
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Graph 7. Change of the total consumer surplus after the merger of fossil fuel firms. 
𝛿 = 0.5, γ = 0.6 
 
 
 
Graph 8. Change of the total consumer surplus after the merger of fossil fuel firms. 
𝛿 = 0.5, γ = 0.6 
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Graph 9. The change in environmental threshold given resource availability. 
𝛿 = 0.5 
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